Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

MAY, 1916

NOBODY FOR HUGHES

—*BUT THE PEOPLE*

BY THE EDITOR

As for us, our eyes as yet failed for our vain help: in our watching we have watched for a nation that could not save us.—Lamentations, iv: 17.

When not so long ago the Honorable Henry A. Cooper of Racine, Wisconsin, remarked somewhat grimly in the House of Representatives that it would be vastly easier to "stand by the President" if the President himself would stand still, we have to confess that no slight effort was required to suppress a sigh of sympathetic understanding. But now when we pause to contemplate the political happenings of the past two months and compare even the most notable contradictoriness of our President who is, with the astonishing performances of our President who was, we feel as one abruptly transported from the rock of Gibraltar into the heart of a prairie cyclone.

Here only last March we were speculating calmly and quietly upon the prospective marriage of a party having principles but no leader to a party having a leader but no principles. Our Colonel, of course, was the suitor, not humble perhaps but most considerate, most tender, most ingratiating and wholly unselfish,—in truth, to all seeming, a veritable John Alden, speaking not for himself at all but for anybody here named Kelly or Miles (not the General) or Standish or what-not. And then like a bolt from the blue

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came from Trinidad the flashing intimation that Our Hero might be induced to speak for himself if only Priscilla, too, would be heroic.

But the lady shied. No longer a credulous Puritan maid, but fully matured in years and experience, widowed in fact by the hand of an assassin who for the nonce shall be nameless, she did not even hesitate. Thus far (and welcome) but no farther,—this was the firm response. Whereupon our gentle suitor reverted to type, transformed himself into a Cave Man and inaugurated a Campaign of Frightfulness, compared with which Germany's is mildly persuasive. Lord love us! What a world! What a time! What a man!

Two months ago when we were speculating—not predicting, mind you—there was much talk of favorite sons and sons-in-law,—talk, as may be recalled, which struck us as quite fatuous at a time when, more surely perhaps than ever before, a boy ought not to be selected to do a man's work. Hence our suggestion as the most promising combinations, as of the moment, of Root for President and Roosevelt for Senator and of Roosevelt for President and Root for Secretary of State. Although few concurred in this judgment at the time, the consensus of opinion at this writing seems to accord with the view then expressed. Oddly enough, while other minds have been groping to that early tentative conclusion, our own has changed completely as the consequence of an unforeseen development, which presently in due order shall be revealed. In a word, while daring in March only to speculate, we now in May stand ready to predict.

But first let us glimpse the rapidly moving picture. Assuming, as we may assume now with confidence, that the favorite sons previously regarded have flickered out on the film that has disappeared, what do we perceive? Technically the stage is about as dark as a stage can be. That is to say, officially there are no candidates except Mr. du Pont, who stands for Powder, and Mr. Ford, who personifies Peace. Truly, the nomination of both of these opulent citizens, if that were feasible, would make for a clearly defined issue; but probably we are warranted in leaving the favorite of Michigan in the seclusion of his advertising department and the proprietor of Delaware to the tender mercies of the ubiquitary Mr. Ormsby McHarg. There remain then in the luminous limelight, as manipulated with scrupulous impartiality by Mr. Robert Bacon, but two striking figures, the

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one distinguished, the other heroic,—Root and Roosevelt. Nobody else is in sight; and yet—but wait!

"Elihu Root," wrote President Nicholas Murray Butler in beginning the proclamation signed by seventy New York Republicans, "is the ablest living American." This is going far—so far, indeed, as to invite consideration of the relative capacities of many others who have achieved eminence in their respective spheres. But there is no call to make comparisons which might seem to be invidious. What Dr. Butler meant to say was that Mr. Root is the greatest living American statesman,—a simple fact universally recognized. So there need be no analysis or discussion of his qualifications, none of his achievements or experience, none of his fidelity to the interests of the Nation since it became his client sixteen years ago. Mr. Root clearly and beyond question, in the words of the proclamation, "stands pre-eminent among contemporary Americans as a constructive, far-sighted and forward-facing statesman." As a partisan, moreover, not only has he earned the highest reward, but he cannot again be in a position to receive it. He should be nominated. We wish he might be. But we are concerned now, not with preferences nor with proprieties, but with prospects. The real questions are: Do the people want Mr. Root? and Does the Republican party think it could elect him in opposition to Mr. Wilson? Answer the first question and the second may be disregarded.

Whoever says Our Colonel is a candidate is a liar. He is no hill-climber. He is Mahomet. If the Mountain sees fit to come to him, it may bask in the glories of Heaven; if not, it can go to Hell. "I will not enter into any fight for the nomination and I will not permit any factional fight to be made in my behalf. Indeed, I will go further and say that it would be a mistake to nominate me unless the country has in its mood something of the heroic; unless it feels not only like devoting itself to ideals, but to the purpose measurably to realize those ideals in action." This was the Message from Trinidad,—since emphasized and amplified, but in no sense repudiated or shaded. Did not Our Colonel attend the hallowed primary of his party, an enthusiastic gathering of six or maybe seven, and declare positively that he was still a Progressive and that, whatever else one might find to his disfavor, nobody yet had questioned his Americanism? He did, indeed, and with a warranted assurance, too, that

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not everybody in public life—we have nobody in particular in mind—could justify by a mere inquiry.

Then three days later came the wonderful interview, the *most* wonderful interview we have ever read. It was wholly impromptu, of course—i. e., constructed on Monday, revised on Tuesday and delivered on Wednesday—and it was realistic to a degree,—so realistic in point of fact that we no longer wonder at Mr. Howells's advocacy of Mr. Roosevelt's vociferously unsought re-election. A caller called. That was the beginning. Then—from this point all accounts in the universal Press, associated, dissociated, united, disunited, special, common, are precisely alike—then, the account continues:

> This visitor was from a nearby State.

Connecticut maybe, or New Jersey or Penrose's Pennsylvania or little old Rhode Island or perhaps a State of Mind, all nearby; but no, this was hardly possible, since all approaches were closely guarded by lynx-eyed reporters; wherefore the Mysterious Stranger must have arrived by aeroplane or submarine. In any case, he was no ghostly offspring of the imagination of William Bayard (or was it Edward Everett) Hale; he was a man *with* a country, which he was willing to serve. In fact, continuing the tale:

> —who came to Sagamore Hill saying that he expected to be a candidate for Congress as well as a delegate to the G. O. P. convention. Then, in hopes of securing the Colonel's support for Congress [not for Delegate, mind you, but for a *Republican* nomination for Congress; odd thing that!] the optimistic pilgrim [so depicted by all public journals] added: "You know, Colonel, I may make up my mind that we'll have to nominate you."

Extraordinary! Consider, please. Of course, a passing caller from a nearby State might be designated as a "pilgrim," if he dropped out of the clouds or ascended from the waters; in point of fact, he was; so more need not be said. But how in the name of Munsey could even such an one be "optimistic," in contemplation of a dread possibility? Imagine a person throwing up his hands in glee at the prospect of having a tooth pulled! Here is subtlety, brethren, subtlety unsurpassed to our mind in recent years except perhaps in substituting for the official record "incomparably the most adequate"—whatever that may be—for "incomparably the greatest" navy in the world. But that, like

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the bewildering secret order to Funston and his soldiers to play the part of rabbit dogs for a while and then come home, regardless of the destiny of the fox, constitutes the basis of another story. We revert hurriedly to Secretary Æsop's Fable of the Startled Warrior and the Cheerful Mourner.

"Well," began the Colonel, pausing a moment to gather his strength before letting loose, "now let me give you a piece of advice. If you have any doubts on the subject don't nominate me."

Very good, Eddy, very good! Inasmuch as "the subject" which had brought the Optimist all the way from Nowhere in the United States was his own candidacy for Congress, it was quite logical for Our Colonel to reply sternly "If you have any doubts, don't nominate *me*," but some little effort was required necessarily, and it was only natural that he should pause a moment to gather his strength before letting loose. Whether the Pilgrim had or had not "any doubts," we shall never know. Apparently he was struck dumb, or dead, for all that we know. In any case, since Aesop records no more from the Stranger's lips, we can only assume that he buckled on his wings and flew back to his nearby Nowhere, there to remain until elected to Congress or recalled to Sagamore. But there was no escape. Our Colonel raised the window and shouted after the flying figure, that all the reporters might hear:

Get it perfectly clear in your head that if you nominate me it mustn't be because you think it is in my interest, but because you think it is in your interest and the interest of the Republican party, and because you think it is in the interest of the United States to do so.

And more than that, don't you do it if you expect me to pussyfoot on any single issue I have raised.

If, by this, Our Colonel meant the variegated aggregation of "policies," including the Initiative and Referendum and Recall of Judges, and the like, comprised in the famous Columbus Declaration, we hardly know what to infer unless it be that, instead of pussyfooting on them, he has definitely abandoned them. He continued:

And don't you nominate me unless you are prepared to take the position that Uncle Sam is to be strong enough to defend his rights and to defend every one of his people wherever these people are, and he can't be strong enough unless he prepares in advance.

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Amen! to this.

I am not for war. On the contrary I abhor an unjust or a wanton war, and I would use every honorable expedient to avoid even a just war. But I feel with all my heart that you don't in the long run avoid war by making other people believe that you're afraid to fight for your own rights.

Sound and true! Nobody is "for war." Despite its persistent assertions to the contrary, even the *World* knows that Mr. Roosevelt is not. It also should be aware that the sure way to insure peace is to be able to maintain a rightful position and never, under any considerable circumstances, to be too proud to fight.

And don't forget that that isn't a course that provokes war; it is the only course that in the long run prevents war and secures national self-respect and guarantees the honor of this country and the rights of its citizens wherever they may be.

Again, we say, Amen! Passing over as purely rhetorical his strident but hazy distinctions between "just" and "unjust" conflicts, the "strong" and the "weak" as adversaries and, so forth, we find ourselves in full accord with this characteristic pronouncement of Our Colonel.

But that is not the point in issue. We are now considering personal politics, not National policies. And if ever anything was clear to our mind it is that, when he abandoned his conciliatory attitude and inaugurated a Campaign of Frightfulness against the Republican party, Our Colonel overreached so far that he cannot hope to find the common ground which he was seeking. Surely history does not record a political act so fully laden with audacity and presumption as that of a statesman, however heroic, who in one breath defiantly heralds his allegiance to a party which has become a remnant, and in the next arrogantly defines the terms upon which he will accept a nomination from the party which he assassinated. If Our Colonel had read his Bible more closely, he might have profited from the knowledge that it was not the Prodigal Son who possessed the fatted calf. As it is, he has succeeded only in directing attention to his own apostasy, in reviving fading resentments, in arousing old antagonisms and in stirring within the hearts of millions of sturdy Republicans an inflexible resolution to prevent him from finishing in 1916 the work he began in 1912, by swallowing the great organization to which he owes

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his own political fame and fortune. It seemed in March that Roosevelt for President, tempered by Root for Secretary of State, might make effective appeal to the country. It does not seem so now. There was in March at least a possibility that the Republican party would turn to him for "Anything to beat Wilson." We perceive no such possibility now. The entire situation with respect to both Root and Roosevelt has changed in two months.

What then?

Nobody wants Hughes. Roosevelt prefers (as second choice) Root who could serve only four years. Root (we assume from recent happenings) would find his former chief more congenial. Barnes doesn't want him. Penrose doesn't. Mr. Henry P. Davison, of J. P. Morgan & Co., doesn't. Sir George Perkins, formerly of J. P. Morgan & Co. and now of the Harvester Company, doesn't. Mr. Robert Bacon, formerly of J. P. Morgan & Co. and now a most mutual friend of Mr. Root and Mr. Roosevelt, doesn't. Judge Gary doesn't. Mr. Thomas F. Ryan doesn't. Mr. John D. Archbold doesn't. Nicholas Murray Butler doesn't. President Wilson (Heaven help us!) doesn't. Colonel House (Heaven help us again!) doesn't. Mr. Burleson doesn't. Mr. McAdoo doesn't. Mr. Tumulty doesn't. Colonel Watterson doesn't. The *World* doesn't. The *Springfield Republican* maybe doesn't. He doesn't even want himself. Nobody wants Hughes—

Nobody but the People!

Is not that so? It is. You know it. We know it. They whom we have mentioned know it. Even Hughes *may* know it, though we have our doubts. But why *is* it? That is the question.

We can understand why many who are Republicans want Root, why many who are not Republicans want Roosevelt and why the great body of Democrats, headed by a small army of officeholders and pacifists, want Wilson. We can even understand why leading representatives of these three groups do not want Hughes. Mr. Joseph H. Choate, for example, after enumerating Mr. Root's exceptional qualifications and denouncing Mr. Roosevelt for having "deliberately attempted to destroy the Republican party to gratify his own selfish aims," says:

> It should, as I think, be regarded as a fatal drawback to Justice Hughes's nomination that he is a Justice of the Supreme Court, a

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court which must be kept forever inviolate from without or from within. Its spotless ermine should never be smirched in the muddy turmoil of politics. When a nomination for the Presidency was tendered to Justice Story, one of the greatest judges of that court, without his knowledge, he immediately wrote declining the nomination, and declaring that he would not accept the office, even with the unanimous consent of the whole people. That is the only attitude which the members of that court should hold, or which should be held toward them by the people. Hands off the Supreme Court!

To this the People say:

We, too, wish to keep the Supreme Court inviolate, and in ordinary circumstances we would not nominate a Justice for President. But there is no law against our doing so, and we deny the validity of the precedent cited. Justice Story did not decline to become a candidate because he was a member of the Court. His refusal was based upon personal disinclination, and nothing else. In point of fact, he had already determined to retire when his name was suggested, and when he wrote, according to his biographer, Mr. W. W. Story, that "the station of President of the United States would not tempt him from the professor's chair and the calm pursuit of jurisprudence." If there was in his mind any apprehension that acceptance would in any way "smirch the spotless ermine," the fact is not in evidence.

Nor obviously was such a consideration held to be binding by Justice McLean, who was a competitor of Fremont in 1856, nor by Chief Justice Chase, who was an avowed candidate in 1868, nor by Justice David Davis, for whom three electoral votes were cast in 1872. The mere fact, moreover, that no inhibition is imposed by the Constitution suffices to show that the Fathers had no intention of barring us, the People, from designating as our President any native-born citizen whom we should consider best equipped for the highest public service.

Granting, as we have admitted, the customary inadvisability of drawing a great judge from the Supreme bench and granting further the impropriety of such an one becoming an active candidate, it is our inalienable right at this most critical juncture in our country's progress to put at the head of the Nation any citizen who most adequately satisfies all requirements, and it is no less the bounden duty of that citizen to answer such a call. Incidentally, we are convinced that the election of Justice Hughes as President

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would be far more likely to clarify " the muddy turmoil of politics " than to bespatter the judicial ermine—a consummation devoutly to be wished.

But what does Justice Hughes stand for? Less vociferously than the adherents of Our Colonel, but with equal insistence, Mr. Choate continues:

> Besides this, Justice Hughes has never had any experience in foreign affairs, which now most critically involve our national honor and safety, and, what is more, no man knows what his views are on this or any other of the leading questions which now agitate the people of the United States. Under the circumstances, can the party which in this election expects to resume the reins of government afford to select him? His judicial record is perfect. Why should not he and his party and the whole people be content with that as his one and only proper place for life?

And the People answer:

Mr. Roosevelt has had more " experience in foreign affairs " than any other man now living. Would Mr. Choate, in consequence, maintain that " our national honor and safety " would be more adequately conserved by him than by Mr. Hughes? True it is beyond question that Mr. Hughes has never directed the course of his country through a world embroilment. Neither has Mr. Root. Nor has Mr. Roosevelt. President Wilson alone has the advantage of that experience. Is it for this reason that Mr. Choate demands that he be superseded?

Mr. Hughes is as great a judge as Mr. Root is a lawyer. During the past seven years he has had at least an equal experience in dealing officially with international legal problems. As students of political history, they stand upon an even plane. Is it not safe to assume that Mr. Hughes, a sedulous official, has studied as closely as Mr. Root, a private citizen, the subjects, vital to the welfare of the Nation, which have grown out of the great war? Would Mr. Choate feel less assured of ability and virility in the conduct of the affairs of the Nation by Mr. Hughes, at 55, as President, and Mr. Root, as Secretary of State, than by Mr. Root, at 72, as President, laden with the enormous burden of that great office? Can Mr. Choate suggest a stronger combination or one more satisfying to us, the People, than that which we have indicated? Would he not, in truth and candor, concede that Mr. Root, at three-score-and-twelve, could render in-

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finitely greater service as Secretary of State, charged only with the management of foreign affairs, than as President, grievously overwhelmed by domestic problems as well? So we, the People, soberly and sincerely believe. And is it unjust or ungrateful on our part to withhold from Mr. Root the greatest nominal reward for the quite splendid services which he has rendered? Is not a high public position what its holder makes of it? Is Daniel Webster overshadowed in fame by his chief? Or Henry Clay? Or John C. Calhoun? Or James G. Blaine?

Is it quite accurate to say that "no man knows what Justice Hughes's views are on this or any other of the questions which now agitate the people of the United States"? Do not his work as Governor of the State of New York, his "*perfect judicial record*" and his many utterances in published documents and before the people constitute as complete a portrayal as one could desire of his attitude towards all fundamental questions related to popular government? Is it necessary, is it possible, to be more specific with respect to unforeseen problems of the future or even known problems of the present? We are well aware that Mr. Root, no less strongly than Mr. Roosevelt himself, disapproves of President Wilson's conduct. Upon this point his trenchant and scathing speech left no room for doubt. Mr. Hughes may or may not fully coincide with each and all of the judgments voiced in that terrific arraignment. Does it matter? We, the People, are less concerned with the past than with the present and more especially with the future.

Mr Root depicted in telling phrase Mr. Wilson's deplorable blundering in Mexico, but he did not tell us what he himself would do *now* or later. He could not. He does not know. He criticised caustically the Administration's dealings with European Powers, but he did not say what he would say or do to Germany *today* or tomorrow. He could not. He does not know. Nor does Mr. Roosevelt. Nor does Mr. Hughes. But does Mr. Choate really believe for one moment—is there the slightest indication in his whole unblemished record?—that Mr. Hughes would fail to meet any situation involving our Nation's dignity and honor with an intelligence, a courage, a spirit and a disregard of consequences to himself equal to that of Mr. Root or of Mr. Roosevelt or of any other living American? Has Mr. Choate any doubt as to that? We, the People, have not.

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That Mr. Justice Hughes not only "should be" but *is* "content" to remain in his "one and only proper place for life," our venerable and venerated former Ambassador may rest assured. That the managing directors of the Republican party would be no less pleased to have him stay there is certain. That Mr. Henry P. Davison's Committee of Seventy would be easily reconciled to such a happening we may take for granted. That Sir George Perkins would so far forget himself as to raise no voice in protest we can readily believe. That the Administration is willing to the verge of anxiety that he be not disturbed we have a shrewd suspicion. But, measurably because of these very circumstances, though in a broad sense for much larger reasons, we, the People, do not. *We* want Hughes.

Alas, it cannot be. The New York *World,* that "always drastically independent institution" which can "never belong to any party" but must "always remain devoted to the public welfare," says so. But why? Because "Wall Street is for Root," but since it cannot get him it "will take Roosevelt." The *World* continues with characteristic logic and convincingness:

It might be ready to take Hughes too, but Hughes is handicapped in such a way that it is almost impossible for him to obtain the nomination. Unlike the other candidates, he can make no active fight for delegates.

And has made none.

His judicial position forbids.

It does.

He cannot announce his candidacy or discuss publicly any of the issues of the campaign.

Cannot and has not.

He cannot say whether he is for or against the President's foreign policies.

He probably could not even define them.

He cannot say whether he is for or against preparedness.

Unlike the President, who can say the one and do the other.

Nor can he permit his friends to interpret his attitude toward the issues of the campaign, or to solicit support in his behalf, or to enter into any bargain for delegates.

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Quite so.

Any other candidate could accept the nomination at the end of a long and bitter contest. Hughes could not.

Yes, he stands alone.

If he were nominated by acclamation as the unanimous choice of his party in a convention that gave free expression to the sentiment of the Republican voters, then he could honorably accept.

Thanks!

No charge could be made that he had dragged the United States Supreme Court into the mire of politics.

True!

Mr. Choate's warning would have no force.

As we have said.

If Hughes were ready, like Roosevelt, to take the nomination on any terms, in any circumstances, on any platform, and by any arrangement, he might control the convention, but that kind of Hughes fortunately does not exist.

Right you are. In point of fact, says the *World* in another issue:

Justice Hughes is essentially the Wilson type. His outlook on public life is essentially the Wilson outlook. His theory of public duty is essentially the Wilson theory.

What, then, is the purpose of nominating Justice Hughes? To continue the Wilson Administration under Republican auspices? To replace a Democratic Wilson with a Republican Wilson?

Now with Roosevelt there is an issue. No two men could be more unlike than Wilson and Roosevelt, except Hughes and Roosevelt.

Wilson's attitude toward government is incorrigibly American. His spirit is the spirit of Franklin, Jefferson, and Lincoln.

Clearly, no further information as to what Hughes "stands for" is required. As between the Justice and the President, a "drastically independent" public journal which can "never belong to any party" could have no preference. And yet, bewilderingly, the *World* not only vehemently demands the nomination of Roosevelt, regardless of possible consequences to the country, but sapiently insists that Roosevelt will never permit his friends to vote for Hughes, and that, if Hughes should be nominated, Roosevelt "will find an excuse to run against the man whom he refers to in private conversation as 'that Baptist hypocrite.'"

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We, the People, who have cherished Our Colonel in the past and continue to wish him well, have no means of learning and no wish to publish what may have been uttered "in private conversation." If it should develop, upon trustworthy testimony, that Mr. Roosevelt did actually and deliberately apply to Mr. Justice Hughes the opprobrious term quoted, our disregard of its designed effect would be equaled only by the sense of shame upon its author which would possess all decent minds. While, moreover, we do not believe, and do not believe the *World* believes, that Mr. Roosevelt would strive to re-elect Mr. Wilson by running independently to defeat Mr. Hughes, our conviction is positive that such an attempt would avail nothing more and nothing else than the utter humiliation of the hapless head of a decimated company. No Republican and no Progressive, barring such as might feel that President Wilson should be upheld, would have either reason or excuse for refusal to vote for Mr. Hughes,—and not a corporal's guard could be persuaded to the contrary.

There were no overshadowing international problems in 1908, when, as now, we, the People, wanted Governor Hughes in preference to the puissant President's successful candidate, but there were domestic issues which still live. And one desirous of knowing where Hughes stood had only to ask the question of the man who "would not preserve availability at the expense of candor." He was unaffectedly proud of the great organization of which he had been a member all his life.

"The Republican party has maintained the national honor," he said then, as if in anticipation of an issue in 1916, "and under its direction American diplomacy has attained the highest levels of honorable purpose and distinguished achievement."

"A protective tariff is essential to the interests of our wage earners," he said, "in that it makes possible the payment of wages on a scale to which we are accustomed in this country and thus maintains our American standard of living. Hence the difference in the cost of production here and abroad is the fundamental consideration. But I do not believe in making this policy a cover for exorbitant rates or for obtaining special privileges from the Government which are not based upon consideration of the general welfare. I believe that the tariff should be revised, and in order to effect

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whatever readjustment may be necessary to make the tariff schedules consistent with the principles underlying the protective policy, I favor the appointment of an expert commission, so that the facts may be ascertained without delay and that Congress may dispose of the matter in the fairest possible manner."

"With regard to the Filipinos," he said, "we are placed under the most sacred obligations. In justice to them and in justice to ourselves we must omit no effort to prepare them for self-government."

"We are devoted," he continued, as if the thought of the Philippines had suggested it, "to the interests of peace and we cherish no policy of aggression. The maintenance of our ideals is our surest protection. It is our constant aim to live in friendship with all nations and to realize the aims of a free government, secure from the interruptions of strife and the wastes of war. It is entirely consistent with these aims, and it is our duty, to make adequate provision for our defense and to maintain the efficiency of our army and navy. And this I favor."

He recognized throughout the country and personally shared "a wholesome sentiment" for relief from boss domination.

"That sentiment," he said, "is that the instrumentalities of party management shall not be so arranged as to facilitate the purposes of those who would subvert government to their selfish advantage. It is a sentiment that demands for the members of political parties simple and direct methods by which they can exercise their just rights in determining party choices. It insists that the work and preferences of party managers shall be brought to the test of party opinion freely expressed, to the end that leadership that dishonors the party may be more readily overthrown and that it may be easier to give effective support to honest party management in the public interest."

"It has been stated," he said on another occasion, "that I have not paid sufficient attention to those who are politically active and who bear the burden and heat of the day in political campaigns. It has been said that I regard political activity as a disqualification for public office.

"Now no cause can be advanced without hard work, and it must be the object of zealous devotion. I esteem those who in an honorable manner work for the party. Political activ-

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ity by virtue of the experience and knowledge of affairs gained in it so far from being a disqualification may be a most important qualification for office. But I want that political activity to be of such a character as to leave a man free and independent in the dignity of his manhood to perform the duties of office, if appointed, unembarrassed by improper influences and unaffected by accumulated obligations."

More significant than these or many other utterances which might be cited is the living fact of Mr. Hughes's undoubted sincerity and perfect rectitude. We, the People, care more for what a man is than for what he says. If we know him through and through and believe in him, as we believed in Washington, in Lincoln and in Cleveland, we do not need to be informed of his opinion upon every subject that may come up, from peonage in Mexico to ruffled birds in the West Indies. We do not think Mr. Hughes is a better American than Mr. Roosevelt, but we think he is just as good, twice as sound and many times as trustworthy. We do not rank him as high intellectually as Mr. Root, but we perceive none other who surpasses him in this regard, and we cannot but consider the hazard, and perhaps the wrong, of placing the tremendous burdens of the Presidency upon the shoulders of a man who is living on "borrowed time." We do not know, indeed we doubt, that he is as keen and shrewd in mind as Mr. Wilson, but we think he is more dependable, and somehow or other we feel that he is *more of a man*,—"a regular feller," as they say on Cherry Hill, as contrasted—well, with whatever one's opinion happens to be.

So we, the People, say or think.

Do you doubt it? Ask the man in the street, on the sidewalk, in the car, on the subway, in the Pullman, on the jitney, in the vestibule after service, on the golf links before or after, downtown or uptown, in or out of clubs not dominated by masters of finance, in Hartford, Springfield or Peacham, in wealth-wallowing Pittsburgh even, or Columbus, or on the farms of Iowa, in Oregon or Washington, anywhere and everywhere, uphill and down dale, in this broad land, ask yourself, your wife, your plethoric uncle, your spinster aunt —and what do you find?

Some who distrust the supporters of Root; many who are angry at Roosevelt; not a few, inclusive of Democrats, who are sick of Wilson; none whose countenance fails to brighten at the mention of Hughes.

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But—" will he take it "?

Ay, there's the rub. God save the Court! implores Mr. Choate. It is too late for him to speak, shouts the *World*. We cannot beat a man with no man, say the mighty leaders. Where would we be at, without an understanding? queries Wall Street. Nevertheless, patiently but persistently, we have to ask *Will* he, despite the fact that many think it might be safer to say *Would* he? We have already recorded faithfully the judgment of ourselves, the People, respecting the mutual obligations of Citizen and State. Now let us examine more closely the more specific circumstantial evidence.

Be it observed then, at the outset, that Mr. Hughes has never directly sought, or even been an inferential candidate for, public office. When, in 1906, immediately following the insurance investigation, he was first " prominently mentioned " for Governor, the Republican politicians became as " nervous and excited " as all of us who advocated Preparedness appeared to the President a year or so ago. Was he a candidate or was he not? Would he accept or would he not? Even then as now. On August 22nd he sailed for Europe, remarking pleasantly to the reporters on the steamer that he had no ambitions beyond what the practice of law could afford him. On September 26th he was nominated, accepted, and was the only candidate on the Republican ticket who won at the polls. There was much opposition to his renomination in 1908 because of his veto of the popular two-cent fare bill and of his opposition to race-track gambling. Again he did not turn a hand, heedless of the consequences, but received 827 out of 1007 votes and was re-elected.

" I do not seek office," he had said in 1907. " To me public office means a burden of responsibility—a burden of incessant toil at times almost intolerable—which under honorable conditions and at the command of the people it may be a duty, and even a pleasure, to assume, but it is far from being an object of ambition. I have not sought, nor shall I seek, directly or indirectly, to influence the selection or the vote of any delegate to any convention."

That was Mr. Hughes's position then. It is his position now. " I am not a candidate, actively or tacitly," he wrote to Mr. Henry Wood, " and, in view of my judicial office, I do not feel that I have any right to take part in any political discussion." In a word—and this, we are fully con-

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vinced, may be taken as fact if not as law and gospel—this old-fashioned man holds firmly to the old-fashioned idea that the responsibilities of the Presidency are so great that it ought not to be sought and *must not be declined.*

Such is our interpretation of the sober thought and ardent wish of the American people. Never since this Republic demanded that George Washington become its first President has there appeared so striking an instance of the Office seeking the Man. Never has been a call so peremptory, never a constantly swelling force so certain, in our judgment, to prove irresistible. Rightly or wrongly, wisely or not, the Will of the People will prevail, and Charles Evans Hughes will be the next Republican candidate for President of the United States. And the overpowering issue will be one of men—of ability, of judgment, of fidelity, but above all of character.

Hughes or Wilson?

That will be all. When the lively wedding in Chicago shall have been supplemented by the sedate funeral in St. Louis, Patriotism must dictate a choice between the two.

O Lord, save Thy People!

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES

Charles Evans Hughes was 54 years old on the 11th of April last. He was born in Glens Falls, N. Y., on the 11th of April, 1862. When it is said that his father, David Charles Hughes, was a Baptist preacher having charge of the village flocks of Glens Falls and Sandy Hill, near by, and that his sole revenue was the salary usually paid to such a country gentleman, it is not necessary to emphasize the fact that Mr. Hughes began his life, as the majority of American men who have gone farthest and won the highest esteem of their countrymen began theirs, in the rather bleak but stimulating air of a home where money is scarce.

In one respect Mr. Hughes had the advantage over many American boys whose parents were poor. He did not have to fight a long, up-hill battle to get an education. Before his father was ordained a minister at Wesleyan University, he had been a teacher of Latin, Greek and English at West River Collegiate Institute in Maryland. Moreover, Mr. Hughes's

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mother was a finely educated woman. Her name was Mary C. Connelly when Pastor Hughes first met her. She was the daughter of a highly respected physician in Delaware County, New York, and at Claverack Institute, from which she was graduated, she had won distinction for proficiency in the languages, and, what is rather unusual in young girls, for decided strength in mathematics. Thus we have not very far to seek for the source of that taste for mathematics which is so pronounced a part of Mr. Justice Hughes's mental equipment, and which perhaps is not disassociated with those powers of continued concentration of thought for which he is remarkable.

Naturally, the son and only child of such parents did not have to get out and struggle for his early education; it began right at home, and it began as soon as he was able to absorb it. Both his father and his mother taught him languages and mathematics in the little home parsonage. However, he attended the public schools later on. At Oswego, where his father labored for a time as a preacher after leaving Glens Falls, he went into the primary grade school, and at Newark, New Jersey, where the elder Hughes had a subsequent pastorate, he attended the high school, as he did a few years after in New York, when the family went there to live. But in the meantime the home tuition continued. The Rev. David Hughes wanted his son to follow in his own footsteps and become a Baptist preacher. So, concurrently with his earlier instruction, his father grounded him well in the rudiments of theological lore. But law, to young Hughes, was ever a more alluring topic than theology, and when, after a year in Colgate, he entered the sophomore class at Brown University, it was with a well-fixed purpose of becoming a lawyer and not a preacher.

With such a college preparation, and with habits of study thus inculcated in him from childhood, it is not surprising that he emerged from Brown with flying colors. As a matter of fact, he took about all the honors there were—honors in the classics, the Dunn premium in English, and, above all, one of the two Carpenter prizes given to the two students in each graduating class showing the greatest promise as based on scholarship and character. He had the reputation, too, of not studying very much at Brown. He did not have to. His home instruction and mental discipline had been so thorough that he was at a marked advantage over most of his

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fellow students. He had plenty of time for college amusements, and he went in for them heartily. He was an enthusiastic fraternity man, and has kept up his interest in Delta Upsilon during all the thirty-five years that have elapsed since he graduated from Brown.

It was not until he was out of college that the really hard grind of work definitely began. First of all, he had to earn the money to enable him to get his legal education. To do this he taught Greek and mathematics in Delaware Academy at Delhi, New York, studying meantime in the law office of Judge Gleason. Then he went to Columbia Law School, reading at the same time in the office of the Hon. Stewart L. Woodford, subsequently Minister to Madrid at an interesting epoch in our relations with Spain. At Columbia he duplicated his experience at Brown, winning the highest honor, the Prize Fellowship, which carries with it an appointment as tutor at five hundred dollars a year. He did the tutoring and he earned the very acceptable money. From 1884 till 1887 he worked as a law clerk by day and taught a law class in Columbia by night.

But he had long before attracted the notice of that eminent lawyer, Walter S. Carter, noted as a collector of etchings and of bright young men in the legal profession. In 1888 Mr. Hughes was made full member of the firm of Carter, Hughes and Cravath, and a certain love affair, long smouldering but very earnest, culminated soon after the law firm arrangement. On the 5th of December, 1888, Mr. Hughes and Miss Annette Carter, daughter of the young man's senior law partner, were married. Miss Carter was a graduate of Wellesley College and fully sympathetic with the decided literary tastes of Mr. Hughes, for the learned Justice is not wholly given over to mathematics and legal problems. He likes Balzac, the elder Dumas, good detective yarns, and is a great admirer of Mr. Dooley. It may not be generally suspected, but he is really blessed with a liberal sense of humor. Like most men of intense purpose and an insatiable appetite for work, he has paid the penalty in a certain fixed sternness of expression, and the reputation of being an "iceberg." But he is a capital story-teller none the less, and on his campaigning tours he liberated reserve stores of warmth, humor, and even sentiment, which few had dreamed that he was capable of harboring.

"If they perform an autopsy on me," he once said, "I

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hope they will find something besides sawdust and briefs inside."

Though not quite what has been called a "clubable" man, but rather a home-loving, retiring temperament, he is by no means an "iceberg." He likes to hunt in the Maine woods and to climb mountains in Switzerland. For thirteen successive years he never missed the Swiss trip until he was Governor. During two of the trying years he was in Albany he had but one vacation—eleven days in the woods.

But hard work has its limits, and as early as 1891 it had all but claimed its toll from Charles E. Hughes. He had egregiously overdone the thing. That was the reason he accepted the law professorship in Cornell University. To be sure, he worked at about his accustomed pace while there, but it was a new field. It served in lieu of a vacation from the trying New York legal grind. But Mr. Carter wanted him back, and in 1893 he returned, and again plunged into his law work. It was soon after this that Senator Stevens picked him as the man he wanted for counsel in the gas investigation.

It is idle to rehearse now either what he did to the gas companies or to the insurance companies. Both events are of sufficiently recent date to remain vividly in people's minds. What the relentless questioner sought to uncover in both cases was such a revelation of unwarranted practices as would form a basis for remedial legislation. He refused to be diverted an instant from this object. He sought no punishments, no revenges, no political capital. He would permit no efforts in either of these directions to confuse or degrade the high purposes of the inquiry. Those purposes he in full measure attained, and in attaining them emerged from a species of obscurity to the status of a commanding figure within and beyond the borders of the State.

Of political ambition he was probably utterly devoid. He said he was, and every act and utterance of his confirmed what he said. In politics he was a Republican by inheritance and conviction. His father was a fervent Republican, dating back in his party inspiration to the days of Lincoln,—a Republican, moreover, who never failed to do his duty as a citizen on election day, and he voted naught but the straight ticket.

But the masterful Republican leaders did not want him for a gubernatorial candidate in 1906. Nor did there ever

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come from Mr. Hughes the slightest intimation that he wanted the nomination. During all the discussion he held himself aloof. He would not say he wanted the nomination. He would not permit anybody to present his claims or his availability. It was a matter solely for the people of the State to decide. The party was split wide open at that time with factional fights. There was nobody else that had the remotest chance of election, a fact which was afterward sufficiently demonstrated at the polls when Mr. Hughes was the one Republican on the State ticket who was elected. It had gone to the people for decision, and they decided it.

As Governor, the bitterness he evoked among some of the leaders is matter of history—that and the unswerving confidence of the people back of the leaders and the leaders' masters. He governed out in the open, for one thing. He abandoned the inner seclusion of the Governor's suite in the Albany capitol, and moved his desk out into the big reception room. If anybody had anything to say to him as Governor they said it there or it went unsaid. For days the newspapers had columns of comment and good-humored chaff over the curious new departure.

Then came the veto of the two-cent fare bill, because no facts were presented to justify its adoption; the passing of the Public Utilities bill to provide for the gathering of such data; and then the race-track gambling bill. Long and keen were the knives that were out to prevent the Governor's renomination in 1908. But the people still had the bit in their teeth. The leaders no longer led. Mr. Hughes was nominated by a vote of 827 in a convention of 1007 delegates. Thus Charles Evans Hughes was again elected to the Governorship of his State, and from Governor he was appointed Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

THE SUBMARINE CONTROVERSY WITH GERMANY

THE WARNING

(Bryan to Gerard, February 10, 1915)

"If such a deplorable situation should arise [destruction of American life or American ships upon the high seas], the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be con-

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strained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

THE REPLY

(Von Jagow to Gerard, February 16, 1915)

" Germany must, in the exigency into which she has been unlawfully forced, make her measures effective, at all events, in order thereby to compel her adversary to conduct maritime warfare in accordance with international law, and thus to re-establish the freedom of the seas, which she has ever advocated and for which she is fighting likewise to-day."

THE EFFECT

On American Trade

(Grey to Page, March 15, 1915)

" I must emphasize again that this measure (suppression of German trade) is a natural and necessary consequence of the unprecedented methods, repugnant to all law and morality, which * * * Germany began to adopt at the very outset of the war, and the effects of which have been constantly accumulating."

On American Life

(Bryan to Gerard, May 13, 1915, in reference to the destruction of the *Lusitania* and *Falaba,* and attacks on American steamers *Cushing* and *Gulflight*)

THE DEMANDS

" It [the Government of the United States] confidently expects, therefore, that the Imperial German Government will make reparation, so far as reparation is possible, for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended."

THE THREAT

" The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any

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act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

THE ANSWER

(Von Jagow to Gerard, May 28, 1915)

"With regard to the loss of life when the British passenger steamer *Lusitania* was sunk, the German Government has already expressed its deep regret to the neutral Governments concerned that nationals of those countries lost their lives on that occasion. * * * In view of these facts [alleged presence of guns, subsequently disproved, and instructions to British vessels to use neutral flags and markings], which are satisfactorily known to it, the Imperial German Government is unable to consider English merchant vessels any longer as 'undefended territory' in the zone of maritime war designated by the admiralty staff of the Imperial German Navy; the German commanders are consequently no longer in a position to observe the rules of capture otherwise usual, and with which they invariably complied before this. * * * The company [by shipping ammunition] thereby wantonly caused the death of so many passengers."

THE REITERATION

(Lansing to Gerard, June 9, 1915)

"The Government of the United States therefore very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representations of its note transmitted to the Imperial German Government on the fifteenth of May, and relies in these representations upon the principles of humanity, the universally recognized understandings of international law, and the ancient friendship of the German nation."

THE COUNTER-RESPONSE

(Von Jagow to Gerard, July 8, 1915)

"In particular, the Imperial Government is unable to admit that American citizens can protect an enemy ship through the mere fact of their presence on board. * * * Consequently, accidents suffered by neutrals on enemy ships in this area of war cannot well be judged differently from accidents to which neutrals are at all times exposed at the seat of war on land, when they betake themselves into dangerous localities in spite of previous warning."

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THE REJOINDER

(Lansing to Gerard, July 21, 1915)

"In view of the admission of illegality made by the Imperial Government when it pleaded the right of retaliation in defense of its acts, and in view of the manifest possibility of conforming to the established rules of naval warfare, the Government of the United States cannot believe that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the *Lusitania,* or from offering reparation for the American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for a needless destruction of human life by an illegal act."

THE DECLARATION

"Friendship itself prompts it [the Government of the United States] to say to the Imperial Government that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly."

THE ASSURANCE

(Von Bernstorff to Lansing, September 1, 1915, following destruction of *Arabic*)

"Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."

THE *Arabic*

(Von Jagow to Gerard, September 17, 1915)

"The German Government most deeply regrets that lives were lost through the action of the commander. The German Government is unable, however, to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the *Arabic.*"

(Von Bernstorff to Lansing, October 5, 1915)

"The attack of the submarine, therefore [upon the *Arabic*], was undertaken against the instructions issued to the commander. The Imperial Government regrets and disavows this act, and has notified Commander Schneider accordingly. Under these circumstances my Government is

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prepared to pay an indemnity for the American lives which, to its deep regret, have been lost on the *Arabic*."

THE *Orduna*

(Von Jagow to Gerard, December 9, 1915)

"The first attack on the *Orduna* by a torpedo was not in accordance with existing instructions, which provide that large passenger steamers are only to be torpedoed after previous warning and after the rescuing of passengers and crew. The failure to observe the instructions was based on an error, which is, at any rate, comprehensible, and a repetition of which appears to be out of the question, in view of the more explicit instructions issued in the meantime. Moreover, the commanders of submarines have been reminded that it is their duty to exercise greater care and to observe carefully the orders issued."

THE *Persia*

(Von Bernstorff to Lansing, January 7, 1916)

"German submarines are therefore permitted to destroy enemy merchant vessels in the Mediterranean—i. e., passenger as well as freight ships, as far as they do not try to escape or offer resistance—only after passengers and crew have been accorded safety. * * * If commanders of German submarines should not have obeyed the orders given to them, they will be punished; furthermore, the German Government will make reparation for damage caused by death of, or injuries to, American citizens."

THE SUBMARINE CONTROVERSY WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

THE *Ancona*

(Lansing to Penfield, for delivery to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, December 6, 1915)

THE DEMANDS

"As the good relations of the two countries must rest upon a common regard for law and humanity, the Government of the United States cannot be expected to do otherwise than to demand that the Imperial and Royal Government denounce the sinking of the *Ancona* as an illegal and indefensible act; that the officer who perpetrated the deed be

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punished; and that reparation, by the payment of an indemnity, be made for the citizens of the United States who were killed or injured by the attack on the vessel."

THE REPLY

(Burian to Penfield, December 15, 1915)

"As is not difficult to perceive, the presentation of the facts in the case in the aforesaid note leaves room for many doubts; and even if this presentation were correct in all points, and the most rigorous legal conception were applied to the judgment of the case, it does not in any way sufficiently warrant attaching blame to the commanding officer of the war vessel or to the Imperial and Royal Government."

THE COUNTER-REPLY

(Lansing to Penfield, December 19, 1915)

"The Government of the United States, therefore, finds no other course open to it but to hold the Imperial and Royal Government responsible for the act of its naval commander, and to renew the definite but respectful demands made in its communication of the 6th of December, 1915."

THE REJOINDER

(Burian to Penfield, December 29, 1915)

"Also as concerns the principle expressed in the very esteemed note that hostile private ships, in so far as they do not flee or offer resistance, may not be destroyed without the persons on board having been placed in safety, the Imperial and Royal Government is able substantially to assent to this view of the Washington Cabinet. * * * Should the more precise circumstances under which the American citizens [on the *Ancona*] were injured be unknown to the Government of the United States, due to a lack of the proper material evidence, the Imperial and Royal Government, in consideration of the humanely deeply deplorable incident and guided by the desire of again manifesting to the Government of the United States its friendly sentiments, would be readily willing to overlook this gap in this evidence, and to extend the indemnity also to those injuries, the direct cause of which could not be ascertained. While the Imperial and Royal Government may well regard the *Ancona* case as cleared up by the foregoing representations, it, at the same

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time, reserves to itself for a future time the discussion of the difficult questions of international law in connection with submarine warfare."

SUBMARINES AS COMMERCE DESTROYERS

(Bryan to Gerard, May 13, 1915)

"Manifestly, submarines cannot be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity."

(Lansing to Gerard, July 21, 1915)

"The events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it is possible and practicable to conduct such submarine operation as have characterized the activity of the Imperial German Navy within the so-called war zone in substantial accord with the accepted practices of regulated warfare."

ARMED MERCHANTMEN

(Lansing to Von Bernstorff, September 19, 1915)

"A merchant vessel of belligerent nationality may carry an armament and ammunition for the sole purpose of defense without acquiring the character of a ship of war."

(Lansing to Allied Ambassadors, January 18, 1916)

"I should add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying armament of any sort, in view of the character of the submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of underseas craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser, and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerant Government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly."

(Von Jagow to Gerard, February 10, 1916)

"In the circumstances set forth above, enemy merchantmen armed with guns no longer have any right to be considered as peaceable vessels of commerce. Therefore, the German naval forces will receive orders, within a short period, paying consideration to the interests of the neutrals, to treat such vessels as belligerents."

(Woodrow Wilson to Senator Stone, February 24, 1916)

"The course which the Central European Powers have announced their intention of following in the future with

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regard to underseas warfare seems, for the moment, to threaten insuperable obstacles, but its apparent meaning is so manifestly inconsistent with the explicit assurances recently given us by those Powers with regard to their treatment of merchant vessels on the high seas, that I must believe that explanations will presently ensue which will put a different aspect upon it. * * * But, in any event, our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, has the right, while war is in progress, to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war."

THE REAL RESULTS

FOR GERMANY

Continuance of submarine operations in accordance with the original policy laid down by Admiral von Tirpitz.

Maintenance of friendly relations with the United States through vague and indefinite promises.

Reduction by the United States of its first demands in the case of the *Lusitania* as a result of secret negotiations yet to be given to the public.

Time.

FOR THE UNITED STATES

Disavowal in the single case of the *Arabic*.

Expression of willingness to pay damages in the case of the American steamers *Cushing, Gulflight* and *Nebraskan*.

Promises of indemnity for American citizens drowned, killed or injured.

Assurances of future good conduct the character of which have provoked discussion.

Trouble.

AFTER THE WAR—WHAT?

After the war, what—for America? It is not too early to to ask. The end of the war may come as suddenly and as unexpectedly as its beginning. It may come soon, or it may be long delayed. In either case it is essential that we shall be prepared to meet it; and at present we are not thus prepared. It is probable that we shall have much more need of special preparation for its end than we had for its beginning. For we needed at its beginning only a reassertion of neutrality,

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and a resolute maintenance of our rights. But at its end we shall have to meet a general readjustment of the industry, commerce and finance of the world, and perhaps of political conditions; and we may have to meet something still more serious.

The war has already caused an enormous disturbance of international trade. From that the United States has largely profited. We have developed a vast trade in military munitions, and a less but still considerable trade in other commodities. The end of the war will, of course, mean the end of the munitions trade. It is an interesting and important matter of speculation, to what extent it will also mean a reversion of non-military trade to the old lines, or will mean the confirmation of this country in its present gains. Certainly the United States seems now to have a unique opportunity to make great and lasting gains in many directions. It will be recalled that as a result of our Civil War our ocean carrying trade was almost entirely lost, and was transferred to other nations, chiefly to Great Britain. It is to be considered whether there is not a somewhat similar opportunity now, for a measurable retransfer of the European carrying trade back to the American flag. At any rate, the United States ought not to neglect a single item of possible preparation to secure such gains.

Speculation concerning the end of the war turns chiefly, however, upon the supposition or the suggestion of a military menace to the United States from that side which shall be victorious in the European conflict. Upon this opinion is divided, with much emphasis. Pacifists, of course, scout the notion of any menace whatever. They insist that no European Power has any designs or any desire whatever to attack America; and that if any had, it would not be able to do so because of the exhaustion and prostration which it will be suffering at the end of this war. Neither of these propositions is convincing, nor capable of satisfactory demonstration.

There are, on the contrary, strong reasons for believing that at least one great European Power has long cherished both the desire and the design, if not of bluntly attempting the conquest of America, at least of so traversing our principles and impairing our material interests as to compel either our humiliating submission to its dictation or a clash of arms and a struggle for mastery. It has been an open

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secret that Germany is as intent upon getting "a place in the sun" in the Western as in the Eastern hemisphere. We need not look so far afield as the German colonization of several states in Southern Brazil. The covetous eye of that Power has for years been fixed upon places much nearer to us, within striking distance of our own shores, around the Caribbean Sea or upon or near the Isthmus of Panama.

For a long time Germany has been negotiating for the acquisition of the Dutch West Indies, either through direct purchase from the Netherlands, or through the annexation of the Netherlands to the German Empire. Once, if not twice, German influence at Copenhagen has defeated plans for our acquisition of the Danish West Indies, though both the United States and the islands in question as well as the Danish Government earnestly desired the transfer. The German intrigues at Bogota in 1902 were notorious, their aim being to prevent our acquisition of the Panama Canal, and to promote and effect the acquisition of it by a German corporation which would be an *alter ego* of the Imperial Government itself. It was largely German influence that caused Colombia to reject the Hay-Herran treaty, though in doing so it overreached itself and provoked the Panama revolution. Germany also attempted to gain a foothold in Venezuela through very much the same tactics which she employed for getting a foothold in China at Kiao-chau, and was prevented from so doing only by the American Government, which sent to the Wilhelmstrasse a curt ultimatum, to the effect that if Germany persisted in sending the threatened military expedition, it would be met off the Venezuelan coast by Admiral Dewey with the American battle fleet, ready for instant action. It would be folly to assume that Germany's mind has changed, that she is now less desirous of securing a place in the American sun, and that her victory in the European war would not mean a prompt renewal of such tactics, in a more militant fashion than ever before.

But, say the pacifists, Germany would be too much exhausted by her struggles in Europe to be able to undertake a war against America. The examples of history warrant no such fond belief. Seldom has a victorious nation been so exhausted as to be incapable presently of beginning another war; and seldom has a Power hesitated, for cause, to take on a new antagonist in a war in which it was already engaged. To go back no further than our own early history:

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The Seven Years' War did not so exhaust England and France that they were not both ready for another war a few years later. When Great Britain was at war with her Thirteen Colonies, and was so hard pressed in it that she was desperately seeking mercenary levies for her armies in several European countries and was getting them alone in Germany, she did not hesitate also to wage war against France. Less than a score of years later, years of exhausting strife and a gigantic war still continuing did not restrain France from provoking America to war, though John Adams refused to yield to the provocation. In 1812 Great Britain was suffering the strain of many years of costly war, and was actually engaged in a gigantic life or death struggle with the most formidable adversary in the world; yet those things did not restrain her from engaging in another war with the United States. At much later dates, within our own recollection, the Danish war did not incapacitate but rather prepared Prussia for her war with Austria, and her war with Austria in turn left her ready and eager to provoke war with France. Japan's war with China was not a bar against but rather a prelude to her greater war with Russia. Our own Civil War, gigantic and costly as it was, left us not so prostrated and exhausted that we were not quite ready to try conclusions with the French Empire, unless Louis Napoleon would speedily withdraw from Mexico; which he discreetly did.

If, therefore, Germany had any designs of American aggressions before this war, as it is impossible to avoid suspecting, we must believe that the result of her victory in this war would inevitably be to promote them, to encourage her in cherishing them, and to expedite her actual attempt in that direction. We must remember that she has more than one long-standing grudge against us. They began, perhaps in 1898, when she instigated the attempt at meddling by a combination of European Powers in our controversy with Spain over Cuba, and when she got from President McKinley a most courteous but most effective snubbing. They were increased by the notorious Dewey-Diederichs episode at Manila; by our trumping of her trick at Panama; and by our peremptory ordering her to keep her *pickelhauben* out of Venezuela. We have no notion that anything in the American attitude in the present war has materially mollified her feelings toward us.

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There would be, moreover, at least one prime reason for seeking a war with America, not merely in spite of but actually because of the great European struggle through which she had just passed and which had been so enormously costly to her. That is, the impossibility of extorting from the European countries indemnities sufficient to pay all her war bills, and the consequent desire to get at little cost a huge indemnity also from the United States. The tribute which she has levied upon Belgian cities is an earnest of what she would levy upon American cities if she had the chance; and that she could have the chance in case of her victory over the European Allies there can be little question. That she could eventually and permanently conquer the whole United States is not for a moment to be believed. But the best military and naval authorities are agreed that against our present defensive establishment, and against any that we can have for several years to come, it would be not only possible but easy for her to place New York, Boston and other Atlantic Coast cities at the mercy of her guns, and indeed to occupy them with her troops. It is all very well to say that we should drive her out again. Yes; but a few days' possession of those cities would be sufficient for the collecting of such tribute as would make Belgium's seem picayune by the side of it. If then she were compelled to retire, and to scuttle out of the country, she would take the loot with her across the Atlantic, and if we sought to recover it and to take revenge upon her, we should have to do so by the practically impossible means of crossing the ocean and conquering her at home. It would be perfectly practicable and highly profitable, and we may add that it would be quite probable, for Germany thus to make a raid for revenue only upon the American coast.

Now all this may be regarded as out of the question, for the reason that Germany is not going to win the European war. We are firmly of that opinion ourselves. Yet there is no absolute assurance of it; and though there be only one chance in a hundred of Germany's winning, the consequences of her doing so would be so transcendently menacing that it would be criminal folly for us deliberately to remain unprepared for even so remote a contingency. We know not when the war may end, nor how. But this we do know, that it behooves us not merely as American patriots but also simply as rational beings to be as fully

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prepared as possible for that end, whenever it may come and whatever it may be.

FRANCE, OLD AND NEW

France remains the great surprise of the war. There was really no occasion to be surprised at the marvellous degree of preparedness and efficiency which Germany displayed at the outset, and which she has maintained. We cannot admire it too greatly, for the world has never seen anything quite its equal; but we cannot wonder at it. It had been taken for granted in advance. Neither is there cause to be astonished at the preparedness and efficiency of the British Navy. Its primacy, above the waves, was known, and in holding the German battle fleet in check, and in driving the German merchant marine from the high seas, it has done precisely what was expected of it.

But France, with all possible respect, has astonished the world. She has done what she was not expected to do, and she has not done what she was confidently expected to do; and there is much good in her. She had for many years been regarded as a mercurial, emotional, excitable nation. She was expected to show much agitation in this war, and to comport herself in a spectacular manner; with much rhetoric and display. Popular panics, flamboyant "demonstrations," and perhaps revolutions, were looked for. In the field, fierce and brilliant dashes were anticipated, which might as speedily be transformed into routs. Probably nine out of ten outside observers would have predicted such courses for that country, in government, in army and in people.

In fact, the exact reverse has been realized. Of all the nations at war, France has been and is the coolest and most collected. Her nerves are steadier than those of Germany; her temperament is apparently more phlegmatic. For "bulldog tenacity," for resolution and "staying powers," she surpasses England. She has shown not a touch of panic, nor even of excitement. She has performed not one spectacular act. There is not a touch of flamboyant rhetoric in any of her utterances, in the tone of the press, or in the speeches and conversation of her citizens. The world has never seen

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a finer exhibition of ordered self-restraint, of organized resolution, than France has given and is still giving.

It seems a prodigy. It is a prodigy, to those who remember only the delirious, hysterical France which was between Saarbruck and Sedan, or the excitable France of Fashoda. Yet to those who look beyond a few episodes, to the real France of extended history, this revelation of her spirit should not, after all, be surprising. For in the "Terrible Year" the soul of the country was possessed of a grim, silent resolution never surpassed in all the annals of endurance. The defence of Paris vied with Lucknow and Londonderry. There was through month after month of hopeless struggling a constancy never shaken, a resolution that never faltered. Why should we be surprised at the reappearance of the same spirit now?

Indeed, history through many centuries belies the too common notion of France as fickle and emotional. In the Hundred Years' War, she was as stubborn and as resolute and as self-contained as her English antagonist. Her patience and endurance during years of disaster were almost superhuman. Granted that in the Revolution Paris went mad and raved. There was no madness and no raving in the calm, cool, and tremendously efficient work of her soldiers upon the border, who were holding back the impact of all Europe upon her. At Waterloo the cuirassiers might dash themselves in frenzy upon the British squares or into the sunken road of Ohain; but the Guard could also stand its ground to the last with a fixedness of purpose that Wellington's "long-enduring hearts" could not exceed. In the Crimea it was the British brigade that threw itself away in that spectacular charge which "was magnificent but was not war;" while it was the French commander who gave and who amply fulfilled that unrivalled watchword of indomitable resolution, "J'y suis, J'y reste!"

The world is therefore astonished at France without due cause. It is not a new France that we see to-day. It is the old France of glorious history. We are surprised and astonished, not at France, but at our own misconception of France. It is not that she has transformed herself, but that we have corrected our vision and our estimate of her.

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SHALL AMERICA PREPARE AGAINST JAPAN?

BY K. K. KAWAKAMI

THE problem of preparedness is a delicate problem for a "hyphenated" resident to discuss. If he advances a view not favorable to the promotion of its cause, he is likely to be suspected of scheming, in the interest of his native land, to lull the public into a sense of security and thus counteract the vigorous movement advocated by patriotic Americans. Yet, if he be honest, he cannot compromise his views for the sake of popularity.

It is not my intention to argue either for or against the preparedness programme now under consideration at Washington. With the American desire to establish a larger army and navy no foreign nation, least of all Japan, should have any quarrel—though we may, with Lord Rosebery, privately regret that "the United States should voluntarily take up the burden which, after this war, will be found to have broken our backs." If my discourse seems to run counter to the contentions of the advocates of greater armament, it is not because I wish to discourage them. I shall try to set forth facts and facts alone, and let the reader draw his own conclusion.

It is significant that, in the present agitation for the increase of armament, Japan is held up before the public as a possible enemy or rival. When the General Navy Board at Washington adopted, in October, 1903, a programme calling for the construction of 34 battleships before 1920, Japan cut no figure in the consideration of the naval authorities. When in 1907 Mr. Roosevelt began to urge the speedy execution of the programme of 1903, Japan was still only vaguely thought of as a nation against which America should prepare. From that time, however, the Mikado's Empire was, in the eyes of the American people, gradually looming up on the political horizon of the Pacific. Thanks to the San Francisco

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school incident, the immigration question, the Magdalena Bay incident, and the California land legislation, an unthinking public has become obsessed with the idea that sooner or later Japan will demand a reckoning with the United States. In the present armament propaganda, public attention, especially on the Western coast, seems to be almost equally divided between Germany and Japan. We may ignore the irresponsible utterances of certain publicists, but we cannot overlook the fact that a sense of fear and suspicion with regard to Japan has crept into the minds of Americans. The fear is as yet vague and undefinable, but it is as real as it is persistent.

It is useless to reiterate that the Magdalena Bay scare was deliberately conjured up by certain sinister elements eager to fish in troubled waters and anxious to see the United States annex at least the northern section of Mexico. It is useless to assure the American public that the Japanese Government and the Japanese people know well that the immigration question and the California land question are not the kind of questions to be settled satisfactorily by the arbitrament of the sword. It is useless to tell them that Japan's policy in China is not going to be detrimental to the open door policy proclaimed by the late Secretary Hay. These are times when convincing arguments do not convince.

Yet it is to be hoped that authentic data as to the relative strength of the Japanese and American navies, as well as certain issues which claim the first attention of the publicists of the two countries, will be found conducive to the alleviation of the nervousness now taking hold of the American people.

If I remember correctly, it was Mr. Roosevelt who first began to urge preparedness as a means of keeping out Oriental—and more especially Japanese—immigration. In May, 1909, he published in *The Outlook* an article on Japanese immigration in which he said: "We have the right to say, for instance, what immigrants shall come to our own shores, but we are powerless to enforce this right against any nation that chooses to disregard our wishes unless we continue to build up and maintain a first-class fighting navy."

Since this clarion call for preparedness was sounded, many a publicist of less prominence has responded to it, and to-day Japan is undoubtedly thought of as a menace to America's future. I do not believe that the immigration question has ever been regarded by Japan as an issue to be settled by

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war. Presuming, however, that the Mikado really wished to argue his side of the controversy in terms of shot and shell, has he ever possessed, and will he ever possess, a navy powerful enough to justify such a course? That is the point which we must first determine.

Let us, then, study the existing naval strength of Japan as well as the programme which she has adopted for the construction of additional warships. At present Japan's fighting fleet consists of six dreadnoughts (total tonnage 191,500), including two now under construction, four battle cruisers (total tonnage 82,500), thirteen battleships of the old style (total tonnage 193,666), four armored cruisers (total tonnage 56,700), fifty destroyers (total tonnage 36,118), and seventeen submarines. All in all, Japan's fighting craft aggregate 560,484 tons.

As against this strength, the American Navy, as it stands to-day, consists of nineteen dreadnoughts (total tonnage 506,636), twenty-three battleships (total tonnage 314,906), ten armored cruisers (total tonnage 140,080), sixty-two destroyers (total tonnage 73,097), fifty-one submarines, and twenty-two colliers (total tonnage 236,401). This makes a grand total of 1,271,120 tons—i. e., 710,636 tons more than the Japanese fleet.

Even a cursory survey of the above figures convinces us that the Mikado's fighting fleet is far inferior to the American. But when we scrutinize more carefully the character and equipment of the ships on both sides, the discrepancy becomes all the more obvious. In the first place, the American dreadnoughts are much larger than the Japanese. Of the American fleet the seven largest dreadnoughts have each a displacement of 32,500 tons, while the four largest Japanese dreadnoughts are of a displacement of 30,600 tons each. Again, as against six American dreadnoughts of 27,500 tons each, Japan has only four battle-cruisers of the same size. The remaining two Japanese battleships displace 20,800 tons each, whereas the United States has two dreadnoughts of 27,243 tons each, two of 21,825 tons each, two of 20,000 tons each, and two of 16,000 tons each. In modern naval warfare the dreadnought is the cornerstone of a fighting fleet. In spite of the increasing efficiency of the submarine, this theory has not been altered. Not only in point of numbers but also in the size of each vessel, the American fleet of dreadnoughts is far superior to the Japanese.

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I am fully aware that the tonnage of a warship is not the only, or even the most important, criterion of efficiency. Much of the fighting power of a man-of-war depends upon the kind of guns with which she is armed. How does the American Navy stand in this respect?

Of the nineteen dreadnoughts of the American Navy, five are equipped with twelve 14-inch guns, four with ten 14-inch guns, two with twelve 12-inch guns, four with ten 12-inch guns, and two with eight 12-inch guns. The remaining two dreadnoughts which are now under construction and which are not yet named will probably be of the type of the *California,* and will be equipped with twelve 14-inch guns. On the Japanese side, there is not a single dreadnought equipped with so many as twelve 14-inch guns. To go into details, four of the six Japanese dreadnoughts have only ten 14-inch guns, while two are equipped with twelve 12-inch guns. The Japanese battle-cruisers, four in all, have each only eight 14-inch guns.

It is obvious that the fighting power of a navy cannot be estimated by the number of the ships of which it is composed. Much depends upon the number and the kind of guns with which each vessel is equipped. In point of numbers the American dreadnoughts are almost twice as powerful as the Japanese dreadnoughts and battle-cruisers combined, but when the power of the guns on both sides is taken into consideration, the American dreadnoughts are nearly three times as powerful as the Japanese.

Let us turn our attention to the battleships of the pre-dreadnought period. I have said that Japan has thirteen of such ships, aggregating 193,666 tons, as against America's twenty-three with a total displacement of 314,906 tons. In the face of these figures the superiority of the American fleet of battleships cannot be disputed. Yet when it is known that only two of thirteen Japanese battleships are fit to stand on the first line of battle, as against six of the American fleet, the inferiority of the Japanese Navy becomes the more apparent.

On the American side there are sixty-two destroyers, and on the Japanese side fifty. Here the discrepancy is not, *prima facie,* very great. But we must remember, what is more vital, that the majority of American destroyers are seagoing, having a displacement greater than 800 tons each, while the Mikado's Navy has only six destroyers above 800

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tons. Thus sixty-two American destroyers have a total displacement of 73,097 tons, which is more than twice the total tonnage of fifty destroyers of Japan.

As most of the Japanese destroyers are for the purpose of coast defense, so are the Japanese submarines, of which there are only seventeen as against America's fifty-one. While the Japanese submarines are mostly not seagoing, the majority of the American submarines are of a large type, and therefore seagoing.

Last but not least, we must remember that the American Navy has 22 colliers aggregating 236,401 tons, while Japan has none. In a naval expedition to distant waters the collier is as important as the fighting craft, for without fuel no warship can move. The Japanese Navy, being intended to protect Japanese and Chinese waters and not to send expeditions to distant lands, has made no such elaborate provision for supplying its warships with fuel as has been made by the British, German, and American Navies. In case of emergency the Japanese Navy requisitions merchant ships, which are, of course, decidedly unsatisfactory as colliers.

So much for the existing naval strength of Japan as compared with that of the United States. We have seen how insignificant the Japanese fleet is beside the American. And yet this is the fleet which has constantly been held up by scare-mongers and demagogues as the force which the Mikado will some day send across the Pacific to attack the fair coast of California!

But the Japanese, we are told, are feverishly engaged in building new warships. Are they not secretly smarting under the slight which America has meted out to them, and scheming to settle old scores at the point of the bayonet?

Japan has never been " feverishly " engaged in building warships. Has it ever occurred to the average American that as early as 1907 the American Navy was twice as powerful as the Japanese? In the two years that followed America launched six dreadnoughts, while Japan launched only three. The result was that by 1910 the United States had a fleet of warships three times as powerful as the Mikado's, and this ratio has been maintained ever since.

It is significant that while alarmists are raising hysterical cries about the alleged rapid expansion of the Japanese Navy, Japan's naval critics are deeply deploring the utterly " unprepared " condition of their country. As an instance

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of their lamentation I quote the following passage from a series of ten articles written by the naval expert of the *Jiji-Shimpo*, assuredly the most reliable newspaper in Japan:

> It is regrettable that while other Powers have each been pursuing a definite naval policy, our Navy should be permitted to drift with no preconceived plan. The United States adopted, as early as October 19, 1903, the principle which is in reality the foundation of the stupendous naval programme formulated by Secretary Daniels. According to the programme of 1903 the United States was to build thirty-four dreadnoughts in seventeen years.
>
> Turning to Europe, we see that Germany adopted a naval-repletion programme in 1907, Russia in 1911, France in 1912, Italy in 1910, and Austria in 1912. In the meantime we were lagging hopelessly behind these Powers. When at last we awakened to our own sluggishness and decided upon a programme last year, it was only on a ridiculously small scale.

In these two paragraphs is expressed the universal feeling of uneasiness which the Japanese entertain over what they consider the aggressive naval policies of Europe and America. Let us study Japan's new naval programme, which the *Jiji-Shimpo's* naval expert tells us is "on a ridiculously small scale," and compare it with the great programme proposed by Secretary Daniels.

The Japanese programme, adopted last September by the National Defense Council, calls for the construction, in the five years from 1917 to 1921, of four dreadnoughts, six cruisers, ten destroyers, and nine submarines. For the execution of this programme Japan is to expend $85,000,000 in five yearly installments.

Beside this modest programme the American programme looks prodigious. It calls for the building of ten battleships, six battle-cruisers, ten scout-cruisers, fifty destroyers, fifteen seagoing submarines, eighty-five coast submarines, four gunboats, one hospital ship, two ammunition ships, two fuel oil ships, and one repair ship. This requires an expenditure of $422,964,087 in the five years from 1917 to 1921. This enormous expenditure is for new ships alone. In addition to it, $48,518,127 is to be expended for the completion of the dreadnoughts for which work has already been begun. Nor is that all: for the plan provides for an appropriation of $6,000,000 for naval aviation and $25,000,000 for reserve ammunitions. All told, the five-year programme entails an expenditure of $502,482,214.

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Assuming that this stupendous plan were adopted, let us picture the relative strength of the Japanese and American Navies at the end of 1921, when their respective programmes will have been carried out. Leaving out of consideration minor ships such as gunboats, hospital ships, ammunition and repair ships, with which Japan is ill-supplied, the relative position of the two navies by 1921 will be as follows:

	America.	Japan.
Dreadnoughts	27	8
Battle-cruisers	6	4
Battleships	25	15
Cruisers	20	10
Destroyers	112	60
Submarines	151	27
Colliers	24	0

It must be noted that two American ships which are at present classified as dreadnoughts, and two Japanese ships likewise so designated, are, in the above table, counted among battleships, because by 1921 they will have become too old and out-of-date to be called dreadnoughts. A glance at the table shows that the American fleet will be more than twice as powerful as the Japanese. But as I have already said, the American ships are equipped with a larger number of more powerful guns than are the Japanese vessels. Then, too, the majority of American destroyers and submarines are seagoing, while Japanese destroyers and submarines, except a few, are all intended for coast defense. Moreover, the American Navy has the advantage over the Japanese in that it has a large number of the most up-to-date auxiliary ships, such as fuel-oil ships, repair ships, hospital and ammunition ships. When all these facts are taken into consideration, it becomes evident that the American Navy to be built in pursuance of the Administration programme will be almost four times as powerful as the Japanese Navy. Heretofore, the boast of the Japanese Navy, if it really had anything to boast of, has been its battle-cruisers, combining the fighting power of the dreadnought with the speed of the cruiser. The speed of our battle-cruisers during the war with Russia was a marvel to the enemy. Since then the naval Powers of Europe have followed Japan's example and have been building a powerful fleet of battle-cruisers. Strange to say, America has been slow in following suit, and

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has been building only battleships of the dreadnought type. But now the American Navy has awakened to its deficiency in this respect, and, in Secretary Daniel's programme, six battle-cruisers are provided for.

Even if Congress rejected Secretary Daniel's measure, and authorized the building of a smaller number of vessels in pursuance of the principle first inaugurated in 1903, while Japan followed the programme adopted last year, the result would still be that by 1921 the American Navy would have at least twice the strength of the Japanese.

Such, in short, is the "navalism" of Japan—the specter which certain publicists, having their own axes to grind, are constantly exploiting to further their ends. While we are perfectly willing to accept President Wilson's assurance that his naval programme is for self-defense and not for aggression, we fear that other nations will feel that this unprecedented plan of America's has other designs than mere self-defense. There is, indeed, a tone of sinister and cynical frankness in these words published in the official organ of the Navy League at Washington:

> There should be no doubt that, even with all possible moral refinements, it is the absolute right of a nation to live in its fullest intensity, to expand, to found colonies, to get richer and richer by any proper means, such as armed conquest. Such expansion as an aim is an inalienable right, and in the case of the United States it is a particular duty.

Those who fear, or pretend to fear, Japan's "navalism," point to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and give warning that in the event of rupture between Japan and the United States, Great Britain would throw the whole weight of her mighty navy on the Japanese side of the scale. These wiseacres are ignorant that Great Britain will in the near future enter into a general arbitration treaty with this country, and that the Anglo-Japanese alliance contains the following provision:

> Should either High Contracting Party conclude a Treaty of General Arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such Treaty of Arbitration is in force.

Even in the absence of such a clause of exemption, the Japanese know that England would not unsheath the sword to aid them in their combat with America.

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I have shown that the Mikado's Navy is too weak to cope with the American Navy. It would be superfluous to dwell upon the geographical difficulties which Japan would have to surmount—if they are surmountable—in waging an aggressive war against America. I may, however, touch upon this particular phase of the problem by quoting a Japanese naval officer, a veteran of the Russo-Japanese War. Early in 1910, when Captain Hobson and others were diligently applying themselves to the task of creating the ghost of Japanese designs upon Magdalena Bay, I was in Washington, and talked with Commander Tokutaro Hiraga, naval attaché of the Japanese Embassy. The commander, who as a rule was reticent, waxed almost eloquent when our conversation turned to Captain Hobson's prediction of a war between Japan and America, and expressed himself very freely on the impossibility of such a war. Emphasizing the difficulty of protecting a transport on a long voyage, he said:

> During the Russian War Japan had a fleet of warships guarding the six transports employed in carrying troops and ammunitions across the straits of Korea, only eighty miles wide. Yet these transports were attacked and sunk by three Russian cruisers. What would happen if we tried to convoy a fleet of transports across the Pacific to a point 5,700 miles away? To transport a real army across the ocean we would have to impress every steamer afloat in our waters. Has it ever occurred to you that a steamer can carry only fifty soldiers per 100 tons of displacement? It is 3,455 miles from Japan to Hawaii, and 2,288 miles more from Hawaii to San Francisco. Even a Hercules would not be so reckless as to attempt an invasion of California with such an inadequate navy as ours.

We have seen that Japan is neither prepared nor preparing for a military expedition to America. Now the question is whether there are any issues likely to precipitate an armed conflict between the two nations.

The late Count Tadasu Hayashi, the veteran diplomat of Japan, in his posthumous memoirs, says:

> The three questions between Japan and America are the immigration question, the school question, and the problem of China. Not one of these can possibly lead to a war between the two countries. . . . The feeling between the two nations is cordial. Japan regards America as her benefactor, and she is deeply indebted to her for much help and many improvements. In reality, the feelings of Japan for America are as cordial as they were fifty years ago. There are some people who assert that Japan has ambitions on the Philippines and on Hawaii. Any person possessing common sense

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can realize what madness it would be for Japan to deprive so powerful a nation as America of her valuable possessions.

This utterance coming, as it does, from a man noted for his straightforwardness, and found in a document never intended by its author for publication, is especially remarkable. Since Count Hayashi penned those words, the San Francisco school question has disappeared from the diplomatic horizon, and to-day there remain only the immigration and the Chinese questions. And yet, as far as the Japanese Government is concerned, the immigration question has been settled through the instrumentality of a "gentlemen's agreement." When that agreement began to work effectively in 1909, Japanese immigration to the continental United States fell to 2,432, from 9,544 for the preceding year. Against 2,432 admitted in that year, 5,004 Japanese departed from these shores. Again, in 1910 only 2,598 were admitted, while 5,024 returned to Japan. Since 1911, Japanese immigration gradually increased, until, in 1915, it reached 9,029. But it must be remembered that the increase is mainly due to the fact that those Japanese who went home on a visit in the preceding few years have gradually been coming back to this country; for the Japanese Government has not been sending any new immigrants. That this statement is in the main correct can be judged from the fact that in the seven years from 1909 to 1915, 38,932 Japanese entered continental United States, while 39,248 departed for Japan. It must also be kept in mind that the year 1915 was the Exposition year, bringing many Japanese to San Francisco in connection with the Panama-Pacific International Exposition, for which Japan expended $700,000 in spite of California's ungenerous attitude towards her.

To be frank, America ought to be thankful that she finds in Japan an efficient Government to deal with in the adjustment of the immigration question. The Tokio Government has been handling the matter so effectively, skilfully, and honestly that no Japanese has ever been smuggled into this country. With the recent sensational story of the smuggling of Chinese before us, have not the people of California reason to be glad that the Federal Government, in dealing with Japan, is not dealing with such an inefficient Government as that of China? As for the anti-Japanese land law of California, its wisdom or unwisdom may be gauged from the official statement of Mr. George Robertson, statistician of the Cali-

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fornia Board of Agriculture, to the effect that in 1914 the Japanese in California owned only 218 town lots with an essessed value of $136,955, and 331 farms totaling 12,726 acres, and having an assessed value of $478,990. There has never been, and never will be, a wholesale purchase of California land by Japanese.

Not only is the Japanese Government restricting emigration to the United States, but it is most carefully restricting it as well to Mexico and Canada. In spite of all the insinuations which sensational American journals are publishing with regard to the alleged Japanese activities in Mexico, there are only about 3,400 Japanese in all Mexico, and the number is fast decreasing because of the chaotic political conditions in that country.

It is important to note the difference between the situation in Hawaii and the situation in California or on the Pacific Coast. Some critics point to Hawaii as an example of the orientalization of the American soil, and give warning that California must not become a second Hawaii. The fact is that California will never become a second Hawaii, even if she wanted to become such, because the conditions prevailing there are radically different from those in Hawaii. To appreciate this it is only necessary to know something of the history of the sugar industry in the islands. To begin with, Hawaii was not a white man's land; it was inhabited by dark-skinned, semi-civilized natives. And when the white men secured the privilege to exploit its resources they brought all sorts of Oriental labor by the shipload for the sugar plantations. The country had neither a white population nor "white civilization" when the planters began to import Oriental laborers.

The conditions on the Pacific Coast are totally different. Here American civilization and a Caucasian population have been so firmly established that Japanese immigration, so strictly checked by the "gentlemen's agreement," cannot possibly become a danger.

Nor can arguments advanced against Chinese immigration prior to the enactment of the Chinese exclusion laws be applied to the Japanese immigration of to-day. Chinese immigration from 1854 to 1882 totalled 138,455, the overwhelming majority of which came to and remained in California. In view of the fact that in the seventies of the past century, when agitation for Chinese exclusion was begun, the State of

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California had a population of only 560,000, including Negroes, Indians, and Chinese, the apprehension that the Chinese might hinder the wholesome growth of the white community in the State was not without ground. But the conditions on the Pacific Coast have since radically changed, while circumstances attendant upon Japanese immigration are widely different from those accompanying Chinese immigration. In 1900 the white population of California increased to 1,402,727, and in 1910 to 2,259,672. It is difficult to ascertain the number of Japanese in the State. The census of 1910 places it at 41,356. While this seems to be a conservative estimate, it is perhaps no more conservative than the number given for the white population. Perhaps the common estimate, which places the number of Japanese at 60,000, is not far from the mark, although much of it consists of floating elements contemplating a return to Japan, or, to a lesser extent, a move to other States. This number will probably remain stationary, if it does not materially decrease, because of the fact that the gap left by departing Japanese will be filled by children born of Japanese parents in the State.

With the "gentlemen's agreement" strictly enforced, with Americans flowing into California from the Eastern States in ever increasing streams, with the opening of the Panama Canal stimulating European immigration, there is no reason why California should apprehend the "orientalization" of the State.

As far as immigration is concerned, therefore, the Japanese Government does not regard it as a vital issue. It does not intend, as it never intended, to force emigration upon the United States. This is not, of course, to say that Japan does not care to send emigrants to the United States. Indeed, she wishes that America would look at the matter in a different light; but if she has to choose between America's friendship and emigration, she will without a moment's hesitation prefer the former. Moreover, we must credit the Japanese statesmen with the ability to foresee that the immigration question cannot be solved at the point of the sword, for an armed conflict must inevitably intensify race hatred, and thus defeat the very purpose for which the war is waged. What Japan wants, then, is not emigration, but just treatment of the small number of Japanese who are already domiciled in this country.

This, in short, is the real status of the immigration ques-

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tion, much talked about but little understood. If America cannot tolerate even such a conciliatory attitude on the part of the Japanese, it will perhaps behoove her to bend her energies to the upbuilding of a great navy, for her relentless pursuit will ultimately drive the Japanese to the point where they will have to make their last desperate stand. We have too great a faith in the wisdom and sagacity of the American people to think for a moment that they will ever play such an unprofitable game.

Perhaps a greater danger lies in the Chinese question, if America, relying upon the great naval prowess which she is now trying to attain, be determined to enforce her will in that part of the world. For here Japan will show herself unyielding. She thinks, and with good reason, that she has already made concession enough to the United States in regard to the immigration question, and expects the United States to show a similar spirit of concession in dealing with her in regard to the affairs of the Orient. Japan firmly believes that the measures she has taken in China are intended for the mutual benefit of China and herself, and for the prevention of the political encroachment of Western Powers upon her ancient neighbor. She is equally certain that the "open door" in China has not been closed by her hands. Surely America will not be so short-sighted as to display her superior naval strength by bullying the Japanese out of the country with which their destiny is so closely interwoven.

K. K. KAWAKAMI.

COMMENT BY THE EDITOR

Mr. Kawakami deprecates the idea that the United States should prepare against Japan; and he bases his argument mainly on the statement that the United States Navy is much greater than the Japanese.

That our navy is greater than the Japanese may be granted at once, if one includes in a navy only such things as battleships, cruisers and other water craft. Mr. Kawakami seems to do so; for his statement of the forces on both sides includes only dreadnoughts, battlecruisers, "battleships of the old style," armored cruisers, destroyers and submarines; with the addition also, for the United States, of twenty-two colliers. He makes no mention of airships and aeroplanes, though it is well known that in these essential

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craft, Japan's navy far outstrips the United States Navy.

The data which Mr. Kawakami gives as to the actual tonnage in naval craft possessed by the two Powers, while approximately correct, according to information held in this country, indicates a disparity greater than our information indicates. Furthermore, the data are based on published statements, though the feeling is everywhere prevalent that the Government of Japan has been making large profits from the sale of munitions to the Allies, and that these profits are being expended in building war craft in the censured seclusion of the dockyards of the Government. Nothing more natural, more wise, or more proper could be done with those profits. The position of the Japanese Islands, lonely and small, inhabited by a race virile, ambitious and brave, requires just such measures of foresight and decision. All honor to Japan for her sturdy spirit. We wish there were more of that spirit in the hundred million people inhabiting the United States.

But let us grant that the disparity in war craft between the two navies is as great as Mr. Kawakami thinks; what is the disparity in trained officers and men? Here the disparity is reversed; for the Japanese navy has, including trained reservists, more than ten per cent. of officers and men than have we. A navy cannot fight more ships than it has men with whom to fight them.

From this point of view, we see that the Japanese Navy, so far as successful fighting is concerned, is ten per cent. *greater* than ours! Even, however, if we should admit that, in number of ships and men, our navy were superior to the Japanese, we should remember that that superiority in actual war would be effective in one case only—the case in which the Japanese fleet operated as far away from her coast, or nearly as far away, as the United States fleet did from hers. But if, for instance, our fleet had to go to Japanese waters to carry on a war, as the Russian fleet did, it would be under such disadvantages in the matter of getting fuel and supplies, and in making needed repairs, that the net advantage would probably be on the Japanese side, instead of on ours. For instance, if the Japanese should take the Philippine Islands, either because they wanted them, or because they did not want the United States to keep them, they could easily capture them, and land so large an army that it would be impossible for us to take them back, without

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sending a highly trained army of greater size, and carried in transports far more numerous, than it has ever yet entered into the American mind to conceive. The practical difficulties of successfully convoying so many helpless vessels over so great a distance into hostile seas would be almost insuperable, as would also be the difficulties of supporting our troops when landing in the face of active opposition. The mere sustaining of our fleet so far away from any kind of base, and in the face of the attacks that would be made by submarines, air craft, destroyers and other vessels, would be a feat never yet accomplished by any navy. So we see that even if our fleet could defeat the Japanese, if the Japanese attacked our continental coasts, it could not protect the Philippine Islands from capture, and might not be able to retake them after they were captured.

The admission just made that the United States fleet could defeat the Japanese, if Japan attacked our Western coast, assumed that our entire fleet could leave the East coast and go to the West coast. Perhaps it would be safe to do so, and perhaps not; sometimes it would be safe, and sometimes not. Surely it would not be safe now. If Japan should attack our West coast now, would we send our fleet there? Remember, the Panama Canal will be untrustworthy for some time to come. Even after it shall have gone into successful operation, we shall look at it very critically, when the question of trusting our entire fleet in it may come up. We do not wish to have the canal break down just when half our ships have got through; or even after the entire fleet may have gone through in safety to the Pacific; for it would take it two months to get back to our Eastern coast, by way of Magellan's Straits.

People in the United States are not "nervous," as Mr. Kawakami fears, about Japan; or about Germany, Great Britain or any other Power or Powers. On the contrary, they are nerveless about them, and will probably continue to be so, until shells begin to fall in their back yards. Some of them do feel, however, that while Japan has no intention of attacking us just now, she may strike, swiftly and effectively, when some other Power attacks us on the East coast, or when tension with some other Power is so great that we would be afraid to send the fleet into the Pacific.

Bear in mind that the United States has no ally, and that Japan has several.—THE EDITOR.

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CLOSING THE OPEN DOOR

BY GEORGE BRONSON REA

If America desires to participate in the development of China's resources, we must invest our capital through Japanese intermediaries, permit Japanese managers to direct the enterprises, and Japanese engineers, foremen and other technical and skilled assistants to supervise them during construction and after completion.—This, in brief, is the new doctrine laid down by Japan for this nation to follow in China. Unless we accept its provisions, we are warned by Baron Shibusawa that "our activities in the Chinese market might lead to hostile competition, mutual distrust and bitter animosity which may be mutually disastrous."

After two months spent in this country preaching the new doctrine, Baron Shibusawa returned to Japan in January and proclaimed to his people that his mission had been a success, and that American financiers had pledged themselves to co-operate through Japan in the "peaceful exploitation" of China. Careful investigation, however, among the leading financiers of Wall Street, reveals the fact that no such pledge was ever given. The announcement was emphatically made that American financiers would never endorse any doctrine which impaired the rights of the Chinese Government, ignored the rights of the Chinese to participate in the development of their own country, or undermined the policy of the American Government proclaimed in the Note of May 16 last to the Governments of China and Japan.

The issues between the two nations are therefore intensified by this latest development and must sooner or later compel a reopening of questions that have long been left quiescent by the Administration and the press of this country. These issues involve the independence of the Republic of China, and the right of Japan to exercise a dominant influ-

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ence over the political and commercial affairs of this peaceful nation. Japan has declared a super-Monroe doctrine over Eastern Asia (under which the Philippines would immediately fall if cast adrift by this country) based on the theory that the independence of China is menaced by some imaginary Western Power, and that to protect her own independence, she, Japan, must exercise control over the affairs of her larger but weaker neighbor. This doctrine of paramount political interest is now reinforced, as far as the United States is concerned, by the declaration that Japan must exercise supreme commercial control over future Chinese industrial developments. Unless the United States is prepared to accept this interference with its treaty rights, the alternative has been made very clear to us by Baron Shibusawa and the official Japanese publicists in this country. The result will be "disastrous." In plain words, it may lead to hostilities.

Is Japan's position justified? Is China's independence threatened, and, if so, by what Power? Before any discussion of these questions is possible, it is essential that certain facts be made perfectly clear, facts that will prove without the shadow of doubt that China's independence and neutrality are guaranteed through a series of interlocking conventions before which the agreement to respect the independence of Belgium fades into insignificance.

The integrity of China is guarded by four treaties, and it is of interest to note that Japan is a party to each, therefore binding herself four times over to respect the independence of her neighbor.

In chronological order these treaties are:

1. The Franco-Japanese Agreement of June, 1907; 2. The Russo-Japanese Convention of July, 1907; 3. The Root-Takahira Agreement of November, 1908; and 4. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance of July, 1911.

The wording of the portion of these instruments relating to the preservation of the independence of China is almost identical, as will be seen from the following extracts:

Franco-Japanese Agreement: The Governments of Japan and France, being agreed to respect the independence and integrity of China, as well as the principle of equal treatment in that country for the commerce and subjects of citizens of all nations . . . engage to support each other for assuring the peace and security in those regions, with a view to maintain the respective situation and

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the territorial rights of the two High Contracting Parties in the Continent of Asia.

Russo-Japanese Convention: The two High Contracting Parties agree to recognize the independence and the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in the said Empire, and they engage to uphold and defend the maintenance of the *status quo* and the respect of that principle by all the peaceful means possible to them.

Root-Takahira Agreement: They [America and Japan] are also determined to preserve the common interests of the Powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire.

Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance: The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China. (Object B.).

There is a strong family likeness to be discerned in these solemn engagements. The importance (in the interests of the Powers themselves) of maintaining the independence of China is fully recognized. It is the cornerstone of Far Eastern diplomacy. In addition to the above citations of international law as applied to China it is also important to invite special attention to the following clause of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty between Russia and Japan:

Treaty of Peace Between Japan and Russia: Article III. The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

Article IV: Japan and Russia reciprocally agree not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

To the above guarantees for the preservation of China's administrative and territorial integrity, must be added the pledges given to the American Government, by France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia, to adhere to the commercial policy of the Open Door, conceding the right of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China. The principle underlying the Open Door is based on the complete recognition of China's administra-

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tive independence, and the undisturbed application of the Chinese treaty tariff, levied and collected by the Chinese Government. As explained by Mr. Choate, our Ambassador to Great Britain, in his Note to Lord Salisbury:

> It is the sincere desire of my Government that the interests of its citizens may not be prejudiced through exclusive treatment by any of the controlling Powers within their respective "spheres of interests" in China, and it hopes . . . to remove dangerous sources of international irritation, and thereby hasten united action of the Powers at Peking to promote administrative reforms so greatly needed for *strengthening the Imperial Government and maintaining the integrity of China, etc.*"

In subscribing to the doctrine of the Open Door, the Governments of France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia, therefore, entered into a solemn agreement with the Government of the United States to respect not only the principle of equal opportunity but the independence of China on which the principle is based.

It will be seen that the only great Power with whom Japan has not entered into any special agreement to respect and maintain the independence of China is Germany. But it is well to remember that until recent years, Germany and Great Britain were partners in the exploitation of China under an agreement between their official financial groups, approved by their respective foreign offices. It is also well to recall that the Governments of Germany and Great Britain entered into an agreement signed at London on October 16, 1900, to defend the integrity of China:

> *British-German Agreement:* (2) Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial German Government will not, on their part, make use of the present complication to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions, and will direct their policy toward maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire.
>
> (3) In case of another Power making use of the complications in China in order to obtain under any form whatever such territorial advantages the two contracting parties reserve to themselves to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China.

The independence of China and the rights of all Powers to equal opportunity in that country would seem to be adequately guaranteed. Japan is a party to the most important covenants. If Japan now proclaims that these guarantees

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are worthless, and that it becomes her duty to exercise paramount control over China by the declaration of an Oriental Monroe Doctrine, she announces to the world that the United States and the Powers of Europe can not be trusted to live up to their agreements. The pretension of Japan that her political and commercial interests in China are paramount and must be acknowledged by America would seem to be a clean-cut violation of all treaties and an imputation of bad faith against all the Powers who have solemnly pledged their honor to respect the independence of China. Japan's new doctrine, therefore, isolates her from the family of nations, and creates an issue that will have to be faced as soon as the Powers have time to devote to their interests in that part of the world.

The issues involved in the maintenance of China's independence and the preservation of the doctrine of equal opportunity have a direct bearing on the future peace in this country. Japan's policy of aggression towards her weaker neighbor at a time when no one can interfere creates another focus of international trouble which bodes ill for the peace of the Pacific.

Since the day when President Wilson penned his first "strict accountability" note to Germany, the attention of the nation has been focused on the tremendous drama being enacted on the stage of Europe. International law has almost ceased to exist. Solemn treaties and covenants underlying the existing code have been ruthlessly violated. Might reigns supreme. Thanks to widespread and intelligent publicity, these issues are clean-cut and comprehensible to the people of America.

Similar issues have arisen in the Pacific, but no voice is raised to warn the nation of their import. A seeming conspiracy of silence, of criminal indifference and childlike incredulity, operates to conceal the truth from the public; and the nation drifts onward to its peril. As Germany's armed might riveted the shackles of bondage on unoffending Belguim, so has the great Oriental military Power violated her pledges and sought to fasten the yoke of her imperialism upon unprotected China. The destruction of Belgium finds its counterpart in the rape of China, but the threat of dire punishment prevents the full truth from being proclaimed to the world by the defenseless victims of Oriental aggression. No Chinese official dares lift his voice in protest against the

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violation of his country. The feeble cries of outraged China are drowned amidst the uproar of the mighty conflict of giants in Europe; the vociferous protestations of Japan that she is protecting her own honor (through the dishonor of her victim) distracts attention from the accomplished deed.

On January 18 of last year, the Japanese Minister at Peking presented twenty-one demands on the President of China, which, if accepted in full, would have converted China into a vassal state of the Mikado. These demands violated every principle that Japan's allies were fighting to maintain in Europe. Every argument advanced by Great Britain to justify her entrance into the war against Germany applies with equal force against Japan. There was no provocation; no justifiable pretext. Japan's independence was not threatened. Taking advantage of the life and death struggle in Europe, Japan stood forth in her "shining armor" and gratified her lust for power on her innocent and unprotected neighbor.

The Open Door policy was converted into waste paper; the basis of Japan's alliance with Great Britain was discredited and destroyed; the solemn promises embraced within the provisions of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty to respect the rights of China in Manchuria were publicly scouted, and other equally binding compacts were as indifferently set aside. The European signatories to the treaties were busy fighting for their own lives, and the one Government which could protest was dominated by the arch-priest of pacifism, who, on previous occasions, had tacitly acquiesced in Japan's interpretation of her mission in China.

The hour that Japan had patiently waited for had struck; the "opportunity which would one day surely come in the Orient" — Viscount Hayashi's prediction — had arrived. Japan, in her strength, could do as she pleased, and, if necessary, "put meddling Powers in their places." "She had waited long, preparing against the day of opportunity," and, when it dawned, she threw off the mask, worn merely in order to lull the suspicions of the world, and boldly followed in the footsteps of Germany by repudiating her solemn pledges to maintain the *status quo* in China. Strong pressure was brought to bear in order to prevent the truth from leaking out. All the resources of secret diplomacy and government-controlled sources of news were manipulated to

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conceal the facts. Slowly, very slowly, however, the truth percolated through the meshes of the censorship. As fact after fact was disclosed to an amazed and unbelieving world, Japan denied and denied, until concealment was no longer possible. Then, and only then, after the accomplished fact, did she admit the truth as to the twenty-one demands, and sought to justify her attitude by classifying the vital demands as only "wishes" or "desires." But these "desires" are on record, and the threat hangs over China that they are to be revived at some future time; or, in other words, they will be transformed into demands when Japan, in her opinion, decides that the opportune time has again arrived. Last year Japan was caught in the act; the process of lulling the suspicions of the world is now being repeated all over again.

The truth concerning the number, nature and scope of the demands was repeatedly brought to the attention of President Wilson and the then Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, but not until the eleventh hour did the American Government place its position on record. As in the case of Belgium, there was no protest against the violation of international law. There was no publicity. The American Note to China and Japan was not handed out to the newspaper correspondents at Washington for publication in the papers of this country. The American people would have remained in total ignorance of this act of their Government had not a wide-awake English correspondent at Peking cabled it in full to the London *Daily Telegraph*. Its subsequent publication by one newspaper in this country aroused temporary curiosity; and, one month after the note was dispatched, it was finally corroborated by the American correspondent stationed at Peking.

This one incident is typical of the secrecy surrounding the policy of the Administration towards the issues in the Pacific. Prior to this and for some time afterwards (until the policy of the State Department in this particular was revised) every note to the European Powers was immediately handed to the press, but wild horses cannot drag from the State Department any information concerning the greater issues involved in the disputes with Japan. It is significant that even the American news services failed to perform their functions at this critical juncture. What influences operated to prevent this important note finding

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its way promptly into the columns of the newspapers? Even after its publication in this country, there were no editorial comments—absolutely no intelligent discussion. It was immediately forgotten. It is well to recall its exact wording:

> In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place or which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and the agreements which have been reached and as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into, or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy commonly known as the Open Door policy.

An identical note was handed to the Japanese Government through the American Legation at Tokio.

This is clear and to the point. It places our Government on record as asserting that the United States will not recognize any impairment of international law as applied to China. In effect it is almost another "strict accountability" note; and as events proved, it had as little effect in deterring Japan from her course in China: as Germany disregarded the submarine note, so Japan politely ignored our right to interfere in China. Her army and navy were mobilized for war. Her fleet was in Chinese waters, cleared for action. Her forces in China had been doubled under the pretext of relieving the garrisons already stationed in China. No one could interfere. America was the only Power which could object. But a Higher Power intervened on behalf of Japan. The Great Buddha providentially came to the assistance of his chosen people, and caused a warship accidentally to run her nose into the soft mud of Turtle Bay in Southern California, providing the excuse for the assembling there of a Japanese squadron with colliers, repair and supply ships. A temporary advanced naval base was established between San Diego and the Panama Canal, superior to the American naval force at that time in the Pacific, for the legitimate purpose of protecting the salvage work. It was all perfectly correct and proper. Providence took the place of strategy on behalf of Japan, and during all the time that the negotiations were proceeding in Peking, a Japanese fleet was secretly ensconced within striking dis-

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tance of the vulnerable coasts of the only nation which might intervene or protest. It was simply accident. We must accept Japan's explanation. But we must remember that Count Okuma told his people at that time that " diplomacy to be successful must be backed up by force." When weak and unprepared America attempted to preserve adherence to the accepted tenets of international law in China by the dispatch of another diplomatic note, the Premier of Japan smiled and proceeded to make China pay.

The American Note bore the date of May 16. One week later, with this warning before her, Japan compelled China to sign two treaties and exchange fourteen notes, which did impair the rights of America in China, circumscribed the rights of American citizens to do business with the Chinese Government, annulled two valuable American contracts with the sovereign state of China, deprived the Chinese Government of its political and administrative independence in two provinces, and, by reverting to the " Spheres of Interest " doctrine in Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia, Shantung and Fukien, repudiated the policy commonly known as the Open Door policy. The American Government has placed itself on record that it cannot recognize these impairments of the treaties. The issue is clear.

America may never go to war in defense of these principles of international law as applied to far-off China. All the great Powers have declared their adhesion to the Open Door doctrine, and are bound by a series of interlocking treaties, conventions and understandings to respect the territorial and political integrity of China. While these Powers are engaged in a life and death struggle for the maintenance of their own independence, one of the signatories to the treaties (in pursuit of purely selfish aims) has broken through the ringed fence of international agreements. Might makes right; and, while this situation exists, America can only place herself on record as refusing to countenance or recognize the violation of principles in China to which all Powers have equally subscribed and which they have pledged themselves to uphold.

The fundamentals of international morality on which the future peace of the world must rest are now being ground into powder between the millstones of military expediency. If the sanctity of treaties is to be replaced in the future by the will of the strongest, there can be no peace. If, there-

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fore, after the war in Europe, the Christian Powers acquiesce in Japan's spoliation of China; if the binding power of solemn covenants, alliances and other agreements does not apply where the rights of this defenseless and pacific nation are concerned; if meekness and righteousness, based on justice, are to be made the sport of armed force; if might is to be right, the future of America is clearly foreshadowed. For, as defenseless China, through her acceptance of the doctrines of pacifism inculcated in the spirit of the people through centuries of domination by the literati, passes under the yoke of the stronger military Power; so, too, in time, will the days of our pacific Republic be numbered, and (as Count Okuma was good enough to advise us) "we will be governed by those who have mended our ways."

If the Open Door doctrine, subscribed to by all the great Powers of the world, is powerless to save China; if treaties, conventions, protocols, understandings and alliances based on the preservation of China's independence are utterly worthless; if the defenseless nation is still considered as the prize of her two neighbors, America may well ask herself how she is to maintain the Monroe Doctrine when the strong-armed nations of the world, on conquest bent, laugh at our unsupported pretensions. And, if China goes under without a protest from America, if Europe stands idly by and acquiesces in Japan's demands, just so surely will the Monroe Doctrine be put to the test later, and unless we are prepared, it will be too late. There is only one alternative: America must arm, and arm rapidly. We must stop talking, and prepare to fight for our life.

GEORGE BRONSON REA.

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INFLUENCE OF THE WAR UPON THE POPULATION

BY WILLIAM S. ROSSITER

WHAT is to be the effect upon population of the war which is now being waged by the great Powers of Europe?

After a year and a half of conflict in which the successes and failures of one group of belligerents seem to balance almost exactly the successes and failures of the other group, it is possible to present in orderly fashion, certain fundamental facts relating to population, knowledge of which is essential in any serious analysis of war loss of human life.

In 1815 the Battle of Waterloo brought to a close the long period of nearly continuous European wars which began in 1793, and from which the great Powers emerged exhausted. In 1916, after the passage of a century of generally peaceful development, the leaders in the contests of the Napoleonic period, reinforced by large population increase and immense expansion of material resources, are again at war. Thus the century from 1816 to 1916 has had no counterpart. It began with the close of what was then the greatest war of all time, and ended with the beginning of a far greater contest. Yet the epoch-making war now in progress has been made possible by the population development of the century.

The population of 1816, the year in which general peace began, of Russia (in Europe), France, Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom and Italy, was 164,390,143.[1] To a

[1] Population in 1816 of the Nations at War in 1916.

Russia (Europe)	45,000,000
France	29,676,148
Austria	27,000,000
Germany	24,833,000
United Kingdom	19,500,000
Italy	18,380,995
	164,390,143

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much larger degree than in our own time these nations were composed of peasantry, supported from the soil. Cities were small. Exclusive of Russia the number of inhabitants per square mile in the nations specified ranged from 104 in Austria-Hungary to 166 in the Italian States, a uniformity which reflects the generally agricultural character of the nations at that period.

In 1816 countryside and city were war-scarred, and most of the people of Europe were poor and bereaved. Yet economic changes, revolutionary in extent, were impending. The application of steam to industrial and transportation uses was about to open a new realm of activity and profit by the safe and rapid interchange of products, which was to provide employment for additional millions. Moreover, to nations already well populated, but having small geographical areas, this epoch-making development actually held out an invitation to increase materially their population. Hence, it appears that in 1914, after the passage of almost one hundred years, the number of inhabitants of the great Powers now at war had increased to 390,993,402,[1] almost two and a half times the number living in the same area in 1816.

In 1716 the population of the six Powers now fighting seems to have aggregated about 65,000,000. According to one authority, increase in the population of Europe in the sixteenth century approximated 25 per cent; in the seventeenth, 20 per cent, and in the eighteenth, 50 per cent.

The increase shown from 1816 to 1914 was approximately 150 per cent, and probably was unprecedented. Europe, sparsely settled, with great areas of wilderness and forest, and the tribal conditions described by Caesar, required at least two thousand years to develop the dense population existing in our own time, but the rate of increase which occurred from 1816 to 1916, if applied from the beginning of

[1] Population in 1914 of the Nations Then About to Engage in War.

Russia (in Europe, including Poland)	141,679,176
Germany	68,442,262
Austria	51,080,081
United Kingdom	46,498,959
France	39,947,699
Italy	35,597,784
Belgium	7,747,441
	390,993,402

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this long period of growth, would have provided, almost a thousand years ago, the population recorded by the Powers in 1914.

During the century from 1816 to 1914 unoccupied area and natural advantages invited increase and development for Russia only. The industrial and economic changes which occurred from 1816 to 1914 exerted an immediate and remarkable influence upon all the others, and in general were responsible for population increase. In 1914 the inhabitants of Austria had increased to 195 per square mile; in France, to 193; in the United Kingdom, to 382. In the latter, however, the increase may be said to have resulted from exceptional causes. In Italy, the increase of population resulted in 321 inhabitants per square mile, but the latter country and Austria found relief to some extent from population congestion through emigration.

The most significant changes during the century occurred in the area which became the German Empire. In 1816 the inhabitants of Prussia and the other German States numbered 123 per square mile. Because of industrial development and the ambitious attitude of the nation, population increased with remarkable rapidity upon a small and unchanged geographical area, until, in 1914, the population of the Empire approached seventy millions. Having thus increased to nearly three times the population shown in 1816, and upon practically the same area, the German rate of increase was exceeded only by that of Russia. Colonial outlets, which the United Kingdom found so efficacious in meeting the same problem, proved of doubtful value to Germany. Emigration, the other main source of relief, steadily decreased. In the United States, for example, to which flowed a very large early German immigration, the number of persons born in Germany decreased in number 283,561 from 1890 to 1910. For the five years 1909 to 1913 inclusive, the total emigration from the German Empire was but 117,530. Thus, the number of inhabitants per square mile continued to increase until in 1914 it reached 328. If this unit were applied to the United States, our population would approximate one thousand millions.

It is evident that if the increasing number of the German people found no natural or adequate outlet, the characteristics of the nation were such as to suggest the probability of

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reversion to age old methods for the purpose of reducing population pressure. From a strictly statistical standpoint, therefore, the present conflict might be considered as simply a logical outcome of population congestion. There are doubtless innumerable other factors to account in part for the war, but a statistician would be inclined to find the one here mentioned a sufficient cause.

To understand clearly the change in the population of the six Powers which has been in progress during the century, it is necessary to observe their population weight in 1816 as compared with that existing in 1916:

	Relation on a scale of 100	
Nation	1816	1916
Russia	27	36
France	18	10
Austria	17	13
Germany	15	18
United Kingdom	12	12
Italy	11	9
Belgium	—	2
Total	100	100

It will be observed that Russia and Germany only have increased their relative importance. Great Britain has remained stationary and the others have lost in varying degree. The significance of the relatively increasing importance of Germany and decreasing importance of France is obvious, but the thoughtful observer is likely to ask if the striking preponderance of Russia may not prove to be of greatest ultimate significance. This increase alone of all those recorded during the century, came from distinctly natural causes. Should the industrial development which in large part has been responsible for the increase in the other nations, (and the influence of which in those nations must now be nearly spent), become a factor for increase in Russia, it would be difficult to set bounds to her power.

With population increased to two and a half times that existing a century earlier, what were the human resources available to the great Powers when the present war began?

In 1910 or 1911 the number of men within the age groups

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approximately 15-50 years in the nations at war was 87,764,606.[1]

The natural increase which occurred since the enumerations here utilized, may be regarded as more than offset by the number of defective, dependent and ill, set by some authorities as high as one-fourth, so that 80,000,000 can be suggested as an approximation of the number of strong males actually available to the nations at war in 1914.

Estimates made before the Royal Statistical Society in March last, with later estimates by American authorities, indicate that approximately 30,000,000 men will have been called to all branches of military service by July 1st, 1916. Thus it appears that about three-eighths of all the available men in the nations at war are now with the colors, or will be by the end of the second year of the war, while in Belgium and northern France, and in practically all of Poland, the remaining theoretical five-eighths, as factors in war or national affairs, have been impaired or destroyed.

How many men of the total human resources a nation may spare for actual warfare without jeopardizing economic life, has never been determined. Although by the end of this war the problem will be nearer solution than ever before, a new uncertainty has been introduced by the fact that war has become largely a matter of machinery and supplies. Hence the pressing need for many thousands of operatives in munition and supply plants, so that the number of workers for war at home now bears somewhat the same relation to the number actually fighting that the hull of a ship below the water line bears to the structure above. In general one might venture the opinion that in this period, a nation can not hazard in the battle line much more than fifty per cent of all effectives.

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[1] Males of virile age (15-50) in Powers at War, 1910-11.

Austria-Hungary:	
Austria	6,919,000
Hungary	5,816,000
Belgium	2,089,650
France	10,034,400
Germany	15,658,578
Italy	7,426,807
Russia	28,661,500
United Kingdom:	
England and Wales	8,917,571
Scotland	1,146,739
Ireland	1,094,361
	87,764,606

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If this be accepted as reasonable, the nations at war are fast nearing the limit of men available as shown by the latest censuses, and must hereafter depend almost entirely upon lads just reaching, or possibly only approaching, military age. To call upon mere boys, however, is a grave draft upon national vitality.

Losses for the first year ranged from 12 per cent to thirty-three per cent. At the end of the second year 40 per cent will not be excessive to cover service mortality and also incapacitated survivors. This would represent a loss by the Powers at war of 12,000,000 men, withdrawn, moreover, from the most virile element, set, it will be recalled, at 80,000,000 in all.

What is the normal increase in the male population of the nations now drawing so heavily upon their human resources, and when can they expect to repair the loss?

For the Census decade nearest 1914, the population of the belligerent nations increased 46,863,687.[1] Assuming the births to be divided with practical equality between the sexes, the males born in these nations during the ten-year period, exceeded those dying by approximately twenty-three and one-half millions.

Considering the increase above shown merely as an aggregate, the loss of 12,000,000 males represents about five years of normal excess male births over deaths. Even under most favorable conditions, five years would be too brief a period in which to replenish the great human losses already incurred. With 15 per cent of all males of virile age killed or incapacitated and many more impaired in strength, repair of losses would proceed at a slower rate than that previously shown when those removed by violent death or wounds, themselves contributed toward the increase.

The normal peace rate of increase can not, indeed, properly be accepted as indicating the rate of future increase. This becomes apparent at once upon inspecting the varying rates of increase heretofore shown by the several nations at war.

[1] Ten Year Increase of Population

Russia	27,148,442
Germany	8,625,060
Austria-Hungary	4,053,154
Great Britain	3,761,439
Belgium	730,226
France	349,242
Italy	2,196,124
	46,863,687

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Russia, for example, reported a normal increase of more than 13,500,000 males during the decade ending in 1914. Russian levies and Russian losses are unknown, but even if 3,500,000 men or even a larger number, have been killed or rendered useless, obviously the Russian Empire can speedily repair this loss, since the normal male increase is 1,300,000 per annum. Withdrawing the Russian increase from the aggregate decade increase of the warring Powers, the normal or peace increase to be expected in a ten-year period for the remaining five nations is approximately 9,850,000 males. It has been suggested that the war loss of males by these Powers by the end of the second year will approximate 8,500,000. For the Powers, therefore, exclusive of Russia, the loss approaches the normal male decade increase so closely, that the operation of adverse factors, such as loss of great numbers of virile males, bereavement and poverty, will make unlikely repair of this loss much within double the normal peace period for such increase.

Even this computation is too general. Clearly the nations at war will vary greatly in the period required to replace human loss. Germany and Austria-Hungary combined show a normal peace excess of male births over deaths of 6,400,000 per decade. They might be expected to repair a loss of 5,000,000 within at least fifteen years, but many factors are to be considered before even such bounds can be set. If the war is finally ended by some agreement under which Germany and Austria fail to extend their boundaries and to receive great indemnities, they will enter the new period of peace under staggering indebtedness. Loss of strong men, vitality, prestige and treasure, may be expected to retard somewhat the normal increase even of these prolific states.

In the case of Great Britain the problem of repair of human loss is somewhat complicated by the participation of many colonial troops, but here also, if the probable loss at the end of the second year in soldiers and sailors dead from warfare, exposure and disease, or incapacitated, reaches one million, more than a decade would be needed under conditions developing favorably, to repair the loss.

In Belgium, it is probable that the military loss has equaled the normal decade increase of male births over deaths, but the entire social structure of the nation has been so shaken and impaired that even if the kingdom receives

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again the independence so richly its due, without immigration the loss of strong men is not likely to be repaired for a long period of years.

For France, uncertainty concerning recovery of human loss is naturally greater than for the other Powers. Although rich in enterprise and exhibiting a marvellous degree of sacrifice and patriotism, French population has long been practically at a standstill.

The total losses of the French army in the Franco-Prussian war amounted to 150,000, and losses of life from all causes due to war approximated 200,000. The Census of 1872 showed a decrease of population as compared with the enumeration of 1866 of 392,000. The Census of 1876, however, showed the largest increase (reckoned as annual increase per 10,000 inhabitants) since 1821-41. Thus but two years were required to repair the war loss in French males. Reasonably generous increase was again reported in 1881, but since that date the population of France has showed an average increase of less than 60,000 per annum, or only enough to increase the number of inhabitants one person per square mile, every four years.

How will the French Republic confront the enormous loss of strong men caused by this war? If reckoned on the basis of normal increase, a loss of 2,500,000 men will be replaced only after the lapse of 83 years. This, of course, would mean that France never could make good her loss, but would be doomed to actual decrease in population; for the capacity to increase, feeble under favorable peace conditions, would have been fatally impaired by the loss of strong males.

This seemingly logical conclusion, however, can not be accepted. The returns for the decade following the war of 1870 suggest the temper of the French people under discouragement and humiliation. From the thronging incidents and impressions of the present war stand out perhaps before all others, the patient restraint, limitless sacrifice and patriotism of the French people. Who can doubt but that these qualities will be manifested in the endeavor to repair human loss? Yet under the most favorable conditions, repair of such loss is likely to require at least two decades.

There is another factor which bears upon the replacement of population. Before the beginning of the present war, males were in a decided minority in all the seven nations in-

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volved. Under the most favorable peace conditions, a shortage existed of 5,000,000 males.[1] Emigration to America was in part responsible for this phenomenon, though it occurs also in countries from which there were few departures. Added to the direct war loss of approximately 12,000,000, the male sex in the nations now at war may be expected to begin the new era of peace to be hoped for after the close of this conflict, 17,538,000 less in number than the female sex.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, France, because of constant wars, was reduced in proportion of males to females as 950 to 1,000. This proportion applied to the aggregate population of the Powers at war would result in an excess from all causes of approximately ten millions of females. Upon the assumption of an early termination of hostilities, the foregoing analysis has shown that an excess of approximately 17,600,000 females is to be expected at the close of the present war. This excess would represent for every 1,000 women, but 914 men.

From the maze of conflicting influences, many of which are entirely new in human affairs, and which may set at naught all expectations, some solution for the two interesting statistical problems here sketched will appear. They may be thus summarized:

First, will the new and grave aspect of life which accompanies the tragedies and momentous events of war, will bereavement, loss and quickened patriotism—and above all, will instinct, lead the men and women who survive to take up the burdens of home and nation after this war, to make good by increased fertility the loss in strong men which is now in progress in Europe?

Second, what is to be the effect on population change of the great excess of women?

Nature equips the male to meet emergencies of reasonable sex disproportion, and through the ages seemingly has

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[1] Excess of Females, 1910-11.

Great Britain	1,328,625
France	634,000
Germany	841,800
Austria-Hungary	699,711
Russia (including Poland)	1,344,400
Italy	627,997
Belgium	62,206
	5,538,739

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expected this condition to exist. But, the impending disproportion in Europe will be unusual. It is possible, indeed, that sex equilibrium may be so disturbed as to affect social and economic conditions for several decades.

No statistician of our time has expected to see these problems worked out to a solution during his own lifetime, nor has he expected a solution to appear for many decades, yet before us in the quick march of events that are to follow the greatest of all wars, it seems probable that some natural law will begin to reveal itself, under the influence of which men and women will set about the early repair of human loss, or else one or more of the nations involved in this conflict will face continued weakness, which is certain to lead to their destruction or absorption at no distant date.

It must not be overlooked that the crude but effective method existing in past ages to protect the race has to a large degree been abandoned. In earlier periods of history, nations were not concerned with the economic aspects of events. Neverthless they unconsciously performed an important economic function by making war in such fashion as generally to secure the survival of the fittest. Under the most favorable conditions, only the reasonably fit survived to maturity, and therefore, while the waging of a war decreased the male population, in general the most virile survived.

Under modern conditions the perfection of medicine and surgery has enabled a large proportion of weaklings to reach maturity. They do not recruit the armies now in the field, but remain at home and breed. Meantime, the strong, who as of old are found on the field of battle, are being reduced by every known destructive agency, without regard to individual strength or prowess. Those who finally return from the war will be those who escaped shell, bomb and bullet by lucky accident, not those whose strength overcame adversaries. Hence the burden of carrying forward the nations is likely to fall more heavily than heretofore upon a weak or weaker human element.

Among thoughtful observers of the momentous events now transpiring in Europe, apprehension is general that the economic system prevailing before the war has been shattered beyond repair. It may matter little what form the conditions for peace ultimately assume. The withdrawal of 30,000,000 workers from active civil pursuits, has been met by

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drafting women into the callings of men. Nearly half of the absent male workers either will never return, or will return physically or mentally weakened. The new activities of women, their numerical preponderance, and the new ideals and ambitions of war-aroused men, are likely to exert revolutionary influences upon reproduction, and upon the social and economic life of the nations concerned.

As we wonder and speculate, the ruthless hand of war may be fashioning a new age, to be far different from our own. It is clear at least, that in the presence of such possibilities, prophecy and opinion are alike immaterial.

WILLIAM S. ROSSITER.

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ENGLAND'S SECRET DIPLOMACY

BY H. M. HYNDMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE ENGLISH SOCIALIST PARTY

THIS is A. D. 1916. But nobody would believe it who came back to England after a Rip Van Winkle slumber of only twenty-one months since August, 1914. Then we were in the period of unconscious though steady change. Now we are under the complete control of bureaucratic domination, the effects of which are not yet perceived by the mass of the people. "This, Sir," said Mr. Stanton, the War Minister under Abraham Lincoln, during the Civil War in America, to an English visitor, "This, Sir, is a free country. I have only to touch that bell on the desk in order to have you locked up for the next three years and nobody will know where you are."

England has not quite reached that point yet. But branch after branch of industry and distribution have been put under arbitrary State management, and at least one Minister has at his disposal economic, political, social and military powers which would have been furiously resisted less than two years ago. Few people have any idea of the despotic authority which our Government has taken to itself under the Munitions Act and the various Orders in Council. Our Courts of Law have been superseded, the House of Commons has been reduced to a Bed of Justice and our ordinary liberties have been filched away. We have, in fact, undergone a reactionary revolution without knowing it. Our public servants of yesterday are our uncontrolled masters to-day. The entire administration of the country has been transformed, in order to attain success which has not been attained, and to establish an organization which has repressed individual initiative without securing collective efficiency.

The Foreign Office alone is practically untouched. It was in full harmony with the bureaucratic movement from

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the start. Bureaucratic and secret before, secret and bureaucratic it remains. No modification was needed. For more than a century the Foreign Office has been dominated almost exclusively by its permanent officials.

The Foreign Office is a very close borough. Though Foreign Office clerks are now supposed to be selected as a result of open competitive examination, the fact that the competitors themselves are nominated from above restricts the field of choice. So much so, indeed, that a study of the lists shows the same family names occurring again and again over a long period of years. This does not mean that they have escaped the strict qualifying examination; but it does prove that the free competition which was recommended by the Civil Service Commission has not been achieved so far.

But that which gives the Foreign Office as public office its main, and so far quite unshakable, influence is its secrecy. Everything is mysterious. Criticism is "not in the public interest." The sacred traditions of "the Office" must be upheld at all costs. The people, therefore, have little chance of knowing what is being done in their name, until, for good or for ill, the matter is virtually settled, and confirmation is demanded from a docile party majority for an accomplished fact.

The position arises in this way: The right of Treaty-making belongs absolutely to the King. The Cabinet is the King's Executive Committee: unknown, in its present form, to the Constitution, but none the less powerful on that account. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, chosen by the party Prime Minister, is the trusted agent of the Cabinet; and to this Minister come, through the Foreign Office, all that mass of "private letters" from Ambassadors, as well as confidential information from other quarters which, at critical periods, and even in those ordinary times which lead up to critical periods, are very much more important than the despatches printed *in extenso* for public perusal and information.

Here is where the Foreign Office differs from any other department. There are secrets, no doubt, in all offices, though the fewer there are the better. But in the Foreign Office, as at present conducted, secrets are of the very essence of its being. Moreover, so long as we are bound to carry on business with other countries, most of which are even less democratic than our own, it is difficult to see how

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confidential communications can be dispensed with, extremely dangerous as they are. When Ambassadors have revealed to them facts which go directly contrary to the solemn public assurances of the monarchs and statesmen of the foreign nations to which they are accredited—by no means an uncommon case—they are bound to keep their own Government fully informed as to what is really going on. Their public despatches convey the assurances given: their "private letters" warn their own superiors at home that those same despatches are wholly untrustworthy. How are the people to be consulted or properly informed under such circumstances? At present we suffer from the drawbacks of both systems.

Let us consider some of the historical operations of the Foreign Office. Previous to the outbreak of the Crimean War in October, 1854, not only were our Government and the Foreign Office concealing secret despatches which would have entirely changed the course of public opinion, they were also keeping back the proposals of Nicholas I to Sir Hamilton Seymour, when the Czar promised not to occupy Constantinople and offered much better terms than Turkey has ever been able to secure since. More than this, Lord Aberdeen's Administration actually suppressed the secret treaty entered into by Nicholas I himself in 1844. This treaty was concluded at Buckingham Palace between the Czar on the one side and the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen himself on the other, the Prince Consort being present. The English statesmen then undertook, should the guardianship of the Holy Places come up for discussion, that the views of Russia, as claimed by her under the Treaty of Kainardji, should be supported by England, the French claims being ignored. A distinct promise was given by the English negotiators to this effect.

Naturally, therefore, Russia expected that a Cabinet headed by the same Lord Aberdeen would not take the extreme course of backing the claims of France against the Muscovite Empire on this very question, which he and his eminent coadjutors had solemnly undertaken not to do. Had the English people been duly apprised of the existence of this clear agreement, accepted by men whom they had every reason to respect, would they have been moved to the pitch of exasperation against Russia which gave Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet assurance of the national support in declaring war?

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Passing on to the Schleswig-Holstein surrender, which so greatly lowered our prestige and influence in Europe, we can see again that had all the facts been revealed to the country, England would never have acted as she did. Either Denmark would have been told plainly that she could not rely upon our assistance against armed attack, however good her case might be; or, the nation, having pledged itself to give help when needed, would have held by its promises to the end. What actually occurred is a matter of history. Our Foreign Minister, Lord John Russell, stated in his despatches that if Denmark were attacked "most serious consequences would ensue"—we should go to war, in short. Lord Palmerston as Prime Minister said in the House of Commons in 1863 that "if any violent attempt is made to overthrow the rights and independence of Denmark, those who make the attempt will find in the end that it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend." This obviously meant the same thing. It was inconceivable that England had no intention of fighting at all.

When, however, war was declared by Prussia and Austria together against Denmark, our Government wholly failed to act up to its strong public utterances and still stronger private assurances. All we did was to warn off the Austrian Navy from any action against Denmark by sea. In fact, when our statesmen found that France was unwilling to help on land, although she was given plainly to understand that we should not greatly object if she happened to seize the Rhine Provinces of Germany, they left Denmark to face the Germanic Powers entirely alone. All the world now knows the real reasons for the Prussian attack. Prussia wanted the harbor of Kiel as a naval base and full possession of Holstein for herself.

Could any amount of publicity have been more injurious to the character of Great Britain for good faith than this record of the hopeless failure of secret diplomacy, even when largely under the control of a Prime Minister so deeply versed in Foreign Affairs as Lord Palmerston? The success of Prussia in this nefarious business was the first step in that campaign of forceful aggrandizement whose effects we are now experiencing.

Again, in 1870, our Foreign Office had so conducted our national business that we were entirely deluded as to what was going on. France was still, for us, by far the most

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important military Power in Europe. The fear of French aggression was ever present with our rulers, and the possibility of an attack by Prussia upon an isolated and unprepared France seemed remote.

If, however, all the warnings given at the time were published, it would be found that our own Government was as much to blame for not understanding the situation as was the French Ministry for refusing to pay any attention to the reports of Colonel Stoffel from Berlin.

Once more the nation was sacrificed to Foreign Office incapacity and traditional secrecy. Had the truth been fully declared and the voters appealed to on the serious issue at stake, there can be little doubt as to what the decision would have been. Great Britain would have abandoned her selfish neutrality; Prussia would have been called upon, after the declaration of the Republic, to grant peace on reasonable terms; Russia, Austria and Italy would almost certainly have joined with us in putting pressure upon the invaders; and our natural friend and ally would have been saved from unjustifiable humiliation and temporary ruin. More than this, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine would never have taken place, France would have been attached to us by bonds of good feeling as well as interest, the entire course of European politics might well have been changed and the present terrific war averted.

The next period of difficulty and danger was the Russo-Turkish war of 1878-79.

Never was secrecy, however, more sedulously cultivated nor the people more persistently misled. Lord Salisbury's whole proceedings were Venetian in their subtlety and unscrupulousness. But his one object throughout was to keep England out of war; and war might possibly have occurred but for his dexterity. When, however, a Foreign Secretary solemnly assures the House of Lords that a secret agreement, to which he himself was a party, which was reprinted with complete accuracy, and could not have been disclosed by Mr. Marvin without Lord Salisbury's own consent, "is wholly unworthy of your Lordship's confidence"; when the same statesman systematically sends cipher despatches to more than one important British Agent abroad whose purport is in direct contradiction of his published despatches —when these and similar methods are constantly used, it may be admitted that even permanent officials most devoted

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to Foreign Office traditions could scarcely go further in the direction of deceiving the country. It is no excuse to say that all this was done in the national interest. The nation itself, which must bear the brunt of failure,—if failure there be,—is kept in the dark.

This truth it was the destiny of the same able Minister to establish beyond all possibility of question when, more than a decade later, he traded away to Germany, for bootless advantages in East Africa, a small but exceedingly important island much nearer our shores. Following upon the much-desired acquisition of Kiel by the war with Denmark, the Prussian Government had long tried to obtain from Great Britain the cession of Heligoland. All previous Foreign Ministers refused to listen to these suggestions. Lord Salisbury persuaded himself, or was persuaded, that this little place was being steadily washed away by the sea, and that no amount of concrete or granite facing or fortification could head back the forces of the ocean. Thus our great commercial rival, whose vast ambitions Bismarck had publicly voiced only a few years before, was presented with the most dangerous naval fortress in the North Sea, which, as we have lately seen, the German Government had determined to make in deed and in truth the German Ocean—a terrible blunder, the effects of which the man who was guilty of it did not live to witness. But ought not a matter of this gravity to have been publicly discussed and publicly decided, before any such surrender was made?

The whole of our relations with Egypt form another example of the danger to the country of negotiations and agreements and treaties entered upon secretly and carried out in the same way. Unquestionably, the acquisition of the Suez Canal shares belonging to the Khedive in 1875 led, step by step, to the position which we now hold in Egypt. A strong effort was made to induce France and afterwards Italy to join in a common occupation and control, and then in a common expedition to put down the rising under Arabi Pasha. The Foreign Office—misinformed, notwithstanding its secrecy, as to the standing of the French Government—believed almost up to the last moment that M. Gambetta would certainly induce France to accept the secret agreement that the two countries would act together. This proved to be impossible, and Great Britain drifted alone into the occupation of Egypt, undertaking that she would act

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only as a trustee for European interests and retire when her task was fulfilled. For this purpose Mr. Gladstone, without any appeal to the country, suppressed the rising of a people "rightly struggling to be free."

Beneficial as our rule, on the whole, may be to the mass of the Egyptians, there can be no doubt that it has on more than one occasion led us to the brink of war; and we were induced by the necessity for "regularizing" our position to give so much support to France, later on, in her aggression upon Morocco, that our antagonism to Germany was intensified.

Since the outbreak of the present tremendous war, however, such matters have been almost completely overlooked in the stress of our conflict with the Germanic Powers. Any inquiry into the events which led up to the struggle between Germany and the Allies is still generally regarded as unpatriotic, unless it tends to prove that our Foreign Office has been entirely right in all its proceedings and that Germany has been solely to blame for all our misfortunes. Unfortunately, the attacks upon our diplomacy and the demands for the entire abolition of secrecy in foreign affairs—in itself quite impossible until democracies control the planet—have been conducted chiefly by a group of men who are regarded by the public at large as pacifist fanatics, or even as people of very suspicious pro-German sympathies. Consequently, any fair summary of the situation becomes extremely difficult. This propaganda, in fact, has strengthened our leading politicians against the remonstrances of those who, like myself, for many years warned their countrymen that Germany was preparing for war, and that secret intrigues and public misrepresentations of her real policy were not effective means of making ready for an attack by the best organized, the best educated, and the most effective military and industrial Power in the world. That Power, controlling and disposing of nearly 70,000,000 inhabitants, together with other States making up nearly 90,000,000 more, has been avowedly preparing for the present campaign since our own war in South Africa. Rather, from that date she has hastened on her preparations; for the acquisition of Kiel and the eagerness to secure Heligoland, together with the attention and expenditure devoted to her fleet, showed that the aspirations of the German Empire to the complete hegemony of Europe and the development

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of her sea power formed a natural continuation of the policy of Frederick the Great and Bismarck. But the early years of the present century can have left our statesmen in no doubt as to the object in view. The preamble to the Navy Act stated, in so many words, that the German Navy aimed at challenging our supremacy on the ocean.

This may have been quite legitimate, in view of the enormous and admirably organized expansion of German trade and commerce after 1878. Competitive industrialism is commercial war: commercial war all through history has, sooner or later, involved the competing nations in naval and military war. Even on general grounds, therefore, we might have been quite sure of what was coming. Very fortunately indeed for Europe, however, in 1914, the extreme Junker and militarist party in the Fatherland took control and forced the pace, thinking to strengthen their own position and to head back the steady advance of Social-Democracy for two or three generations. Had the policy of the cooler heads in Germany been followed—a policy which involved the continuous cajolery of Great Britain and the maintenance of reasonable relations with Russia, until all was quite ready for the final move—the outlook when Germany at last did strike would have been far worse than it is to-day. Whether King Edward VII was right or wrong in his semi-secret endeavors to form a coalition against the German menace, our statesmen knew perfectly well, both then and later, that the danger existed. It was even advertised in public documents and enforced by private speeches of unmistakable purport, such as the clear and powerful address of the Emperor to his Generals in 1908. Nor do I think there was ever known, in a country whose Government was officially proclaiming its peaceful intentions, so persistent and subsidized an agitation against the fleets of a friendly country as that carried on in Germany against English Sea-Power for many years before the outbreak of war. The whole world, outside England, knew what all this, and the growing animosity of the German dominant classes to this country, meant and must mean.

Our Liberal Ministry also could scarcely have misunderstood the objects of the sudden increase of the German shipbuilding programme, as soon as our own expenditure on the Navy was reduced, or the subsequent refusal of the German Government to enter into any binding agreement to slacken

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the pace of competitive armaments. But still our leading statesmen kept up their system of political optimism for domestic consumption. The country was repeatedly told that our relations with Germany were constantly improving. Our working classes were encouraged to send over mission after mission to the other side of the North Sea, in order that they might be " put through " in the most approved fashion, see what they were intended to see, hear what they were meant to hear, and told what it was desired they should believe. Even in 1911, when the two countries were within an ace of war,—serious strikes being on foot from one end of Great Britain to the other,—the people were informed that there was no danger of misunderstanding because the arrangements regarding Morocco had so far satisfied Germany that hostilities in Western Europe were now impossible. So, in 1912, after the return from Berlin of Lord Haldane (who as War Minister had actually cut down our artillery, our most important arm on land), Mr. Asquith stated in the House of Commons, on the strength of his fellow-lawyer's information, that our relations with the German Government and people could scarcely be better. Yet in 1914, the same Prime Minister told us at Cardiff that he knew in 1911 that war with Germany was more than probable. Further, Lord Haldane actually communicated to a Western American newspaper—it was not so many months ago—the astounding statement that, so far from being satisfied with what he learned at Berlin in 1912 (as Mr. Asquith had guaranteed him to be), he came back " very uneasy " in his mind —confident, in fact, that the Emperor and his entourage were bent upon war! Sir Edward Grey and the Foreign Office were parties to this same deliberate and long-drawn deception of us common Englishmen as to the truth. Lord Haldane was in fact the traveling agent of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as well as his confidential friend.

Moreover, during the whole of this period of misrepresentation, we now know, even from the careful selection of the despatches which alone the public is allowed to read, that secret agreements had been entered into with France by which she undertook the naval defence of the Mediterranean, leaving to us the main control of the North Sea and the Channel; and that under certain conditions this would develop into an Alliance with France and her Ally Russia, pledging us to help our neighbor on land. In pur-

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suance of this arrangement Sir John French spent several seasons with the French General Staff in carefully studying the French North-Eastern frontier on the spot; and we renewed our guarantees to Belgium that, if her neutrality were infringed, we should come to her assistance. Thus, apart altogether from this last undertaking, we were virtually pledged by Sir Edward Grey and our Foreign Office to a great war on land such as we had never been committed to in the whole course of our history. M. Clemenceau told our Government plainly that unless we could put at least 300,000 men on the right flank of the Germans within a fortnight of the outbreak of hostilities our help would be useless. Also, no limitation was made as to the number of troops we might be called upon to furnish. Lord Derby, indeed, recently assured us that we are under agreement to our Allies to keep millions of men under arms and in the field either by voluntary service or compulsion. All this when Sir Edward Grey, being pressed in the House of Commons to disclose the full truth, told us that we were under no binding engagements to fight; when likewise we, a non-military Power, were in no way making ready to meet these appalling obligations—obligations over and above the task incumbent upon us of maintaining an overwhelming navy for ocean rule and safe transport, beside the necessity of giving pecuniary aid—unknown millions sterling—to the countries with whom we were supposed not to be allied!

Can a more crushing indictment of secret diplomacy be found than this bald statement of facts?

But the curse of secrecy went much farther than this. For some reason never yet explained the permanent officials in the Foreign Office decided many years ago to follow up and expand the Declaration of Paris. Such a decision could only advance the interests of the great military nations of the Continent. After preliminary surrenders at The Hague, this policy led to the Declaration of London. By that instrument we practically abandoned altogether those rights of capture which had been seriously weakened in 1856. Thus our Sea-Power, vainly attacked for centuries by our actual and possible enemies, was to be surrendered by ourselves. That this was the intention cannot be disputed by anybody who reads Sir Edward Grey's own instructions to the British representatives at the Conference in 1909, at which the Declaration of London was drawn up and signed. "The

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Freedom of the Seas" was the phrase used by our friendly enemies, even then conspiring against our influence and independence, to cover a deadly assault upon our chief weapon of offense in a great European war, and to apply to the sea rules which they themselves have been careful never to observe on land. The Declaration meant what it said: that neutrals should be considered before belligerents in all future wars; that private property at sea should be exempt as far as possible from capture; and that all doubtful questions of prizes should be decided not in our own Prize Courts, under the International Law which had been held valid for centuries, but by a nebulous International Justiciary. In regard to that tribunal of neutrals and antagonistic belligerents we were certain of only one thing: that the overwhelming majority of the so-called judges would be bitter advocates, holding a brief in their own interest against us.

This wholesale surrender was engineered by the permanent Staff at the Foreign Office, and our delegates, who acted upon their instructions, fathered by Sir Edward Grey, were acknowledged pacifists. The country did not in the least understand the overwhelming gravity of the matter: the House of Commons, in which Sir Edward Grey's party had a crushing majority, could not believe that the final surrender of the naval rights which had time after time saved us from ruin was really contemplated. So the Declaration of London, to which Sir Edward Grey and the Foreign Office had already bound us to the fullest extent possible, came within an ace of being accepted as the final Law of the Sea. Happily—or as the men of old time would have said, "providentially"—the House of Lords was roused to a consideration of the whole subject, and, in spite of the vehement support of the Government and its Lord Chancellor, refused to accept the Declaration of London on behalf of the English people. When, therefore, the present war broke out, we were in nowise bound by this unratified and consequently invalid Declaration against our navy and ourselves. Under the circumstances the Declaration of Paris itself might quite legitimately have been denounced.

That was not the view of the Foreign Office. Resolved to carry out its own predetermined policy, which, as matters stood, was distinctly anti-national, this Department persuaded the Government to decree by an Order in Council, and without any reference to Parliament, that the Declaration of

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London should be acted upon as if it had been fully ratified by all the Estates of the Realm. Protest against this arbitrary proceeding was useless. Though the Germans at the beginning of the war were flouting their own solemn Conventions and committing acts of piracy and murder almost every day, our Government persisted for eight months in allowing them advantages to which they could have no possible claim. The whole thing was and is inexplicable. Taken by itself, this enforcement by Star Chamber Order, for month after month, of the unratified Declaration of London against our Fleet and our country, in favor of the Germans and their trade, ought to put a stop for ever to Foreign Office control. Those who can best judge the result of this policy say that it has cost the Allied Armies hundreds of thousands of men.

Foreign Office diplomacy in the Balkans has been similarly fatal. That department always stands in terror of some one Power and seeks to curry favor with it at all costs. Such was the attitude of England to Germany until the declaration of war. Such was the position assumed towards Russia and the United States after war had begun. The great Muscovite Empire was needed to supply soldiers to the Allied forces and must be ingratiated at all costs: the great American Republic was needed to supply food and munitions and must be considered in all matters relating to "freedom of the seas" for Germany. Thus Constantinople was guaranteed as a prize when peace should come to the one; the other obtained almost unrestricted sale of her products, including cotton, through neutral ports. In both cases we were secretly pledged by our own officials to steps which could scarcely fail to damage our own interests. Obviously, Bulgaria and Roumania, to say nothing of Greece, could not regard the presence of Russia at the Golden Horn with favor, seeing that, in a very short time, their water-communications with the outside would lie entirely at her disposal. Nevertheless, it had been quite possible in the early days of the war to harmonize all the antagonistic demands of the Balkan States, and even to undermine the relations between Germany and the Porte. But this demanded a definite policy, supported by strong action from the very start. And that is precisely what has been lacking throughout. Secrecy, however profound, will not help the diplomacy of incapacity. Concealment in the Balkan negotiations may indeed have been necessary; but vacillation

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was fatal, whether things done were made public or not. German diplomacy had put all Europe against her in 1914. English diplomacy put all the Balkan States against her in 1915.

The fatal Dardanelles operations, which have cost us the loss of 200,000 men to no purpose, were entered upon as much to make good our blunders at Sofia, Bucharest, Athens and Constantinople as to satisfy the requirements of Russia. Our Foreign Office, relying upon the political supremacy of M. Venizelos in Greece, as it did upon the parliamentary dictatorship of M. Gambetta in France more than thirty years before, felt confident that the Greek Army would support our ill-thought-out naval raid, and that Greek islands would afford a convenient base for our own army. The Government, therefore, as Mr. Asquith admitted in his speech of November 2nd, plunged into this desperate venture in the highest of high spirits. Constantinople was at our mercy: 30,000,000 quarters of Russian wheat were ready to our hand. Our statesmen had forgotten that German influences were supreme at the Greek Court and that the Staff of the Greek Army had been trained in Germany.

Similarly it was thought quite safe at one and the same time to cajole and snub the astute Coburg Czar of Bulgaria. Worse still, at the most critical moment of all, when Bulgaria had already agreed to throw in her lot with Berlin, our Foreign Office actually decided to ignore information direct from the King of Roumania to the effect that we must consider Bulgaria enlisted against the Allies and make our arrangements accordingly. Nay, it actually set to work through inferior agents in Bucharest to intrigue against King Charles.

Even this did not complete the marvellous tale of Sir Edward Grey's mistakes. Having failed all round in his endeavors to persuade the rulers of the Balkan States that the Allies would win, our Foreign Secretary began to offer "*Danegelt*" in order to secure military co-operation, a proceeding which exhibited our weakness to the world in a most disgraceful form. In any case, we may say that a Foreign Office which ceases to convince by reason and tries to bribe by the surrender of British territory, in order to turn a neutral State into an ally, is a Foreign Office for which the nation has no further use. It has not left itself a single blunder to commit.

The hopeless incompetence of Sir Edward Grey and the Foreign Office is in fact now generally recognized, and he is

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only kept in office because, for some inscrutable reason, it is thought that his withdrawal would be regarded as a triumph for the Germans. But what has happened with Serbia has at any rate proved conclusively that no such powers as those now claimed by the British Foreign Office ought ever to be entrusted to any Department.

Not even our shameful betrayal of Denmark in 1864 was so discreditable to us, as a nation, as our deliberate sacrifice of Serbia in 1915. Granted that Serbian politicians intrigued, intrigue is the natural weapon of a weak State surrounded by ruthless enemies. And we knew, or ought to have known, all that was going on. Had our Foreign Minister, therefore, told Serbia plainly that, being unable to send an army to her defence she must rely upon herself and act accordingly; had he refrained from dictating to Serbia what should be her attitude towards Bulgaria at the critical time; had he insisted—as, in view of our tremendous subsidies to that Power, he was entitled to insist—upon Russia coming to her aid; had he even decided promptly to act in accord with France, when our ally called upon our Government to go forward—Serbia would have been saved. But Sir Edward Grey meddled and muddled all through. He promised assistance and never gave it, made an agreement with France and then backed out of it, held back Serbia from securing herself against Bulgaria and talked platitudes about Balkan solidarity when Bulgaria was already in the German camp.

And so it has come about that England, already responsible for the ruin of Belgium by her refusal to render her long-drawn guarantee of protection effective, is now doubly responsible for the ruin of Serbia by a policy which can only be described as both weak and treacherous.

Even in the matter of the Declaration of London, Sir Edward Grey still refuses to allow the navy to emancipate itself from Pro-German domination. The pretense that this or that single clause of the Declaration is rescinded, when the whole document stands together and never was binding, except as made valid by an undiscussed Order in Council, is worthy of the long line of subterfuges with which we have been gulled ever since April, 1914.

What, then, is the remedy for a diplomacy which is entirely out of touch with democratic opinion and is quite incapable of handling successfully the methods devised by itself? The tendency at the moment is to demand universal disclos-

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ure and general publicity for all matters relating to foreign policy. This seems impossible, for reasons already given. To make public all confidential reports to the national Government would shut out the representatives of the nation from necessary information of the very highest importance. The people are entitled to protect themselves against a continuance of such systematic concealment as that which is complained of, but they would be unwise to demand that all the details necessary to the formation of a sound judgment, some actual, some possible, some still problematical, should be set before them at every stage of international negotiations. But if a fully-explained referendum were made to the entire adult population before any treaty or agreement were entered into on their behalf, there would be little or no danger in entrusting the survey of all foreign information, even the most secret, to a small Foreign Affairs Committee, independent of party, and directly nominated by democratic vote. This would put a stop altogether to that irresponsible and ruinous secret diplomacy whose effects have proved so pernicious, and would force the people to take far more interest in their relations to foreign countries than they do today.

A democratically chosen Committee of Foreign Affairs, small in number but high in character, with power to reorganize the Foreign Office and to call for the production of all documents, is a necessity if we are to avoid great and final disaster. Time presses. The war is not by any means at an end. The resumption of our full rights at sea and the decision as to captured vessels by our own Prize Courts would hasten on that end more, perhaps, than any other step we could take. Never in our history was the nation more determined, never were unnecessary failures judged more leniently than they have been, say, in the past fifteen months. But that is no reason why we should stereotype deadly incapacity or sit down patiently under bootless and destructive ineptitude.

H. M. Hyndman.

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THE WAR AND FRENCH FINANCE

BY EDOUARD JULHIET

THE ties which have for more than one hundred and fifty years bound the great republics of America and France have been, up to the present time, ties of friendship, sentiment and common political ideals. One of the results of the present European War has been the creation of economic bonds: American bankers are lending France billions of dollars; American factories are working night and day to supply France with their products. A kind of partnership which will last for years is being formed between France and America. Will this very profitable partnership involve corresponding risks to America? Will France, despite her bleeding and her lavish spending, maintain her yet unquestioned financial strength? Will the large investments of the United States in the business of France be well secured by the present and future resources of France?

These are questions to be thoroughly debated between the two partners with facts and figures.

When the war broke out at the end of July, 1914, France was enjoying the greatest economic prosperity, industrial as well as agricultural. It is unnecessary to dwell on the agricultural prosperity, when it is so apparent from annual crops valued at about $2,200,000,000. But it may be well to remind Americans that France, an agricultural nation until 1870, started between 1870 and 1880 to become an industrial nation, and has in the last thirty years developed her industries in a remarkable way.

Take for example the iron industry which is such an important factor in modern economics. Many Americans will be surprised to learn how well the production of iron ore in France compared with that in Germany:

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COMPARATIVE TABLE.

Years	*France* Million tons	*Germany* Million tons
1880	2,875	4,245
1890	3,947	7,698
1900	6,050	12,793
1910	15,500	22,455

In thirty years the production of France has increased five times, being the same proportion as the increase of Germany.

In 1880 the coal production of France was nineteen million tons, in 1912, forty-one million tons—an increase of more than 100 per cent. Today France leads in the production of aluminum ore, supplying nearly the entire output of Europe and three-fifths of the world's production.

This activity in mining has given a great impetus to metallurgy. In 1901 the production of cast iron was between two and three million tons. In 1913 it was in excess of five million tons—a large figure for a population of forty millions. In recent years, French manufacturers have particularly developed special and electric steels. The electrometallurgic furnaces installed in the United States have been of French manufacture. For ten years France has supplied the United States with high grade automobiles, and she was the first to put into practical use the aeroplane invention of the Wright brothers.

During these years that French manufacture and agriculture were prospering, French trade increased also in a remarkable manner, thanks in part to her unusual transportation facilities.

France has an excellent geographical position. Washed by three seas, reaching out towards America beyond the rest of the Continent, towards North Africa and the wealthy Orient, she possesses on these three seas numerous harbors, such as Bordeaux, Cherbourg, Havre, Dunkirk, Saint Nazaire, Brest and Marseilles. All these harbors are being constantly improved for greater efficiency. Inland transportation facilities are equally complete. France has 700 miles of railroad for each million inhabitants as against 600 miles in Germany. France has also a very complete system of highways covering 420,000 miles, giving easy access to the remotest corners of the country and representing an outlay of several hundred million dollars. These roads, once abandoned for the railroads, are now regaining

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their value through automobile traffic. As a result of these favorable conditions France's foreign and domestic commerce has become very large. The following figures represent the value of her foreign commerce:

Year	
1890	$1,640,000,000
1900	1,761,000,000
1910	2,681,000,000
1913	2,969,000,000

The relative value of this foreign trade figured per inhabitant amounts to $74.98 per capita as compared with $74.02 for Germany and $42.19 for the United States.

The weak spot in France's foreign commerce is the excess of $300,000,000 in imports over exports. But this figure is offset by two economic factors which are almost constant. They are the revenue derived from foreign investments and the large sum of more than $60,000,000 spent annually by tourists in France.

The figures $567,000,000, the increase of the tax budget from 1870 to 1912, sum up in a striking way the growth of wealth in France. Only a quarter of the sum, approximately $121,000,000, is derived from new taxes. The balance has been automatically obtained from the increase in taxable property, which means a proportionate increase in public wealth.

But these increases in riches have not changed the French characteristics of economy. France saves annually a billion dollars: 16 per cent. of her income. Most of this sum is invested in securities. In this way the last few years she has been increasing her personal property on the basis of five billion dollars every five years. Today her personal property is undoubtedly worth over thirty billion dollars. The practically untouched riches of France's immense colonial possessions covering more than four million square miles and inhabited by fifty-five million people, must be added to the several elements of her great economic power. A part of these domains, Algeria, Tunis and Morocco, which are more extensive than the United States, is of immediate and great value and promises still greater wealth.

Such is France—prosperous and peaceful—upon whom the heavy mantle of a frightful war has fallen. War has taken by surprise her financiers, manufacturers and mer-

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chants. The German banks, warned by their Government several months before the war, had gradually mobilized their resources, whereas the French banks had their money distributed over the whole world. Her manufacturers were not prepared to turn out on a large scale ammunition and war supplies. Her merchants had not laid up stocks of metals, cereals, leather, woolens, meats, etc. So it is fair to ask: What will be the effect of the war that thus took France unawares? How seriously will its losses affect her industries, her agriculture and her finances?

It is interesting to note that only a very small number of French factories have fallen into the hands of the Germans. Even in the North, hardly a quarter of the factories are in the invaded zone. All the great industries of the department of the Loire, of Burgundy, Franche-Comté, Dauphiné—all of the metallurgical factories of Creusot, of the region about Paris, of Normandy, and Brittany, of the Southwest, Centre and Southern France have not been damaged. All the industries of luxuries, the silk factories of Lyons, the textile industries, the jewelry and art object industries of Paris, the porcelain factories of Limoge, are absolutely unimpaired.

The industrial strength of a factory does not lie chiefly in the machinery. Americans know that a factory derives its value much more from its geographical position, its supply of raw materials, its managing staff and its workmen, than from its plant. The working apparatus is a mere tool which is often changed and quickly amortized. In two years a metallurgic plant can be completely refitted at a cost of twenty million dollars and becomes a new plant equipped with the latest improvements. The cost price of steel turned out in such a plant will be fifteen per cent lower than under the old.

Let us admit for the sake of argument that the factories destroyed in the North of France and in the Ardennes have to be rebuilt. This will take two years at a cost of two hundred million dollars ($200,000,000), and the factories so rebuilt will be new and will produce steel products at a much lower cost than before. Many of the factory engineers have come to America to buy ammunition and machinery. They have learned a great deal in the United States, and this experience acquired here about American

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machinery, together with necessity, will all contribute towards making over French industry and will give it a greater impetus than it has ever received before.

The important thing is to have plenty of raw materials of good quality. France is immensely wealthy in iron ore and this is both mined and turned into steel very economically. The last world statistics given at the International Geological Congress at Stockholm in 1910 show the metallurgical iron-ore wealth accurately known and exploitable as follows:

In France	3,300,000,000	tons
In Germany	3,600,000,000	"
In Great Britain	1,300,000,000	"
In United States	4,257,000,000	"

Then, too, France has also very rich coal deposits, yielding forty million tons yearly. French coal costs a little more than English coal, but in view of the proximity of the two countries, English coal is easily obtainable for French metallurgy. Moreover, France is well supplied with hydraulic power. Ten million horse power are being used or can be used, and we all know the growing importance of electricity.

Rich in raw materials, its equipment practically unimpaired, French industry will start up again all the more easily because it has money in abundance. On the other hand, French industrial companies are deriving large profits from innumerable war orders, such as ammunition, revictualling, automobiles, clothing, etc. On the other, they have their strong liquid assets to fall back upon. One company reports that it has $4,500,000 in reserve, and $5,500,000 for current and working assets after the deduction of outstanding debts. Another company has redeemed $6,500,000 on a total investment of $7,500,000 and has in addition to this $1,200,000 in reserve. Many other industrial companies report similar conditions, especially in the North of France.

One contingency could have endangered this industrial prosperity—the shortage of laborers through a large part of the working population being killed. But this danger was avoided, for it so happened that early in the war many workmen were recalled from the front to be employed in the war industries. Those who have remained in the army are mostly employed in numerous tasks involving little danger, such as repairing arms, shoeing horses, caring for automo-

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biles, etc. Others are serving in the artillery where the risks are less than in the infantry.

If we deduct from the 1,200,000 Frenchmen killed or seriously wounded, the colonial troops, white and black—the professional soldiers, the shopkeepers, clerks, "*rentiers*," teachers, priests, capitalists, all of whom represent about 30 per cent. of the soldiers in the trenches; and if we further deduct the peasants, who represent 60 per cent., we shall find that the proportion of workmen actually in the trenches is barely 12 per cent. It is quite probable that up to the first of January, 1916, the total number of workmen killed and seriously wounded did not exceed 150,000. While these figures are sad and depressing, they are by no means large in proportion to a working population of two and a half millions.

Women are taking the place of men in many lines of work. 25,000 women are employed on the railways and street car lines. At the end of July, 1915, 47,000 women were engaged in the manufacture of munitions, their principal duties being drilling, stamping, cartridge-setting, wrapping and packing.

After the war France will receive many immigrants of the laboring classes. The foreign laborer has always been willing to go to France, where the climate, good food and wine, and the cheerfulness of the people, make a workman's life easy; where French thrift allows a stranger to save without attracting undue attention; where democratic and liberal ideas permit a man to live as he pleases, free from the domination of an arrogant and imperious aristocracy. Every year the workmen of Italy and Spain, where wages are low, have been accustomed to flock to France in large numbers. This immigration will continue to a greater extent after the war. Lastly, we must not forget the strong contingent of workers from the French colonies, more particularly the Arabs from Algeria and Morocco, and the Kabyles, a bronzed and rugged race of mountaineers, who for several years have been working in French factories where they form a strong complement of unskilled labor. They constitute a resource which will prove very valuable and almost unlimited in the future. Thus we see that the scarcity of labor will not be a serious problem for French manufacturers. On the other hand industry will be greatly stimulated by the opening up of new markets. Russia will be closed for a number of years to the Germans; so will Italy, Algeria and Morocco. These

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countries already bound to France by so many commercial and political ties, will afford her bigger openings.

French industry is already showing signs of renewed activity. Of 37,380 factories inspected by the Minister of Labor only 51 per cent were working in August, 1914; whereas in July, 1915, 79 per cent were running. The number of operatives, which had fallen in 1914 to 35 per cent of the normal number, because of the general mobilization, had risen in 1915 to 69 per cent. It is true that certain industries have been doing very little work. The textile industry has fallen to 11 per cent of the normal. But the metal, chemical and leather industries have been greatly stimulated by the needs of war. Factories have doubled and tripled their equipment and are showing an activity much above the normal. These facts prove that war, in spite of the ruin it has wrought, cannot have any serious or lasting effect on French industry. Of course, this industry will have to redouble its efforts, but it will be towards a more rapid growth rather than in a struggle for existence. It is very probable that France will enjoy a period of great industrial prosperity, as she did after the war of 1870.

It is in the field of agriculture that France has suffered most, and the damage done there will take longer to repair.

France's agriculture, which covers 75 per cent of its territory and employs 41 per cent of its population, has been badly hurt by the war. But the material or physical injury does not amount to much. The farm buildings destroyed in the North of France by fire and shell will be rebuilt in a few months. The fields which have been torn up by explosions of mines and by miles of trenches can be put in cultivation immediately after the retreat of the enemy. This surprised Richard Harding Davis as he went over what had been battlefields the year before, and he wrote:

> To-day the fields are cultivated to the very butts of the French batteries. . . . Where there were vast stretches of mud, scarred with intrenchments, with the wheel-tracks of guns and ammunition-carts, with stale, ill-smelling straw, the carcasses of oxen and of horses, and the bodies of men, is now a landscape smiling with peace and plenty, with miles of growing grain, green vegetables, green turf. The French spirit and nature working together have wiped out the signs of the German raid.

The same miracle—this resurrection of the soil—will be performed wherever the land is free of the enemy. The war

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will leave no other trace than humble wooden crosses marking the resting places of the dead.

The use of meat for army rations has not seriously diminished the live stock of the country, for the French army is fed principally upon imported meat. The French herd and flock have been diminished by less than a quarter of their normal number and this loss will be quickly made up. In certain provinces cattle had ceased to increase because there was no more ground left for breeding purposes, but in four or five years, the normal increase in the Charolais and Limousin herds will bring French cattle up to the former number.

While we see that the physical damage inflicted by the war upon livestock, farm buildings and fields is of slight importance, the damage to French agriculture by the death of countless peasants in the battlefield is undoubtedly serious. How many of these humble toilers, so eager for work, always thrifty, working the soil fourteen hours a day, leaving no foot of land uncultivated, will return to their villages? They are the artisans who created the great riches of peaceful France. Their blood will have saved their country, but the country they died to save will suffer bitterly by their loss. Farm labor, which even before the war was scarce, will certainly be insufficient. On some farms all the men will have been killed as in the case of a Poitou family, where the father and three sons died for their country. In many instances the men of the family will return crippled, unable to work and will only be an added burden to their families. Some villages in Burgundy have lost half of their able-bodied men.

Is the situation, then, really threatening for the future of French agriculture? Can it be that this steady and inexhaustible source of national wealth will be crippled for many years to come? The answer is no. The missing peasants will be replaced, the plow will not lie rusting for the lack of hands to guide it, and the reaper will leave the barn as usual when the harvest time comes, even if the owner of the farm is no longer there. Woman will take the place of man. The humble peasant woman of France will be the savior of French agriculture. Every American who has stayed for any length of time in the country districts of France has noted the part played by woman in farming. She is the hardiest specimen of womanhood, the first to rise in the morning and the last to retire at night. She is the mistress

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of the dairy and the poultry yard, the helpmate of her husband in the more arduous labors of the farm. She manages the finances of the farm, yet she never shuns the coarsest work, and is not afraid of spoiling her hands, or of tanning her face. The French peasant woman has always been able to run the farm unaided, save for such help as the old people and children might be able to give. To this splendid woman France of the next decade will be indebted for keeping intact the riches of the land. This is not a mere dream or conjecture. Last summer, agricultural France was as perfectly cultivated as in times of peace. The furrows were perhaps a little less deep; the weeds were perhaps less scrupulously destroyed, but not an acre of land remained untilled. In the South the vintage went on as usual but the vintagers were women, children and old men working under the direction of the wife of the absent farmer.

It must not be forgotten that there will also be an increasing use of agricultural machinery. It was not so many years ago that the crudest sort of plows were used, the reaping and threshing were done by hand, and the grapes were pressed by the bare feet of boys. Within the last few years all this has changed. Improved plows, threshing machines, mechanical reapers and wine pressers have come into use, and these and other machinery will lessen the need of farm labor, and so compensate for the loss of men. The earnest efforts of the entire agricultural population, the Government, and the large landed proprietors will be required to work such a transformation, but this effort will most certainly be made because the French peasant will never live with even a part of his land uncultivated. The peasants of France have never been deaf to the call of the soil.

Fortunately, the French farmer has to help him, 6,200 agricultural syndicates and 4,100 farming loan associations. These 10,000 local associations are permeated with a genuine spirit of co-operation and have at their disposal valuable resources, and they will do all that is necessary to promote the work of reconstruction on the farm lands of France.

Thus, we see that although the war has been a terrible trial, it cannot endanger French farming. A troublesome period of re-adjustment may be foreseen, but French agriculture will meet this crisis by replacing the peasants who have been killed in the war with women, children, agricultural machinery and with the foreign labor already referred to.

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Another aspect of the situation it is not so easy to forecast with accuracy—the financial effect of such a gigantic war. It is simple enough to calculate the present expenditures, but how long will they continue? It is possible, however, to demonstrate that in spite of the immense cost of the war, it is relatively small when compared with the wealth of France. This war has already cost France some six billion dollars, and is being carried on at a rate of about half a billion a month. These are two definite figures on which we can base our calculations. Supposing the war to last until the end of 1916, the total cost to France would be approximately eleven billion dollars. Such an expenditure would represent an annual fixed charge of six hundred million dollars, to which we must add two hundred millions for pensions to mutilated soldiers, widows and orphans, making in all eight hundred million dollars. Before the war France had a national debt of $6,500,000,000 and an annual expenditure of $1,100,000,000 (of which $260,000,000 went toward the public debt). This budget will have to be increased 72 per cent, and new resources will have to be found to meet the additional $800,000,000, which will represent the new burden the future generation will have to bear. Here the private fortunes of French citizens come into play. There is no clearly defined line of demarcation between the finances of a country and the fortunes of its citizens. The citizens are the associates of the *res publica,* and French citizens are the stockholders of the great corporation which is called France. France will call upon her citizens for an increase in the budget in such proportion as may be necessary. The total annual income of France's citizens is more than six billion dollars, that is to say, the cost of the war for one year. A 12 per cent on the total income, if all the incomes were taxable, would produce the $800,000,000 which would be necessary to insure the future handling of the war debt and of the war pensions. This percentage of 12 per cent on incomes can be all the more easily borne in view of the fact that the steady increase in the wealth of the country will later allow the rate to be diminished, and also because four-fifths of the war expenses are paid in France itself, one-fifth only being paid to foreign countries.

If necessary France could resort to the system adopted by Germany before the war of taxing not only incomes but also the fortunes themselves. Stocks and bonds alone amount

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to more than twenty-eight billion dollars. From ten to twelve per cent of this is invested in foreign securities. By these different means, which can be used simultaneously, the new resources will be obtained. The well known "*rentier*" will pay most of them, for taxation on fortunes will be more and more the rule of French finance.

The foreigner has little idea of the enormous amount of wealth in France because it is so well distributed. Fortunes of moderate size are numerous. Statistics show that 43 per cent of all inheritances are in excess of 2,000 francs, and the appraisals made in 1907, in view of the income tax bill showed that 95 per cent of the private incomes were under 50,000 francs. As a result of being so widely distributed, French wealth may be underestimated abroad, and yet it is very large.

Another source of strength of these savings is the tremendous gold stock which is behind them. The following table shows the quantity of gold for each inhabitant in 1912:

France	$30.02
United States	19.39
United Kingdom	18.28
Germany	14.08

French national wealth rests on this foundation of gold as a solid rock. At the present time, in the midst of war, the Bank of France has more than a billion dollars of gold in its vaults.

Private fortunes have so far been very little affected by the war. A large proportion of the population is being fed either directly or indirectly by the State, and this is in fact one of the largest expenses of the war. The regular allowance for a soldier's family with four children amounts to more than three francs a day, almost a workman's wages in times of peace. The family savings have remained intact. They have even increased, for today everybody is economizing in France. Table board, clothing, entertainments, jewelry, automobiles, servants, art expenditure, all luxuries have either been cut down or done away with altogether.

France can also derive enormous revenues from the creation of Government monopolies. Moreover, in about thirty-five years, between 1948 and 1960, all of the existing railroad concessions will expire and the Government will come into possession of this wealthy system of roads free of all debts

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and encumbrances. The value of these roads exceeds four billion dollars, and could be realized now if the Government extended the concessions.

The country is still in its full financial vigor, and the French public stands ready to help by subscribing war loans. Nearly three billions have already been subscribed. A loan issued six months hence would bring forth several billions and another issue later would have the same result. To cover the interest on this war debt, the French citizens will be willing to sacrifice a part of their income; most of this interest will go back to them, since the loan will be entirely subscribed in France.

The French nation will bear the burden of both loans and income taxes without a murmur. France is a highly centralized and democratic country in which every citizen is a shareholder of the State. France is not federated like the United States or Germany. The national debt is high, but the "*départements*," the "*cantons*," and the cities have hardly any debts or expenses. The national budget provides for all the important needs of the country such as roads, canals, courts, prisons, schools, universities, telegraph and telephone service. French citizens are accustomed to supply their Government with funds for all the services. They will now increase this outlay. They will contribute eleven, perhaps fifteen or even twenty billion dollars to get rid of the brutal aggressor who has attacked them so savagely. They depend on these expenditures to insure peace for a long time to come.

In this article I have eliminated from discussion anything which was not based on facts and figures. I have not taken into account contingencies which might be favorable to France when they were mere conjectures. Whatever my personal opinion might be as to the financial outcome of the war, I have made no mention of the possible enrichment of France by the iron and potash wealth of Alsace-Lorraine, nor of the commercial treaties which will be entered into by the Allies for their mutual benefit after the war. I have not mentioned the possibility of limiting armaments, which would each year lessen the budget by three hundred and sixty million dollars normally expended for the army and navy, and which would set free for the pursuit of national prosperity young men who in time of peace spend three years with the colors.

Supported by facts and figures alone I have shown:

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That French industry, struck by war in the midst of prosperity, will not be seriously injured, for the reason that only a small part of its equipment has been destroyed, and that its workmen have formed only a small part of the war's casualties. Upon the return of peace, French industry, which has been rapidly growing for thirty years, will continue its progress from where it left off.

That French agriculture, in spite of the great number of peasants killed in battle, will continue its normal production, thanks to women, to foreign labor, and lastly to the more extended use of modern agricultural machinery.

That the cost of the war, in spite of its apparent size, is relatively small when compared with the accumulated and potential wealth of France. All the losses and destruction of property due to the war represent but a small part of the wealth of France, and have not even touched the deep and lasting sources of her prosperity.

France, famous for her love of thrift, a nation which saves a billion dollars every year, a nation which has the highest reputation for performing in the most scrupulous manner all her international obligations, will not fail to retain the confidence of every American.

EDOUARD JULHIET.

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NIGHT OFF GALLIPOLI

(FIVE SPIRIT SONGS)

BY WILLIAM ALEXANDER PERCY

I

A delirious voice:

Sweeter than sleep and the dream of death
To float on the flow of the tempest's breath—
A leaf in the lift of the air's caresses,
A bloom in the sway of the sea's brown tresses.
A bird that the hawk of the storm possesses!
Death, thou art best,
Being rest.

II

Voice of a youthful Turk:

If only up the straits the tempest flew,
Up the blue waters, past the perilous spray
To where the clustered cypresses are blue
Above pale stairs that touch the lisping bay,
I should not care, I should not greatly care—
If only up the straits the tempest flew!

If only up the straits my spirit flew
As once I flew when sails were all my wings,
To that deep garden where the moon is blue
And sea-sounds soften close-lipped whisperings,
I should not care, I should not greatly care—
If only up the straits my spirit flew!

Death could not keep me from the arms of you,
But I should die again upon your mouth
While all the swaying garden changed from blue
To red, and softer grew your bosom's south.
I should not care, I should not greatly care,
Dying again upon the mouth of you!

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III

A poet's voice:

I knew the stars would come,
Brighter than English stars
And purer than the stars of battle!
They shine on Thessaly,
On the pale Argive plain,
And leave a lovelier light on Lesbos.

O Grecian stars, how oft
At home, in the grey sea,
I longed to know the lands ye guard!
Now death, propitious, speeds
My soul on those dark tides
Whose foam ye lit when Helen fled.

Blow, wind of Tauris, blow!
This is the sea that heard
The Lesbian's cry, and further south
The shining song of him
Whose heart was washed with tears.
O southward-blowing wind, blow on!

IV

Voice of a Breton Fisherman:

Douarnenez! Douarnenez!
O little town on the fishing bay!
O southern sea, too soft, too blue,
Let me thro'! let me thro'!
Till the green and the cold of the western sea
And the lonely cliffs of Brittany
And home, my home, Douarnenez,
Break on mine eyes with the breaking day!

V

A host of spirits:

We fought and saw the stars and fell.
To fight and win were better;
To fight and fall is well.

Perhaps a god directed so
We should be overcome;
Perhaps; we may not know.

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We knew the trumpet call of life;
We knew the call was not
To victory, but strife.

And if, indeed, no god there be
That hung the stars we saw,
Yet we who fought, yea, we

Who died, out on the bloody sod,
We know beyond all doubt
In us there was a god.

Strong Spirit, who hast wrought
A fighting world for men,
Take us; like men we fought.

FOR THEM THAT DIED IN BATTLE
(1914-1916)

How blossomy must be the halls of death
Against the coming of the newly dead!
How sweet with woven garlands gatherèd
From pastures where the pacing stars take breath!
And with what tender haste, each with his wreath
Of welcome, must the elder dead return
To greet about the doors with dear concern
These much-loved, proud-eyed farers from beneath.
For these that come, come not forspent with years,
Nor bowed with dragging pain, nor weak with tears;
They mount superbly through the gold-flecked air,
The light of immolation in their eyes,
The green of youth eternal in their hair,
And Honor's music on them like sunrise.

WILLIAM ALEXANDER PERCY.

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CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE

AND SOME MINOR CONTEMPORARIES

BY ALGERNON CHARLES SWINBURNE

[The following essay was Swinburne's last prose composition. It is now printed, for the first time, from the original manuscript.—THE EDITOR.]

THE list which comprises the names of the very greatest among great poets or among men otherwise great can naturally never be a long one: briefer yet is the list of those who are only less great than these, and who first began the work or gave the example which none but they could follow, could complete, or could excel. Above all others enrolled in this latter list the name of Marlowe stands high, and will stand for ever. The father of English tragedy and the creator of English blank verse was therefore also the teacher and the guide of Shakespeare.

There is no such test of critical faculty and genuine instinct for true appreciation of poetry as the estimate given or accepted of Marlowe's place among poets. For his countrymen, at all events, there is none as yet, and probably there never will be. Most writers and most readers above the level of such as would do well to abstain, and should in pity be prohibited, from writing or from reading, are much of one mind about Chaucer and Spenser, about Shakespeare and Milton, about Coleridge and Shelley. Those only who know and understand, as Pindar and as Dante would have expressed it, can hope or can be expected to appreciate the greatness of the man who began his career by a double and incomparable achievement: the invention of English blank verse, and the creation of English tragedy.

It has not always been duly remarked, it is not now always duly remembered, by students of the age of Shakespeare that Marlowe is the one and only precursor of that

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veritable king of kings and lord of lords among all writers and all thinkers of all time. The names usually associated with his by painstaking and well-meaning historians of dramatic poetry are hardly memorable or mentionable at all, except from a chronological point of view, among the names of dramatic poets. Lyly, Greene, Peele, Nash, and Lodge were true though not great poets, who blundered into playwriting—*invitissimâ Minervâ*—in search of popularity or bread. Lyly, Nash, and Greene were writers of prose which it would be difficult to overpraise if we had here to consider the finest work of Greene in romantic fiction, of Nash and Lyly in controversial satire. Thackeray has given to the sweetest and loftiest verses of Peele the immortality which they could hardly have expected or attained, beautiful and noble and pathetic as they are, but for the more than royal dignity conferred on them by association with the deathless name and memory of Colonel Newcome. But their plays, though something in advance of the unreadable *Gorboduc* and the unspeakable *Locrine,* have no particular claim to record among the trophies of our incomparable drama: they belong rather to the historic province of antiquarian curiosity than to the aesthetic or spiritual kingdom of English poetry. No man can be more grateful than I for the research of the learned and laborious historians whose industry has been devoted to the noble task of lighting up the dark ways of study for all future students of the highest, the wealthiest, the most precious and golden branch of a matchless literature. For all these illustrious scholars it was a matter of obvious and obtrusive necessity to register all surviving literary documents which belong to the subject of their study. For a writer whose aim is confined to the indication and illustration of poetic and dramatic quality, of imaginative or spiritual excellence, the attempt would be worse than a superfluous impertinence: it would be an injurious aberration or excursion from the straight line of his intended labor.

Nash is always readable, even when religious: and something of the "lightness and brightness" of his sunny and fiery spirit gives life to his fantastic little interlude of *Summer's Last Will and Testament.* The graceful author of *Rosalynde* is unrecognizable in Lodge's lamentable Roman tragedy *The Wounds of Civil War.* The *Selimus* and *Alphonsus* of Greene are feeble and futile essays in hopeless and heartless imitation of *Tamburlaine the Great;* very

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bloody, very wordy, very vehement, but essentially spiritless and passionless. Had Shakespeare never retouched his *Titus Andronicus,* and earned by his surely slight and transient additions in Greene's own semi-lyrical style the shamefully famous expression of the dying man's undying rancor, that strangely fated play could hardly have been remembered except as the third in this trinity or triunity of rhetorical and rhapsodical horrors. The composition of *Orlando Furioso* is as pitifully scandalous as the story of its author's roguery in the disposal or venditation of his rubbish. *James the Fourth* is a comparatively creditable piece of work; but its few, poor, meagre merits are noticeable mainly because of its date. There is something more of liveliness and coherence in *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay:* enough to exasperate the reader who can see what a far better and what a really charming work of realistic and fantastic invention might have been made of it—by the nameless author, for instance, of *The Merry Devil of Edmonton. George-a-Greene* is an honest and homely expansion of a good old ballad into a passable if rather formless little play. It might savor of paradox to avow a preference for so tardy and so singular a survival of the old moralities as *A Looking-Glass for London and England;* but, if that preference is not perverse and capricious, no more final proof of the fact that Dr. Lodge and Master Greene (M.A.) ought never to have strayed or staggered on to the board could possibly be exacted. For there is not only too much to amuse the reader of this quaint and belated sermon in scenes, there is something for him to admire and enjoy. And it is a pity, if not a shame, that even the smallest and least precious jewel of poetry should have been misframed in so barbaric a setting.

Something of the same regret may probably or must surely be felt by readers of *The Arraignment of Paris.* That George Peele might and should have left a more honored name among English poets than he chose or than he could manage to leave, is painfully or pleasurably obvious when we compare the lovely lyrical and pastoral opening of this little courtly interlude with the weary and wordy commonplace of the rhyming and rhymeless verses that follow and fill out its five acts—"tedious and brief." Quaint and pretty casualties or felicities of expression may be found here and there to relieve the general platitude of style and matter. The "oration" of Paris in the fourth act is noticeable, if not memor-

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able, as a decent exercise in blank verse, when few could achieve anything better in that line than "untimely breathings, sick and short essays." But it has no more claim to be classed among plays or even among attempts at playwriting than any of Lyly's courtly allegories in dialogue; effusions or elaborations of devout and decorous ingenuity with which a critic, or even a chronicler, of dramatic poetry or fiction has naturally no concern.

It is lamentable that neither Shakespeare nor Marlowe should have taken in hand so magnificent and suggestive a subject for historic drama as the reign of the greatest Plantagenet: it is deplorable that Peele should have ventured on it. Difficult and exacting as even the greatest among poets might or rather must have found it, that a man of any literary capacity whatsoever should have dropped upon the nascent stage an abortion so monstrous in its spiritless and shapeless misery as his villainous play of *Edward I,* is a riddle beyond and also beneath solution. There is hardly a passable line or couplet in all the vile expanse of its twenty-five chaotic scenes; the treatment of character and the handling of incident would be disgraceful to a child. The community in platitude of metre, baseness of spirit, and brutality of dullness, between the detestable scenes which do their bestial and futile utmost to pollute such names as Joan of Arc and Eleanor of Castile, may not suffice as thoroughly as we may wish they might suffice to establish the infamous identity of the author of *Edward I.* with the author of the fourth scene of the fifth act of the First Part of *King Henry VI;* but at least it goes very far to confirm all rational English readers in their confidence that this villainy is the branding badge of but one minor poet—not of two curs, but of one cur. The heavy tumidity of *The Battle of Alcazar* is relieved by the really fine scene which reminded Lamb of Marlowe, and is rather honored than disgraced by the kindly raillery of Shakespeare. The miserable traitor and apostate Stukeley would have had no more reason to thank George Peele than to thank the anonymous author of a later play devoted to the commemoration of his misdeeds for the feeble attempt to present them as the achievements of attempts of a melodramatic megalomaniac. The soliloquy which closes the fourth act is matchless, I should hope, for drivel of desperation and platitude of bombast, in all the dramatic memorials of ambitious and hopeless impotence.

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The scriptural tragedy of *David and Fair Bethsabe* hardly deserves either the exuberant effusion of Campbell's praise or the all but unqualified scorn of other critics. It is a poor thing on the whole; yet there is the mark of a real though certainly not a great poet on the earlier scenes. But Voltaire's farce on the same subject "translated" with such adorable impudence "from the English of Hume," is much better worth reading and far more provocative of reperusal. Whether Peele is or is not responsible for the authorship of *Sir Clyomen and Sir Clamydes* is a matter which may be left for debate to the wise men of Gotham who question the authenticity of Shakespeare's part in *The Two Noble Kinsmen.* I should hardly suppose that even this meanest among the precursors of Shakespeare must be credited or discredited with the production of so lamentable if not so belated an attempt to re-open "King Cambyses' vein." The only redeeming point in all the narcotic or hypnotic rubbish is the sometimes rather amusing humor of the clown, Subtle Shift —a not unwelcome survival of the Vice who gives occasional life to the mysteries and moralities which preceded the birth of tragedy or comedy in England as in France.

"These three gifted men," Greene, Peele, and Marlowe, have been thus bracketed by such critics as in three hundred years' time may possibly chain together the contemporary names of those three gifted men, Charles Mackay, Haynes Bayley, and Alfred Tennyson. It is shameful that it should not be (if it be not) superfluous to say that Marlowe differs from such little people, not in degree, but in kind; not as an eagle differs from wrens or tit-mice, but as an eagle differs from frogs or tadpoles. He first, and he alone, gave wings to English poetry; he first brought into its serene and radiant atmosphere the new strange element of sublimity. And, innovator as he was, revolutionist and creator, he was no less loyal, no less competent an artist, no less perfect and instinctive a workman in words, than Chaucer or than Spenser was before him. He had neither the boyish humor nor the childlike pathos of Chaucer; he had nothing of Spenser's incomparable melody and all but inexhaustible fancy: but among all English poets he was the first full-grown man; young indeed and immature if set beside such disciples and successors as Shakespeare and Milton, but the first-born among us of their kind. Flutes and lutes and harps and harpsichords we had heard before the organ-music of his verse astonished and

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entranced all ears not naturally sealed against the higher strains of harmony, all hearts not religiously closed against the nobler tones of thought. And Shakespeare heard at once, and cast off shard by shard the crust of habit which fostered and sometimes fevered the jigging vein of his rhyming mother-wit, sweet and exquisite as it was; and Milton long afterwards prolonged and magnified by reverberation the music of "Marlowe's mighty line." His place among poets is exactly as questionable as Dante's. M. de Lamartine thought little or nothing of Dante, and M. de Lamartine was once a very great poet indeed. When such another champion assails the fame of Marlowe, it will be time for those who know better to undertake his defence. The reviler of Shakespeare can be no other than a scurrilous buffoon, "a decent priest where monkeys are the gods," and where Ibsen is the idol. The anatomist of Shakespeare—the superior person who knows all about the weaknesses of that inferior nature, who can expound the qualities and define the influences which made him the man he was, and precluded him from the dubious chance of showing himself a greater and a stronger man than the soft, flaccid weaklings in whom his pitiful and unmanly ideal of heroic or philosophic manhood is so degradingly revealed—the thinker whose masculine intelligence can fathom Shakespeare's at a glance and dismiss it with a smile—is worthy to be classed and remembered as a representative man after the order of Archquack Emerson. Collier the cleric and Rymer the railer are dead and damned to something less, let us hope, than everlasting fame; pity may surely be allowed to believe in a briefer term of expiatory survival, a milder infliction of purgatorial remembrance, for their successors in the inheritance of contempt. "*Zoïle aussi éternel qu'Homère*"—what hardest of all hearts would not pity the case of Zoilus, eternally alive (or, in Browning's characteristically audacious phrase, "immortally immerded") in "the eternal cesspools" to which, when a living soul, he contributed all the irrepressible exuberance of effusive or explosive malignity which tortured what served him for a brain, and corroded what sufficed him for a heart? No other creature, alive or dead, can be quite so utterly and so hopelessly pitiable.

A much less incongruous and fissiparous trinity or triunity of pre-Shakespearean playwrights would be revealed in the reunion of three associated names much less inhar-

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monious than the copulation of Greene's and Peele's with Marlowe's. Greene, Peele, and Lodge hang very well together; three really good poets at their best, who can only have been whipped and spurred into scribbling for the stage by insanity of ambition or stimulation of hunger. The dullness of *The Wounds of Civil War* is so dense and malarious that it is difficult for a suffering reader to remember the existence of *Rosalynde*. Nothing more perfectly and absolutely worthless, or more difficult for patient application to dig through, has ever been reissued in the various reissues of Dodsley's *Old English Plays:* stupendous as is the stupidity of perversity which has always ignored James Howard's really excellent comedy of *The English Monsieur*, and selected for infliction on modern readers a piece of noisome nonsense which must make his name a stench in the nostrils of the nauseated readers.

But enough or too much has before been written on this pigmy trinity of dwarfish dramatists. It is not with their names, it is with no such names as theirs, that poets or judges of poetry will ever associate the deathless name of Marlowe. To one man only did Shakespeare ever pay the tribute of a passing word—a word of honor, of regret, of admiration, and it might also seem of affection. And to Marlowe alone it is that we can feel as though such a tribute had been due. But to him we may feel that it would be strange if not a word of homage had been offered, not a token of regard had been vouchsafed, by Shakespeare.

ALGERNON CHARLES SWINBURNE.

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SHAKESPEARE'S LATER WORKMANSHIP

"THE WINTER'S TALE"

BY SIR ARTHUR QUILLER-COUCH

IMAGINE a gallery hung with tapestries and having many side-doors to left and right with passages that lead into mysterious parts of the house; or a long garden alley out of which by-paths branch and are lost in glooms of shade and echoes of lapping water, faint, unseen, at times distant and anon close at hand. At close of day in such a place, you will be haunted first by the uncanny feeling "I have been here—just here—before, either in this life or in some previous one," and next by whispers, footfalls, shadows that form themselves at the crossways ahead and fade down them as soon as surmised.

So, at the close of Shakespeare's day, are we haunted as we follow *The Winter's Tale;* and by many ghosts, but chiefly by the ghost of *Pericles, Prince of Tyre.* Indeed (to speak fancifully a little longer of a play that cannot be criticised without fancy) I cannot read these two plays in close succession but I am constantly put in mind of Coleridge's allegory, *Time, Real and Imaginary,* to give it a new application:

> On the wide level of a mountain's head
> (I know not where, but 'twas some faery place),
> Their pinions ostrich-like for sails outspread,
> Two lovely children ran an endless race—
> A sister and a brother.
> This far outstripped the other:
> Yet ever runs she with reverted face
> And looks and listens for the boy behind:
> For he, alas! is blind!
> O'er rough and smooth with even step he pass'd
> And knows not whether he be first or last.

Like *Pericles, The Winter's Tale* slips a long interval of

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years between its third and fourth acts, like *Pericles* employing a chorus to beg our forgiveness for the breach made in the sacred unity of Time. They are yawning gaps, too: fourteen years in *Pericles*, sixteen in *The Winter's Tale*. But of course we recognize them to be necessary as soon as we see what Shakespeare is trying to do; which is, to reconcile the mistakes, wrongs, sufferings of one generation of men and women in their hopes for the next. "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, but through their repentance and under God's mercy the children's teeth shall *not* be set on edge." That is the recurrent task of our Shakespeare in these his last years, in the sunsetting—

> On the wide level of a mountain's head
> (I know not where, but 'twas some faery place):

and as yet Shakespeare, master of resources though he was, could hit on no device to avoid these gaps, having to present, in an action of some three hours, the children Marina and Perdita first as babes exposed, helpless as innocent, to the surge of the sea or the beasts of the forest, anon as maidens grown up to reunite parental hearts long astray, redeem inveterate wrongs, cancel old woes, heal the past with holy hope.

Critics have accused *Pericles* and *The Winter's Tale* of this common fault: that each has a double plot which is also a separated plot—separated by the break between Acts iii and iv. In a previous paper we have examined the double plot of *Pericles*. In *The Winter's Tale*, it is urged, the first three acts made a complete independent tragedy. By the end of them the boy Mamillius is dead; Antigonus is dead; and—far worse—for aught we know Hermione is dead, of a broken heart. The words of the Oracle are fulfilled; and Leontes, childless as well as wifeless, is very righteously left to a lifelong remorse. So far Shakespeare has worked strictly in terms of tragedy; and the action, tragically conceived, has been tragically rounded off. Then (say the critics) in the last two acts, after a supposed interval, Shakespeare tacks on a complete independent comedy, which, picking up the thread of the story at its most tragic point, conducts us out into a garden of pleasant romantic devices where old wrongs meet to be reconciled as in this world they never do and never are.

I do not think much of this fault-finding. To start with,

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I think it unfair to drag *Pericles* into the comparison, since (as we have proved to our satisfaction) the first two acts of *Pericles* are not Shakespeare's work; and therefore in opposing its last two acts against its first three the critics oppose them against work for two-thirds of which he was not responsible; whereas in setting the last two against the first three acts of *The Winter's Tale* they are dealing with work for which he is wholly responsible. Here, if faulty workmanship be detected, Shakespeare and Shakespeare only is to blame.

Next, ruling out *Pericles* for this reason and taking *The Winter's Tale* by itself, I find the fault-finders pedantic. They do their best, but with stock definitions. "Here," they say, "in Acts i, ii, iii, we have Tragedy; there, in Acts iv and v, we have Comedy. *Therefore* Shakespeare is guilty of the attempt to work into one drama two different stories in two separate categories of Art. Q. E. D."

Quite so, O my little wiseacres! *That is precisely what Shakespeare was attempting to do.*

In a world where Nature mixes comedy with tragedy and often shades one into the other indistinguishably—as who can say "it is wet" or "it is fine" of a Summer shower? —Art, if she be Nature's mirror (as Shakespeare held) must always be impatient of hard definitions. They have their disciplinary uses: again and again while he is learning his trade they may restrain the artist from "mixing up things that differ"—which Horace rightly put in the forefront of his *Ars Poetica* as the prime offense against Art. But for him they must be in the end a matter of tact rather than of strict law which *de minimis non curat.* They are, after all, conventions: they are, at the best, inductions from the practise of great artists who have gone before; as Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides preceded Aristotle, and but for them he would have had not only no theory but nothing to theorize about. As he goes on, the great artist with a sense of growing power perceives that (as the saying goes) it is "up to him" to improve the best. At the same time he perceives that in Art, as in Nature, truth is a matter too delicate to be grasped by schoolmen. *La Verité consiste dans les nuances:* and in the division of labor between him and the critics, it is his, not theirs, to lead the way in discovery.

Be this granted or not, no one can begin to understand Shakespeare's later plays who does not perceive that they

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have one common and constant aim—to repair the passionate errors of men and women in the happiness their children discover, and so to renew the hopes of the world; to reconcile the tragedy of one generation with the fresh-hearted comedy of another in a third form of drama which we may call " romantic " if we will.

Moreover—and for a minor point—it is not true of this particular play, *The Winter's Tale,* that Acts i-iii make a rounded play in themselves. A number of threads are deliberately left hanging. For example, while the doom of the Oracle has been exacted, its promise of hope yet waits to be fulfilled—*The King shall live without an heir if that which is lost be not found.* The pith of an oracular response lies always in the riddle, and this is the sole riddle in the answer brought by Cleomenes and Dion from Delphi. " That which is lost " is, of course, Perdita, as her name tells us: and the means of her putting away has already been introduced, and very carefully, into Act iii. That Hermione lives we do not know, to be sure: yet if, as patrons seated in the Globe audience, we know our Shakespeare of old, we ought to have guessed in Paulina's protestations a something held up his sleeve. I grant that it takes a guess, and that Leontes must by no means be allowed to guess.

But—to return to my main argument—if the critics be unintelligent who condemn the general structure of *The Winter's Tale,* they multiply stupidity when they proceed to convert and use it in condonation of certain flagrant faults: as, for example, when they argue that *because* Shakespeare, by compressing two plots into one play, overcrowded the time at his disposal, *therefore* we must overlook the monstrously sudden growth of Leontes's jealousy; that he left himself no room to develop rationally: or, for another example, as when Gervinus, to excuse the unworkmanlike trick by which Shakespeare scamps the recognition scene between Perdita and her father, sagely pleads that " The poet has wisely placed the event behind the scenes; otherwise the play would be too full of powerful scenes."(!)

I shall come to both these examples by and by. Just here I wish to say that, the purpose of these papers being less to give information about Shakespeare than to suggest ways of reading him by which we can increase for ourselves our profit and delight, I have no quarrel with any critic on the mere ground of fault-finding: for I hold that as a rule he

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does us better service who draws our attention to apparent faults than he who glosses them over with ready explanations or quick assurances that they are beauties rather than blemishes.

If we can discover *for ourselves* that an alleged or an apparent fault is, or is not, a real fault, we bring off a critical success, however small: our first business in this world being to judge for ourselves. It is a historical fact that Shakespeare invited the applause of the Globe Theater audience, and it should cost our modesty no great effort to rise to that average. Or we may forget the Globe audience and remember only that Shakespeare is addressing *us*.

But if we would be critics our first task consists in discovering *what the author is trying to do*. This discovered, we understand where his true difficulties lie, and when we come upon an apparent fault in his work we can pretty easily determine whether to condone it—nay, perhaps even to admire it—as an honest attempt that has fallen short or to condemn it for a piece of scamped and careless workmanship. Thus in *The Winter's Tale* the gap between Acts iii and iv comes of honest failure to do an extremely difficult thing, yet a thing well worth doing, which Shakespeare essayed again and again until at length, in *The Tempest*, he mastered it. But the play abounds in flaws far less venial.

I begin with the jealousy of Leontes. This is actually baseless as Othello's: and it has far less excuse than Othello's, for it lacks both a villain to suggest and circumstances to feed the delusion. It is a caprice of self-deception, a maggot suddenly bred in a brain not hitherto supposed to be mad. "During less than twenty lines," says Professor Wendell, "Leontes is carried through an emotional experience which in the case of Othello had been prepared for by above two acts and, when it came, occupied nearly two hundred and fifty lines. Lacking due preparative, it strikes us as monstrous."

Granted that Leontes, as contrasted with Othello, has a naturally jealous disposition—then, *Why are we not warned of it?* Camillo and Antigonus must surely—as observant courtiers—have sounded their master's nature and detected its master-weakness. But Camillo, who opens the play, hints no such knowledge: it comes upon him in Scene 2 like a thunder-clap. Antigonus and all the rest of the courtiers are simply bewildered: Leontes strikes them as a man

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snatched out of his wits. And what of Hermione herself? She has been Leontes's wife for several years, and an attentive wife. Yet she has no inkling at all of this master-weakness. The revelation of it in Act ii, Scene 1 outrages not only her honor but her understanding. . . . Then, I say, if neither the courtiers nor Hermione have guessed, *a fortiori* we are not prepared. I ask any candid reader of the play if the surprise of Leontes's insane jealousy does not hit him, as it hits everyone on the stage, like a blow on the face?

If, on the other hand, Leontes be not a man *naturally* jealous, the awakening of jealousy and the haste with which it possesses him shock probability no less. The apologists on this side are even more at fault. They can only suggest that Shakespeare lacked time and room to develop the change in the man. But I take up the little volumes of the Temple Shakespeare in which, for handiness, I have been re-reading his later plays (they give the famous Cambridge Text). I note that *The Tempest,* a Court play, occupies 106 pages of print; *Pericles,* 116 pages; *The Winter's Tale,* 147 pages; *King Henry VIII,* 148 pages; *Cymbeline,* 169 pages. Now, *The Winter's Tale,* like *Cymbeline,* was written for the theatre: Doctor Simon Forman's diary records that he witnessed a performance at The Globe on May 15th, 1611. A short while before, he had witnessed a performance of *Cymbeline* at the same house. If, then, for *Cymbeline* Shakespeare could be allowed a space of time correspondent with 169 pages of print, why in *The Winter's Tale* had he to compress his action within a space less by 22 pages—or between one-eighth and one-seventh? We are dealing with workmanship, and this is an eminently practical question, as any playwright will tell us. Shakespeare *had* time, or could have found time, to make Leontes's jealousy far more credible than it is. I maintain that he bungled it.

But the play abounds in careless workmanship. Let me follow up this really important flaw by instancing a few lesser ones:

(a) The Oracle. "It seems," says Coleridge, "a mere indolence in the great bard not to have provided in the oracular response (Act ii, Sc. 2) some ground for Hermione's seeming death and sixteen years voluntary concealment"; and Coleridge even suggests how it could have

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been conveyed, in a single sentence of fifteen words. Shakespeare let the opportunity go. The resurrection of Hermione thus becomes more startling, but at a total loss of dramatic irony.

(b) Prince Florizel in Act iv, Scene 4, appears in shepherd's clothes. "Your high self," Perdita tells him,

> The gracious mark o' the land, you have obscured
> With a swain's wearing.

Yet before the end of the scene he is exchanging a fine court suit for Autolycus's rags.

[This, by the way, would seem to argue some imperfection in the text as it has reached us; since obviously such a blunder could not have survived the first dress rehearsal. Yet, strange to say, *The Winter's Tale* seems to be about the most carefully printed play in the whole of the First Folio.]

(c) Next let us take the fate of Antigonus: and let me begin by quoting Professor Sir Walter Raleigh on the fate of this poor man, disposed of in "the most unprincipled and reckless fashion":

> Up to the time of his sudden death Antigonus has served his maker well; he has played an important part in action, and by his devotion and courage has won the affection of all the spectators. It is he who saves the daughter of Hermione from the mad rage of the King. "I'll pawn the little blood which I have left," he says, "to save the innocent." He is allowed to take the child away on condition that he shall expose her in some desert place and leave her to the mercy of chance. He fulfills his task, and now, by the end of the third Act, his part in the play is over. Sixteen years are to pass. and new matters are to engage our attention; surely the aged nobleman might have been allowed to retire in peace. Shakespeare thought otherwise; perhaps he felt it important that no news whatever concerning the child should reach Leontes, and therefore resolved to make away with the only likely messenger. Antigonus takes an affecting farewell of the infant princess; the weather grows stormy; and the rest must be told in Shakespeare's own words.

> Antigonus:
> Farewell;
> The day frowns more and more: thou'rt like to have
> A lullaby too rough: I never saw
> The heavens so dim by day. A savage clamour!
> Well may I get aboard . . . This is the chase!
> I am gone forever!
> (Exit pursued by bear.)

This is the first we hear of the bear, and would be the last, were

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it not that Shakespeare, having in this wise disposed of poor Antigonus, makes a thrifty use of the remains at the feast of Comedy. The clown comes in to report, with much amusing detail, how the bear has only half dined on the old gentleman, and is at it now. It is this sort of conduct on the part of the dramatist that the word Romance has been used to cover. The thorough-paced Romantic critic is fully entitled to refute the objections urged by classic censors against Shakespeare's dramatic method; but if he professes to be unable to understand them, he disgraces his own wit.

This is soundly said; and yet Sir Walter has not plumbed the deep damnation of Antigonus's taking-off. Its true offence is against economy of workmanship. The bear is a naughty superfluity.

Students of this play may find a little profit and much amusement in an acting version prepared by John Kemble for Drury Lane, in 1802. Let me quote the precedent passage as printed by Kemble; or rather a part of it, chiefly for the sake of its stage directions.

Antigonus says:

> Blossom, speed thee well!
> There lie: (*laying down the child*)
> And there thy character: (*lays down a paper*)
> There these: (*lays down a casket*)
> Which may, if fortune please, both breed thee pretty,
> And still rest thine— (*Rain and wind*)
> The storm begins! *

There we behold the child Perdita laid with wealth in jewels and the evidence of her high parentage beside her. All we have now to do as a matter of stage-workmanship is to efface Antigonus. But why introduce that bear? The ship that brought Antigonus is riding off the coast of Bohemia and is presently engulfed with all her crew. The Clown sees it all happen. Then why, in the name of economy, not engulf Antigonus with the rest—or, better still, as he tries to row aboard? I can discover no answer to that. If anyone ask my private opinion why the bear came on, it is that the Bear-Pit in Southwark, handy by the Globe Theatre, had a tame animal to let out, and the Globe management took the opportunity to make a popular hit.

* Kemble is all wrong with his commas, as is the Cambridge text. The casket and papers cannot breed Perdita pretty. How should they? The right reading is, of course,

> "Which may, if fortune please, both breed thee, pretty,
> And still rest thine—The storm begins!"

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(d) Next, for Autolycus: I challenge anyone to read the play through, seat himself at table, and write down what Autolycus does to further the plot. Let me not deny the knave his place in the picture. That is appropriate enough, and delightful. But as a factor in the plot, though from the moment of his appearance he seems to be constantly and elaborately intriguing, in effect he does nothing at all. As a part of the story he is indeed so negligible that Mary Lamb in the *Tales from Shakespeare* left him out altogether. Yet Autolycus is just the character that Charles and Mary Lamb delighted in. Again I give you my private opinion: which is that Shakespeare meant to make a great deal of Autolycus, very carefully elaborated him to take a prominent and amusing part in the recognition scene, tired of it all, and suddenly, resolving to scamp the recognition scene, smothered him up along with it.

This brings us to the great fault of all: to the recognition scene; or rather to the scamping of it. To be sure, if we choose to tread foot with Gervinus and agree that "the poet has *wisely* placed this event behind the scenes, otherwise the play would have been too full of powerful scenes"; if, having been promised a mighty thrill, in the great master's fashion, we really prefer two or three innominate gentlemen entering and saying, "Have you heard?" "You don't tell me!" "No?" "Then you have lost a sight."

I say if we really prefer this sort of thing, which Gervinus calls "in itself a rare masterpiece of prose description," then Heaven must be our aid. But if, using our own judgment, we read the play and put ourselves in the place of its first audience, I ask: Are we not balked? In proportion as we have paid tribute to the art of the story by letting our interest be intrigued, our emotion excited, are we not cheated when Shakespeare lets us down with this reported tale? I would point out that it nowise resembles the Messengers' tales in Greek tragedy. These related bloody deeds, things not to be displayed on the stage.

It is a question of simple *ἀναγνώρισις*—Leontes recognizing Perdita as his child; and the Greek tragedians never (I think I am right in saying never) weaken the dramatic effect of *ἀναγνώρισις* by removing it out of sight of the audience. Ἀναγνώρισις (Recognition) and Περιπέτια (Reversal of Fortune) are in fact the two hinges upon which all Greek drama turns.

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But apart from our own natural expectation, and apart from all rule of tragic workmanship, let us test Gervinus with his "otherwise the play would have been too full of powerful scenes" by what we know of Shakespeare; who never flinched from cumulative effect but on the contrary habitually reveled in it. Did he suffer us to lose that breathless moment when Sebastian and Viola stand and gaze and con each the other, incredulous?

One face, one voice, one habit, and two persons! Did he cast Lear's recognition of Cordelia into *oratio obliqua?* Did he cut out anything from *Macbeth* or from *Hamlet* because "otherwise the play would have been too full of powerful scenes?" Or let us consider *Cymbeline.* In *Cymbeline* we hold our breath while Shakespeare accumulated no less than twenty-four dénouements within the space of one final Act! And in Leontes's recognition of his daughter there is nothing at all to weaken—rather everything to strengthen and lead up to and heighten—the great recognition of Hermione.

Why, then, did Shakespeare shirk it? That I cannot answer, save by borrowing the words of Elijah:

> Cry aloud: for he is a god; either he is talking, or he is pursuing, or he is on a journey, or peradventure he sleepeth and must be awakened.

—by which I mean no more than just this: The longer we consider these later plays that fall to be dated between the great tragedies and *The Tempest,* the more we are forced to feel that—to cast it in terms befitting the vagueness of the surmise—"something had happened." I am not referring to that strange sunset atmosphere which so many have noted; nor to that sublime confusion of dates and places which some set down to carelessness, but which I believe to be part of the method which deliberately sets the story in a fairy haze, so that it belongs to no age but to all time. The anachronisms in *The Winter's Tale* are as flagrant as those in *Cymbeline.* "Whitsun pastorals," "Christian burial," Giulio Romano, the Emperor of Russia and Puritans singing psalms to hornpipes, all contemporary with the Oracle of Delphi—"the *island* of Delphi!" They jar us less than the anachronisms of *Cymbeline,* but only because *Cymbeline* professes to be history of a sort, whereas *The Winter's Tale* but professes to be a tale: and Bohemia is as

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welcome to a sea-coast as Prospero to happen on a West Indian islet in the Mediterranean. "Faery—deliberate faery" is the answer—"the light that never was on sea or land"—but do we not *wish* it was? Faery—deliberate faery: the nursery tale of Snowdrop translated into *Cymbeline,* Danaë and the floating cradle translated into *Pericles*: the Princess turned Goose-girl, the disguised Prince, the clownish foster-father and foster-brother, translated into this play.

No: I am not thinking of *these* touches, which may as easily be beauty spots as blemishes: but rather of those laxities of construction, of workmanship, with which maybe this paper has been disproportionately concerned: of the *tours de force* also, mixed up in *Pericles* and *Henry VIII* with other men's botch-work, confused here, in *The Winter's Tale,* with serious scampings of artistry.

Coming back to our strict enquiry into the workmanship of *The Winter's Tale,* we must admit that the play never lodges in our minds as a whole, is never compact as (for instance) *As You Like It,* or *Much Ado,* or *Twelfth Night,* or *Measure for Measure,* or as *Macbeth,* or *Othello,* or even *Antony and Cleopatra* is compact, or as *The Tempest* is compact. It leaves no single impression. We think maybe of Hermione's most noble rebuke:

> Adieu, my lord:
> I never wished to see you sorry; now
> I trust I shall. My women, come; you have leave.

We think of her, grandly innocent, in the trial scene: or we see her, in the last Act, the statue made life, in the hush of the music, stepping down to forgive Leontes, brought to him, like Alcestis from the grave, turning from him to stretch hands over Perdita who kneels:

> You gods, look down,
> And from your sacred vials pour your graces
> Upon my daughter's head,

then, catching her, holding her a little away, searching her eyes to make sure of bliss,

> Tell me, mine own,
> Where hast thou been preserved? Where lived? . . .

Or again we think of Paulina, that admirable woman in Shakespeare's gallery; prototype of Nurse Berry in *Richard*

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Feverel, with a touch of Madame Sans Gêne, and of that excellent scene in which she beards Leontes, and all the king's horses and all the king's men cannot stay her tongue. But first of all, when *The Winter's Tale* comes to our mind, nine out of ten of us think of the sheep-shearing feast and Perdita handing flowers—gem of all pastorals:

> I would I had some flowers of the Spring that might
> Become your time of day: and yours, and yours,
> That wear upon your virgin branches yet
> Your maidenheads growing—O Prosperina,
> For the flowers now that, frighted, thou let'st fall
> From Dis's waggon! . . . Daffodils
> That come before the swallow dares, and take
> The winds of March with beauty; violets dim,
> But sweeter than the lids of Juno's eyes
> Or Cytherea's breath; pale primroses,
> That die unmarried ere they can behold
> Bright Phoebus in his strength—a malady
> Most incident to maids: bold oxlips and
> The crown imperial: lilies of all kinds,
> The flower-de-luce being one. . . .

—never the total play; but ever separate scene after scene, and this the unapproachable one, in which Florizel and Perdita, no active persons in the drama, find themselves the center of it, being young and innocent and in love. That is all, but it is enough.

> Love is enough: ho ye who seek saving,
> Go no further, come hither! there have been who found it,
> And these know the House of Fulfilment of Craving. . . .
> Here is the cup with the roses around it,
> The World's wound will be healed, and the balm that hath bound it:
> Cry out! for he heedeth, fair Love that led home.

ARTHUR QUILLER-COUCH.

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DRAMA AND MUSIC

Shakespearean Reverberations, and the Doings of Sir Herbert Tree.—Mahler's extraordinary Symphony

BY LAWRENCE GILMAN

You may, if you choose, divide all Shakespeare into two parts. There is, first, the Shakespeare of the famous speeches: the moralizing and quotable Shakespeare: the Shakespeare of "Half-Hours With the Poets":—in short, the Shakespeare who adorns from time to time the pages of the *Congressional Record*. The other Shakespeare is the Shakespeare who is treasured by those for whom he counts chiefly and supremely as a master of beautiful speech: for whom he is less precious as philosopher, as moralist, as dramatist, as psychologist, as historian of souls, than as mere poet; the poet who wrote such things as

Death, that hath sucked the honey of thy breath,

—a line that you will vainly seek in the *Familiar Quotations* of the inestimable Bartlett. For it is the Shakespeare who is *not* to be found in Bartlett that some of us most jealously and unalterably love—the Shakespeare, unmauled and untortured by the anthologists and the rhetoricians and the compilers of calendars, who exists solely for the deep delight of those who would renounce without a qualm the philosophical humanist who is so publicly and notoriously Shakespeare in exchange for the sheer poetic artist who is Shakespeare no less, but whose ways, for Congressmen and calendar-makers, are secret and withdrawn.

In the midst of pageants and festivals to do him spectacular honor, will no one pause in quietness to praise the subtler and rarer Shakespeare: the mere poetic craftsman, the conscious literary artist, the deliberate and incomparable stylist, the cunning magician of rhythms and images, the sovereign master of beautiful words? You will find the

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two Shakespeares—the Congressman's Shakespeare and this other Shakespeare (who yields his bounties only to those for whom the beauty of words can put a spell upon the heart that is like the spell of the sea's voice or of a face once seen within a dream)—you will, of course, find these two, we say, jostling one another everywhere in the Plays; but you will find the Congressmen and the anthologists and the compilers of calendars and school "readers" unfailingly selecting the sententious and moralistic Shakespeare, and leaving the merely poetic Shakespeare for the secret joy of those trifling and irresponsible souls for whom a casual miracle of inspired craftsmanship is more precious than all the wisdom of the Folios. We believe it was Mr. Brownell who remarked that "poetry subsists by individual gems." But the gems by which it does indisputably subsist are, as a rule, those showier and less treasurous gems which are bound to catch most easily the primitively appraising eye of the multitude. For millions who, dutifully esteeming their Shelley, have parroted with unction:

> Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought,

only a few hundreds have loved and murmured:

> . . . like pageantry of mist on an autumnal stream.

So, with the unapproachable master we are all now busily rediscovering, the "individual gems" are almost as certain to be lines out of the "To be or not to be" soliloquy, or any other equally circulated possession, as they are certain *not* to be some one of those innumerable and unextolled miracles of sheer poetic inspiration wherein, through cadenced loveliness and the "shape and hue and odor and sweet sound of words," he has his conjuring way with our deeper hearing and our visioning eye.

Well, we are all, just now, submitting ourselves to that immortal wizardry, so perhaps even the comparatively uncelebrated Shakespeare whom we have here desired to praise may come publicly, for a moment, into his own, if the *Verslibrists* will cease their own exegetical discourses long enough for him to be heard, and if Mr. Masters and Mr. Lindsay and Boston's indomitable and ever-jocund Queen of Song shall not wholly have seduced us from the old manner of poetry to the new before the Tercentenary festivals are past.

Quite naturally—though perversely—it was Sir Herbert

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Tree's production of *King Henry VIII* that turned our reflections in this speculative direction. "Perversely," we said: because, in *King Henry VIII*, you will find neither of the two Shakespeares we have striven to define: neither Shakespeare the moralizing humanist—he whom we have called the Congressman's Shakespeare—nor Shakespeare the supreme poetic stylist. There is, to be sure, plenty of quotable moralizing in *King Henry VIII*, plenty of verse that is meat for Bartlett and the Congressmen,—from Wolsey's "Farewell" oration backward and downward. But not much of it, as we all know, was written by Shakespeare; indeed, Mr. Arthur Symons, through consideration of its metrical structure, outdoes all the modern commentators in his belief that Shakespeare had no share in the play whatever. *King Henry VIII* is, in fact, as Quiller-Couch rather wearily observes, "anybody's child." For the authentic presence of Shakespeare the necromantic master of colored sound, the sly and exquisite artificer of tonal and rhythmic loveliness, you will look here, to be sure, for the most part in vain. We have always treasured Anne's imagined "glistening grief" and "golden sorrow" as indubitable Shakespeare, pure and un-Fletcherized—*pace* Mr. Symons; but assuredly there is little in the play that is cut from this same rich cloth. So you come to take it—this "chronicle-history with three and a half catastrophies, varied by a marriage and a coronation pageant, ending abruptly with the baptism of a child" (as a Teutonic commentator described it)—in the spirit suggested to us by Quiller-Couch: that is to say, as a procession in tapestry,—an unfolding picture: in brief, as a pageant; and that is exactly the view of it that is enforced by Sir Herbert Tree's production at the New Amsterdam.

Doubtless it is not intentional on his part, but certainly it is due to Sir Herbert's participation in the performance, and in a lesser degree to Miss Edith Wynne Matthison's, that the sense of tragedy remains serenely unaroused by what loiters in the memory as an entertainment scarcely less gaily pleasurable than one of Mr. Ziegfeld's roof-top "Frolics" or any of the gayer diversions of the dazzling Mr. Cohan. For this, we have said, Sir Herbert is chiefly responsible. Wolsey is hardly a towering creation of poetic tragedy, and if you share Dr. Johnson's view that, in this play, the genius of Shakespeare comes in and goes out with Katharine, you

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will say that Sir Herbert could scarcely have educed from the part any more than Shakespeare (or another) put into it. On the other hand, you may side with the faithful Hazlitt, who considered the character of Wolsey and the description of his pride and fall "inimitable," having, "besides their gorgeousness of effect, a pathos which only the genius of Shakespeare could lend to the distresses of a proud, bad man like Wolsey." But whatever degree of pathos and essential tragedy you may feel in the character, Sir Herbert does little to enforce it. His Wolsey is an imposing figure to the eye, a virile and magnificent apparition; but he gives you small hint of the imperious power, the masterful predominance, of the great priest. This Wolsey is fidgety and neurosthenic in movement and bearing; he plucks uneasily at the sleeve of his dazzling flame-bright robe, and is forever anxiously fingering his face, like one who has shaved without satisfaction. And not a drop of pathos does he succeed in wringing out of the great "Farewell" soliloquy. Here Sir Herbert's poverty of vocal resource is disturbingly conspicuous. He is not, of course, an actor of marked gifts; and to make the most of Wolsey you must be able to bring to it at least as much as Irving brought to it; and that is a good deal more than Sir Herbert can do. As for Katharine, it is not easy to make her lovable, but assuredly it is possible to make her affecting,—a figure of tragedy and of haunting pathos. Miss Matthison invests her with dignity and queenliness and passion, but she fails to give her either tragedy or pathos. She gives her, instead, a kind of monotonous lugubriosity that is far from being either tragical or touching. She made little, when she might have made much, of the Vision scene—which Dowden was as certain in attributing to Fletcher as Quiller-Couch is confident in claiming for Shakespeare, but which, whoever contrived it, is certainly rich in opportunities for the player.

But you readily forgive the hiatuses in Sir Herbert's Cardinal and Miss Matthison's Katharine when you remember—as you must ever do with joy and thankfulness—the superlative King Henry of Mr. Lyn Harding. Here is the sort of impersonation which will always make the Shakespeare of the theater an unmodified happiness. In its vididness and gusto, its completeness and veracity of detail, its magnetism, its eloquence, its superb authority, it is the most richly satisfying Shakespearean study we

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have seen on the New York stage in many a month. And when, in addition to Harding's quite perfect King (who refuses to let you remember that Dickens called Henry "a most intolerable ruffian and a blot of blood and grease upon the history of England")—when, besides this most persuasive creation, you get such spectacle as the picture of Wolsey's banqueting hall and the splendid and incredibly spacious scene of the coronation in the Abbey, with an astonishingly veritable rose-window glowing in the rear and the King playing cuckoo in his little bird-house above the shining crowd,—then, we can promise you, Shakespeare (even if he is largely Fletcherized) will appeal to you as an entertainment not unworthy of comparison with the best of musical comedies.

Philadelphia, April 4th.

They gave Mahler's Eighth Symphony last night in Philadelphia for the sixth time in a month. The Academy of Music, as at the previous performances, was crowded. Two hours before the doors were to be opened a line of intending ticket-buyers reached around the corner of Locust Street and far up the block along Broad, waiting patiently in the raw Spring wind. As we write, further performances of the Symphony are announced. It is having a run like a Belasco play; even the traffic policemen outside the Academy are excited about the matter, and on the New York trains invading barbarians from the North are suspected of an intention to observe at first-hand these remarkable activities. And remarkable indeed they are. We do not recall in this country a comparable degree of public excitement over an exhibition of music outside the opera house since the first performances of Tchaikovsky's "Pathetic" Symphony, or the great days of the Straussian Era—and that was in the remote dawn of the century.

Five years ago this Spring, Gustav Mahler abandoned in despair his arduous and stormy activities in New York and returned to Europe, an embittered and heart-broken man, mortally sick. On the 18th of May they buried him in the Grinziger Cemetery at Vienna. It is pleasant to remember that in the previous Autumn, at Munich, he had conducted a triumphant première of the Eighth Symphony, which he regarded as his magnum opus. "After the performance," says Mr. Leopold Stokowski (the able conductor of the Philadelphia Orchestra, and the director of the

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American representations), "the vast audience sprang to its feet, and a scene of such enthusiasm ensued as one sees only once in a life-time. To those who knew, in part at least, the inner sadness of Mahler's life, there was something infinitely tragic in his figure at this moment of supreme triumph."

So Mahler returns as a conqueror to the country which he left in defeat. That he happens to be dead is merely, of course, a fulfilment of the traditional and familiar destiny of the artist.

It is not a triumph that has been won by inexpensive lures, by any deliberate address to the groundlings. This Eighth Symphony is austere and exacting in theme and in treatment: an expression, conceived upon the loftiest and most uncompromising plane, of a supremely exalted subject. Mahler has essayed nothing less than a setting of the Final Scene of *Faust,* which he has prefaced with an elaborate setting of the Latin hymn, *Veni, Creator Spiritus.* This, clearly, is no "meat for little people or for fools." It is not every day that a composer elects to write music for Goethe's tremendous conception of what Rosenkranz called "the Human in the process of its union with the Divine, through Redemption and Atonement." Schumann, Liszt, Rubinstein: these are chief among those who had tread where Mahler now has entered—if not quite in angelic vestments, at least as mystic, as poet, as visionary and rhapsodist. And let us without further ado express our persuasion that this is the most eloquent treatment of the subject, the one which comes closest to the spirit of Goethe's text, that we know. You could never say of this music what Mr. Ernest Newman said of the æsthetic religiosity of Gounod: that it is "Catholicism *sucré.*" Now, of course, Gounod, judged by any touchstone that implies a sense of the graver artistic values, is a contemptible and trivial figure. Yet of Schumann, too,—an artist of incomparably loftier stature than Gounod,—you cannot but feel that his setting of the sublimer parts of Goethe's drama justifies at times the epithet of Mr. Newman. And Schumann was by far the profoundest musical intelligence that had sought to plumb the bottomless spiritual philosophy of the *Faust* Epilogue until Mahler essayed his cyclopean setting of that marvellous piece of cosmic symbolism.

This endeavor Mahler approached in a manner un-

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deniably portentous. But it is no affair of the critic's, so far as his function as a suggester of valuations is concerned, what means an artist chooses to use in embodying his conceptions. A good deal of witless comment has been provoked because Mahler in this choral symphony (or symphonic cantata, as you choose) asks for extraordinary forces —for two mixed choruses, a children's chorus, eight solo voices, an enlarged orchestra, with piano, organ, and—a mandolin: in all, more than a thousand performers. These facts are interesting, but irrelevant. The point, since one is discussing not a circus but a work of art, is rather: What has Mahler succeeded in doing with his 950 choristers and his eight soloists and his immense orchestra—and his mandolin?

Well, it is indisputable, we think, that he has handled them like a master: with a constructive technique that takes the breath by its surety, its resourcefulness, its imposing command of mass and its fertility in detail. Here is a superb piece of tonal architecture: majestic and harmonious in plan, noble in its amplitude and sweep of line. These aspects, of course, since they are external and largely intellectual, engage most obviously the eye and ear. What of the stuff within—the spiritual and poetic content of the work, and the character of its inspiration? We think it must be evident to any sympathetic student or listener that a good deal of the spiritual quality of Goethe's conception had found its way into Mahler's heart, and has been precipitated upon the pages of his score. This music, in its best moments, has caught something of the unique ecstasy, the mystical passion, the otherworldliness, the ineffable serenity and tenderness, the rapturous exaltation, of the original. Such moments are the speech of the *Pater Ecstaticus* (so movingly and memorably sung by Mr. Reinald Werrenrath); the line, "*Wenn du hehr gebietest,*" in the speech of *Doctor Marianus,* with the succeeding interlude and choral passage; and the lines beginning "*Neige, neige,*" of *Una Pœnitentium,*—especially the music, of exceeding loveliness, to the ecstatic "*Er kommt zurück.*" In the First Part—the setting of *Veni, Creator Spiritus*—you will not easily forget the overwhelming tonal plangency and power of the *Gloria Patri;* though, as a whole, the opening division of the symphony is less costly in the quality of its ideas than the second—the setting of the scene from *Faust.*

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That all of the texture of the music is not of this rich and glowing quality is scarcely remarkable. Mahler undertook a venture that would have taxed the genius of a Wagner. Bayard Taylor reminds us that in Goethe's poem are "circles within circles, forms which beckon and then disappear: and when we seem to have reached the bottom of the author's meaning, we suspect that there is still something beyond." How, indeed, shall any music save the greatest convey, without numerous haltings and lapses and futilities, Goethe's transcendent imaging of "the victorious vitality of God and the omnipotence of Divine Love?" So one need not be surprised to find Mahler repeatedly stumbling and groping in his music, and writing pages that are empty or dull or commonplace—in which there is a mighty striving rather than a mighty realization. There is no need to specify these pages: they will be identified by those who are most deeply moved by that in the work which is indubitably beautiful and impressive.

It is curious that Bayard Taylor, writing almost half a century ago, should have spoken of the closing scene of *Faust* as "a symphony": "an ever-rising and ever-swelling symphony, with its one theme of the accordance of Human and Divine Love"; as—again—"this mystic Symphony of Love." It almost seems as if he had previsioned the tonal possibilities of the poem—possibilities which Mahler, in this symphony of present actuality, has to so singular a degree realized and fulfilled. For this, despite its lack of continuous excellence (indeed, its frequent discouragements to those who would wish it consistent in eloquence and felicity), is one of the noble and outstanding works of our time. There are things here—occasional inspirations perfect for their devotional tenderness, their uplifted spiritual beauty—of which their creator might justifiably have said, with the singer of the *Odes of Solomon*, "So are the wings of the Spirit over my heart, and I have been set on His immortal pinions."

LAWRENCE GILMAN.

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THE BOOK OF THE MONTH

WOMAN: THE ENEMY [1]

BY LAWRENCE GILMAN

Women cannot aspire beyond the heights to which the normal world has already attained.

Their ideals are only the reflections of the material life of humanity. They want comfort, peace, plenty, stability, recognition.

Some women see higher than others—but there is a limit to all feminine aspiration.

You may soar to the mountain tops, until the inevitable woman subdues you to her limitations: then you are dragged down, not because you could not have resisted her power, but because you were too weak, easy-going, sentimental, too enmeshed in your sexual instincts.

She is an enemy, whose love is only a mantle to hide her true nature. She epitomizes the life of the unessentials,—the life which, in a thousand different ways, aims at stifling the heroic spirit and the soaring intelligence of mankind.

* * * * * *

These great truths were discovered by Stanford West—discovered and rediscovered—through various lamentable encounters. It was the dream of West's intellectual life (and that his intellect was subtle and far-sweeping and profound you will have perceived at once by our notation of his views on The Sex)—it was his dear and lofty dream to give to the world "a gigantic Ethic of Culture" running to ten volumes, which would cover every branch of human aspiration: a work in which, taking courage for his bride, he would defy convention and the Fafners of bigotry and prejudice, and turn "the white light of his intellect" upon the fallacies

[1] *The Man of Promise.* By Willard Huntington Wright. New York: John Lane Company, 1916.

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of our civilization. Especially would this formidable treatise expose the psychology of sex, the true place of woman in the world's moral and intellectual activities. There was preliminary publication in a magazine (doubtless *The Spectator*—for West abided in London); and then, at last, Volume One of the Ethic of Culture was presented to humanity. In it the author was revealed as "cold and unsentimental." He attacked ruthlessly the very structure on which modern education, morality, and art were based. He insisted upon a natural aristocracy wherein there would be no concessions to the demands of illiteracy, and he advanced a series of radical reforms in which the democratic idea was not included. He outlined, further, an æsthetic *rationale* for criticism wherein morality and ethics played no part. He censured, boldly and unsparingly, the most sacred aspects of Western civilization. One suspects, in fact, that the author had come upon Nietzsche.

A week after the book appeared, a storm of public indignation and censure broke upon West's head, and he and his devoted wife Alice found themselves ostracized. Alice wept, and displayed bitterness. To her it seemed that the foundation had been knocked from under their whole existence. She charged her husband with bringing disgrace upon them, for the things he wrote about her sex reflected, as it seemed to her, upon their personal relations. . . . "They think," said she, "you don't respect me." She pleaded for her standard of greatness—"the one recognized by the world." And she asked him if he thought it paid,—to bring upon them scorn and hate for the sake of the pleasure he derived from his thankless endeavor to Nietzscherize the British public. Clearly, as West saw, there was no convincing her; so, haunted by the futility of high ideals and unattainable goals, he gave up his plan of intellectual evangelization, and produced a popular novel, becoming almost immediately "the center of an influx of beneficent admiration." Alice, having successfully aborted the nine unborn volumes of the Ethic of Culture, was "radiantly happy," but West, conscious of the tawdriness of his success, recognized, in profound dejection, a victory of Woman the Enemy. He had fallen into decadence because of his wife: his present spiritual defeat was due directly to her love and the force of her ideals.

When West looked squarely at the facts of his life, and

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analyzed them with a "cynical disregard for his emotions," he arrived at the conclusion that it had been his idealistic consideration for women which had always held him a slave. In each woman who had intimately touched his life he had been deceived. The tyranny of women—had not that been his curse? For the tragedy of West's experience of The Sex's influence as a spiritually azotic force had begun in his college days. One by one, beginning with his mother, the women who had crossed his life had taken something vital out of it.

There was Irene Brenner, with whom, in his college days, he had enjoyed an existence composed largely of "blind, stifling kisses." Drowned in "the unfathomable mystery of sex" and detained by the "soft tenacity" of this lady's arms, our intellectual Samson forgot his studies, his cultural future, the drama upon which he had been ardently engaged. But there came a time when he remembered that the world was still unconquered; and he became aware that Irene was now his foe. He told her that he must resume his work; for "two of the greatest men living" had told him he would some day do wonderful things. But Irene, with the brutal directness common to her ravening sex, had charged him with being tired of her. Her sneering smile was too much for West. "Something reeled in his brain": the familiar "red fog" of fiction passed into his eyes. Since she was now disclosed as his foe, what more natural than that he should have struck her a terrific blow, then a rain of blows that "snapped and crackled like distant fireworks": that he should then have caught hold of her hair and twisted it till her head bent back, laughing loudly and hysterically the while? Then, observing that the Enemy was now making "a low, whimpering sound like a sick animal," her prey desisted.

That had been the first onslaught of the Enemy. Others followed. There was Margaret Moore, the actress, whose unexpected achievement of pregnancy, while sharing his apartment, caused him infinite annoyance and brought about their parting,—though not until his use in her behalf of his position as a dramatic critic had resulted in his discharge and humiliation. Then came Evelyn Naesmith, for whom he left his wife—Evelyn, who "understands the inmost promptings of my nature," he told Alice: "a thing you never understood." But Evelyn, too, disclosed eventually the feat-

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ures of the immemorial Foe: for "she sought, through her tears and entreaties, to render him unfit for sustained thinking," and began to "tear away the other interests of his life—his fellowship with men, his hours of recreation, his excursions into the field of music and painting."

His final sacrifice is for the future of his daughter, for whose sake he renounces all dreams of greatness and returns to a college professorship in his boyhood town.

And so we are shown how Woman, "by her conservatism and social conventionality, interferes with true greatness and conspires instinctively and unconsciously against the higher nature of the man she loves." Thus Mr. Willard Huntington Wright refutes unsparingly and beyond retort the notion of Meredith,—that women either draw us back to the conditions of primitive man, or lift us higher than the topmost star: but that "it is as we please: the poet's Lesbia, the poet's Beatrice: ours is the choice." With this strabismic view Mr. Wright permits us no longer to have patience. Nor may we now remember, save with disdain, that Maeterlinck has told us that women "lead us close to the gates of our being . . . for they know the things that we do not know and have a lamp that we have lost."

But Mr. Wright has his own quaint attitude toward the masters. He classes Maeterlinck and Botticelli with—Massenet. At other times, he inclines toward academic and conventional groupings, and intimates a rather middle-class disapproval of persons like Swinburne, Tchaikovsky, and D'Annunzio. The quality of his own performance is not such as to indicate a spontaneous affinity with distinguished art. He loves the *clichés* dear to the mechanical fictionist: his people are seized with "gnawing doubt"; their nostrils "dilate with passion"; "something snaps" in their brain; they cry "don't touch me!" and "before either of us leaves this room . . ."

This book suggests to us the droll and curious fancy that Mr. Robert W. Chambers, going suddenly and wildly insane, had made a meal of many printed pages torn from the writings of Strindberg, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Bernard Shaw, and had then sat down and projected his resultant sensations into one of his own beloved and inimitable works.

LAWRENCE GILMAN.

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NEW BOOKS REVIEWED

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. An Autobiography With a Memorial Address by Henry Cabot Lodge. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916.

The manuscript of the autobiography contained in the recently published volume entitled *Charles Francis Adams* was sent by Mr. Adams to the Massachusetts Historical Society in 1913. A prefatory note informs us that this "autobiographical sketch," as Mr. Adams called it, was to "serve as material for a memoir to be prepared for publication in the *Proceedings* of the society, when the occasion should arise." Full authority, however, was given to the editor of the society to make such use of the material as he saw fit. No properly qualified biographer was found, and the "sketch," which turned out to be far more than a sketch, was published entire.

It is fortunate that we possess the autobiography of Charles Francis Adams in its original unity and completeness. Henry Cabot Lodge's memorial address serves admirably as an introduction to Adams's own story. Like all that Mr. Lodge has written in this kind, it is distinguished in style, tactful, eloquent, and really illuminating. More specifically, it supplies needed shadings, preparing the mind's eye, as it were, for the intellectual glare of Adams's pages, softening in advance the effect of the asperity or eccentricity occasionally noticeable in Adams's narrative and opinions. But the very excellences of Mr. Lodge's address serve but to emphasize the exceptional quality of the autobiography which follows. Memorial addresses are seldom literature; the autobiography of Charles Francis Adams is.

As a narrative of concrete facts and achievements, the story is best described by the term which Mr. Adams himself finally applies to it—a *resumé*. It is a record, compact—almost impatiently concise at times—recounting all manner of highly complex activities, soldiering, travel, business, politics, historical research and writing—a record almost entirely lacking in the sentimental, voluptuously regretful, or gloating tone of reminiscence. The subject-matter is sufficiently important and varied. But the story deserves the name of literature—it deserves to be ranked among the rarely successful autobiographies—because it is an extraordinarily dynamic expression of personality; and the ways in which the author's personality finds characteristic expression are principally two.

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In the first place, a really strong personality values all things by its own scale. Charles Francis Adams hardly ever fails to evaluate his life experiences, and his valuations are singularly frank and decisive. It is more to him that he helped to save the Fells for Boston than that he was president of the Union Pacific Railroad. His ten years of service on the Massachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners, from 1869 to 1879, were "prosperous, active, useful years—years good to live, good to look back upon." In 1890, he severs his connection with the Union Pacific, "conscious of failure," but profoundly glad to escape. There is no self-deception in his estimate of either episode; in each case there is a critical weighing of the values given and received; and the keenly critical spirit extends even to the estimate of personal relations. "In the course of my railroad experiences," writes Mr. Adams, "I made no friends, apart from those in the Boston direction; nor among those I met was there any man whose acquaintance I valued. They were a coarse, realistic, bargaining crowd." This valuing is done from the point of view not only of a man possessed of marked likes and dislikes, but also from that of an essentially philosophic mind. In a kind of philosophic self-expression, then, the autobiography excels.

In the second place a strong personality impresses its own peculiar quality, its tastes, preferences, instinctive views, with a force that somehow sets free new energy in those who come in contact with it. This is eminently true of Charles Francis Adams's personality as expressed in his autobiography. The narrative often is lit by flashes of extraordinary insight, but its value as a whole is not, of course, to be measured by one's concurrence with the particular views expressed. Caustic often, sometimes extreme or eccentric, Mr. Adams never fails to waken in his reader the response of a heightened vitality, an increased sense of personal worth. It is not usual, indeed, for an author, in dwelling upon the not conspicuously unhappy days of his youth, to lay the principal stress upon the errors, methodically listed and numbered, of his upbringing and education. Charles Adams's unsparing though quite unmelancholy recital of such mistakes is the least engaging part of his life-story—though it is instructive. It alarms one's democratic complacency to read: "The common schools my father did not care to send his children to; and I have always been glad of it. I don't associate with the laborers on my place, nor would the association be agreeable to either of us. . . . I believe in school life; and I believe in the equality of men before the law; but social equality, whether for man or child, is altogether another thing." Then, too, one may not be inclined to sympathize with the assertion that Harvard College—College, not University, the author would have us note—is an institution that needs "reforming altogether," or to take seriously the suggestion that a course in chess might prove of more benefit to college students than some of the subjects in which instruc-

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tion is regularly given. It would be impermissible to insist upon occasional asperities or oddities of opinion, or even upon the pervading tone of almost bitter self-criticism, as characteristic traits of the autobiography, were it not that the story as a whole is so vital and genuine that its defects are to be accounted as virtues.

One does not, of course, read this narrative merely as a character study: the story possesses much objective interest and charm. The earlier chapters have somewhat the fascination of the best of novels of the modern school—the school which joins keen interest in life as an adventure to the lucidity of realism and of an emancipated point of view. Some of the later chapters are memorable in a way that the fictional comparison cannot suggest. Especially to be valued is the chapter entitled "Washington, 1861," with its strong impression of the feeling of the time and its familiar, penetrating views of notable men—rather especially, of Seward and Sumner. Seldom are historic mists so effectually pierced.

Frankness, sincerity: these are inadequate words to designate the quality of this autobiography of Charles Francis Adams. The story vibrates to the note of reality—the reality of intense life and conviction.

THE MEANING OF PERSONAL LIFE. By Newman Smyth. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916.

There is a marked difference between Mr. Smyth's approach to his subject and that of writers who have handled the same problem within contemporary memory. Gone are the old sweeping arguments from analogy; gone is the self-assurance of the writer untrained in scientific thought who jauntily set out to "reconcile science with religion." Conspicuously absent, too, is the wistful pessimism of a Mallock or the rigorous skepticism of a Shaler. The truth is that while science has pretty successfully imposed its method and viewpoint upon all modes of thought, it has itself become less dogmatic than formerly; it leaves openings through which religious thought may pass to freedom. Into such openings as are afforded by William James, Bergson, and the biologists, Mr. Smyth eagerly presses. His book is, so to speak, an extract of all that is most hopeful, from the spiritual point of view, in the writings of modern scientists and philosophers. All who dabble in modern philosophy and science have felt a certain change in the scientific spirit. James did much; other philosophers, though disagreeing among themselves, have urged on the newer tendency; even psychic research has had its influence: the sheer inertia of materialism has been overcome; scientific pessimism has gone rather out of fashion.

Mr. Smyth's treatise is an attempt to systematize the newer tendencies of thought in a manner sufficiently thorough to do full justice to scientific facts and yet untechnical enough to make the

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way easy for the general readers. The method employed is that of scientific inquiry—the method which the special sciences have imposed upon philosophy. Instead of ostentatiously assembling "evidences," the author searches humbly for meanings; he seeks to discover the tendency, the general direction, and hence the destination of life, after the modern method; he would faithfully follow the facts as far as they light the path, and then with some confidence take a leap into the dark.

It cannot be said that this mode of procedure as carried out by Mr. Smyth is wholly satisfactory. To begin with, the author is not very successful in avoiding the twin dangers of superficial generalization and excessive scientific detail. On the whole, there is in his work rather more detail than penetration. Then, too, Mr. Smyth appears to be not especially blessed with the Jamesian gifts of suggestive phrasing and clear, incisive summary. Thus the reader is sometimes left in no small doubt as to whether the discussion of a particular class of facts has materially advanced to argument, or whether the advance actually achieved is really dependent upon the preliminary criticism of materials. Furthermore, as a philosophic thinker the author is hardly critical enough to be clear. He draws, for example, upon Bergson's vitalism, upon James's pragmatism, upon Clifford's peculiar form of idealism, without making it quite plain how much of these systems of thought we may safely accept, or precisely where lies their common ground. Something of the same unsureness of touch is felt in dealing with the teleological argument. Apparently his method does not include a search for *design*, or purpose, in the universe; he looks merely for *meanings*. Yet the distinction is rather a fine one: the reader feels that the meaning of the word *meaning* itself needs to be more carefully defined, and distinguished if possible from that of the kindred words *design* and *purpose*. Finally, despite the method of scientific inquiry which he employs, Mr. Smyth visibly has a hard struggle to prevent his work from turning wholly into a work of edification. Edifying the chapters upon "The Fulfilment of Personal Life in Jesus Christ" and "The Creative Spirit of Christianity" surely are; and for these the preceding chapters in a measure clear the way, if they do little more.

Even as philosophic exposition in the stricter sense, Mr. Smyth's treatise is worth while. To be sure, what may be learned from modern analyses of memory or of the phenomena of aphasia, or what may be gained by attempting to take a leaf out of Bergson's book without accepting Bergson *in toto*, is on the whole rather little. Nevertheless, the author does fairly achieve two worthy ends. First, he demonstrates the inadequacy of materialism. At no point in the series of life-development is materialism a sufficient hypothesis; psycho-physical parallelism is merely a working theory; spiritualism is an allowable if not the necessary alternative. Secondly, Mr. Smyth makes credible the essential reality of the personal self. Once the

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self has been taken apart in thought, he points out, it is difficult to put it together again; yet it has never been really taken apart. Its assertion of reality and of its own worth cannot be mechanistically explained.

GERMANY VS. CIVILIZATION. By William Roscoe Thayer. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916.

Of American books about the war, this of Mr. Thayer's is perhaps the most genuinely unpassioned and the most effectively rhetorical that has been written. Mr. Thayer, who recently gave us *The Life and Letters of John Hay,* is notable among American prose writers for the clarity and grace and the sinewy strength of his style. As a biographer he has shown himself capable of fine sympathy and judicious interpretation. One expects much of Mr. Thayer; but unfortunately it cannot be said that his book, *Germany vs. Civilization,* is in any respect a valuable contribution to the subject which forms its theme.

The defect is not merely that Mr. Thayer has nothing new to offer in the way of explanation or philosophic forecast. There is, besides, a certain superficiality of thought throughout the book, and a tendency toward sweeping generalization. The very questionable view that the behavior of the German people in relation to the present war is explicable on the ground of inherited savagery is urged with unjustifiable sureness and unnecessary bitterness. The effect upon the German mind of the recent German philosophers and pseudo-philosophers—Nietzsche, Treitschke, Bernhardi and the rest—is emphasized beyond critical moderation. The general impression left is that the creed of Kultur is not merely an influence, of such weight, say, as the philosophic element in the French Revolution, but a sort of yellow streak that runs from top to bottom of German society. The author's denunciation of the Kaiser gives an impression of that potentate as such a demon *ex machina* as perhaps never was or can be. It seems unhistorical in temper, and even a little childish.

Mr. Thayer's book is chiefly an appeal to feeling. In estimating such a book one perhaps ought not to apply too strictly mere scholarly standards of criticism. But the question may be asked: Just what good end can be accomplished by such an appeal at such a time? Americans, it may be supposed, have pretty generally made up their minds as to the right and wrong of the present war. Indignation, presumably, has passed into sober conviction.

A certain degree of violence of expression may no doubt be forgiven a man whose heart is generously stirred by reports of German iniquities in Belgium. These things are bad enough, some of us think. No true American can regard without detestation the German policy of frightfulness. We are, most of us, "human, all too

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human," and we are not at all Nietzschean. But, on the whole, the best commentary on the tone of Mr. Thayer's book is supplied by the very calm and judicial spirit of some of the best English writers who have dealt with the war.

THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY. By Henry Otis Dwight. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916.

The year 1916 marks the one-hundredth anniversary of a society which has unobtrusively exerted a tremendous spiritualizing and civilizing influence. The work of the American Bible Society has been the faithful carrying out of a single large and simple idea—the supplying of the Scriptures to all who will receive them. Those to whom the simplicity of the idea suggests ease of accomplishment or unfruitfulness of result should read Henry Otis Dwight's History. It is an inspiring record showing how the effort to live up to one of the "nearest duties" may result in an unlooked-for extension of the sphere of activity, in unforeseen difficulties and in unanticipated success.

The idea of a national Bible Society did not, of course, originate in the United States; the British and Foreign Bible Society was established in 1804, antedating the American Society by twelve years. Before 1816 there were in this country many local societies, of which the Philadelphia Bible Society, organized in 1808, was the oldest. These societies, however, lacked largeness of vision; the spiritual needs of a vast and growing country were imperfectly realized. It was not until 1810 that the devoted efforts of Samuel J. Mills and other "like-minded young men" who felt the missionary call, revealed the extent of "destitution" among American frontiersmen. On returning from his first missionary expedition Mills was supplied with Bibles by the New York and Philadelphia societies. The distribution which followed, was, however, but a drop in the bucket. The reports of Mills and his companions stirred religiously minded men, and at last, in 1816, as the result of action taken by the New Jersey Bible Society, under the leadership of its president, the Honorable Elias Boudinot, a national organization was formed.

The scope of the society's work extended widely and rapidly. As Mr. Dwight remarks, "Home and foreign missions are among the things which God has joined and man may not put asunder." The society found that it could not consistently limit its work to the United States; opportunities for foreign service were too obvious to be put aside, and very early in its career the distribution of Bibles in Latin America was begun. In time the field broadened to include the whole world. An enthusiastic faith led to the undertaking of enterprises of ever-increasing size. In 1829, when the population

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of the United States was about thirteen million, the society resolved that it would " endeavor to supply all the destitute families in the United States with the Holy Scriptures, that may be willing to purchase or receive them, within the space of two years, provided sufficient means be furnished by its auxiliaries and benevolent individuals in season to enable its Board of Managers to carry this resolution into effect." This resolution is indicative of that combination of faith, zeal, and good sense which has fortunately governed all the decisions of the American Bible Society. In 1833, a " most Christian enthusiasm " led to the serious consideration of a proposal to attempt the supply of every destitute family in the world within the space of twenty years. Mature thought and friendly advice from foreign societies brought about the abandonment of the time limit, but effort was not thereby shortened, nor was the ideal once clearly envisioned ever lost sight of.

The growth of the work necessitated the translation of the Scriptures into a multitude of different tongues. Nothing more clearly brings home to the reader the civilizing effect of the society's efforts than do these many translations. " One of the great services to the world performed by Bible translators and Bible distributors," Mr. Dwight truly remarks, " is their taking a language which is the dress of miserable, impoverished and perhaps vile thought, and putting into it the noble, pure and inspiring thought that fills the Bible." Even in the early days it was found necessary to translate the Scriptures into almost a dozen different languages for American distribution alone. Today the society can show a list of one hundred and sixty-four languages in which it has promoted the translation, printing or distribution of the Bible. In fourteen different languages and systems the Bible has been printed in embossed letters for the blind. " What! " said a blind woman to Dr. Howe, " do you think I can read the New Testament which you are printing? Then I can die in peace! "

Throughout the experience of the society the demand for the Bibles has been enormous and pathetically insistent. From all parts of the world applications have flowed in " as eager as the pleas of men in a bread line." And the good accomplished by the distributions which the society has made is incalculably great. The Bible, as one missionary has said, is the best missionary. It can go where other missionaries cannot go and accomplish what they cannot accomplish. Without the help of notes or oral explanations it accomplishes its work of reviving or creating spiritual life. The belief that a community without Bibles becomes degraded, does not rest upon faith alone; it is confirmed by observation, and the terms " destitution " and " famine " which are used to describe a lack of the Scriptures are employed with perfect propriety. Up to the beginning of the present year the American Bible Society has placed in the United States alone 70,000,000 copies of Scripture. Who can

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estimate the effect of this distribution upon the civilization and moral tone of the country?

The difficulties encountered by the society enhance the interest of the story which Mr. Dwight has told. It is pleasant to read of the manner in which obstacles were surmounted and to observe how nearly every effort, however uncompromising it might seem at the beginning, bettered expectation in the outcome. Particularly agreeable is it to read of the faithfulness of many of the Southern auxiliaries in the earlier years of the war and how the Bible passed across the lines without question as by a special dispensation. Such things make the ideal of a universal Christian community seem less remote.

A-B-C OF GOLF. By John Duncan Dunn. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1916.

In the *A-B-C of Golf*, John Duncan Dunn reduces the science of the golfing stroke, i.e. the full drive, to its simplest possible element—body balance. It is only when the body is kept in perfect poise that the player can put the full measure of his strength into the blow; otherwise a large proportion of his available energy must be wasted in keeping himself from pitching forward on his nose, or in simulating the physical agonies of a contortionist. Manifestly, if one has to fight to keep his feet, he won't have much margin of power to put into the ball.

The same theory has been advanced by Mr. Marshall Whitlatch, an earnest student of golfing technique; moreover, Mr. Whitlatch offered a guaranteed panacea against all varieties of non-balance: "Keep the head still—absolutely so—and everything will come right." This dictum at least possessed the merit of simplicity, but the results in practice were not invariably satisfactory, and it made golf a particularly dull kind of business.

The author of the *A-B-C of Golf* points out that we are all born tent-peggers, and he invites us to take up that particular position and notice how smoothly the full power of the body can be put into the stroke: one can't help hitting with accuracy and force. And the reason is very simple—the weight of the body lies naturally in the same plane with the application of the force. Now with the golfer, the club-head moves in an entirely different plane, and its movements must be perfectly synchronized with those of the body muscles if satisfactory results are to be obtained; with the body coming into the same stroke a hairbreadth too soon or too late the stroke is ruined.

The only way in which this all-important "timing" can be secured is the maintenance of adequate body poise or balance. When the body is in balance it will come into the stroke at the precise instant that it is needed; the player does not ever have to think about

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it. Moreover, the full power of the body, or weight, will then be utilized and the utmost possible efficiency conferred upon the stroke. The argument seems to be conclusive, but how are we to arrive at the happy conditions upon which success depends? The answer to this question is the book itself, in which the author gives his pupil a certain series of "setting-up" exercises designed to show him how he may attain correctly the top of the swing and how he should feel when he gets there. The only other thing is to hit as hard as possible.

The manual is illustrated by line drawings accurately reproduced from photographs of the author in action. The bulk of the text is devoted to the full driving swing, but that, in the eyes of the average golfer (not to say duffer), is *the* master-stroke, iron play and putting being merely incidental considerations.

Many ponderous tomes have been written on the art of golf, but it is more than doubtful if anyone ever learned to play from a perusal of their pages. At least the *A-B-C of Golf* presents a reasonable working theory and so is worthy of attention from the 12-handicap golfer.

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CONTEMPORARY ECHOES

NORTH BRITISH SENTIMENT

(From the Glasgow Herald)

We have had a good many American journalists among us since the war began, all of them intent on knowing what we are doing, some of them inquisitively concerned with what we are thinking and saying. But the majority of those who have tried to get a little beneath the surface of things have perhaps been disposed to assume that the chief object of our meditations is "our noble selves." Colonel George Harvey, of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, who was recently an honored guest in this country, made the happy discovery that what the British people and those domiciled among them were thinking about their own affairs was not altogether such an important question as the color and direction of their thoughts regarding the attitude of the United States. His investigations, as disclosed to the readers of his magazine, are interesting to us, and ought to be important to his countrymen. What do we think about America and American policy since we girded ourselves for Armageddon? It is a curious but by no means inexplicable circumstance that when Colonel Harvey began to ask that question the frankest and bitterest replies came not from the British-born but from Americans resident in our midst, some of them the mothers of sons fighting in the trenches for the cause, not as they conceived it of the Allies alone but of their Fatherland, others working themselves to the bone under the Red Cross, and the rest men of generous and adventurous blood who, in spite of Presidential denunciation, put their "passionate sympathy" with justice and righteousness higher even than "their regard for the peace and dignity of the United States."

The distant view, as Colonel Harvey implies, depends for its interpretation on something more than mere visualization. His Americans, glowing with enthusiasm for a noble enterprise and projecting their own fine instincts and ambitions across the seas, are dismayed to find that in the familiar landscape of home an unfamiliar climate prevails. So we are told, ghosts revisit the earthly scene with messages and appeals that none can hear among those other ghosts in frock coats and Norfolk jackets. To us the distant view is not perplexed by emotional interferences. But we have been keen enough to perceive, as Colonel Harvey remarks, that our judgment of the American people should not be confused with our judgment of the American Government. He found here no feeling against the American people because of what the President has done or left undone. But the critical attitude towards the Administration does exist. "The most increasingly powerful man in the Empire" said to him "there is not a particle of feeling in England against the American people. In point of

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fact, there exists rather a sense of sympathy arising from a notion that their real attitude has been misrepresented. It is your Government only that is criticised, and that not severely by thoughtful persons who look ahead." And the cause "is to be found in the rooted belief, constantly reiterated, that we are fighting your battle, and that your Government not only treats the common enemy with the greatest consideration, but seems to go out of its way to annoy and harass us."

On the whole that is a just appreciation of the situation, whoever uttered it. We are not hostile in the faintest degree to Americans; we are critical and, what is more, suspicious of the American Government. But is that a situation with which either we or our American friends can be satisfied? If we are justified in setting aside difficulties and dangers due to differences and antipathies between the two peoples, how much is the case improved by admitting that a public opinion which is unable to make itself operative—which is indeed rather doubtful of the wisdom of making itself too audible—is not the decisive factor and that an Administration which has sometimes acted as if it were wholly out of sympathy with the Allies is? Colonel Harvey found the case of the *Lusitania* constantly quoted against his country. If he returned to our shores he would not discover that the quotation had lost in pertinence because of the manner in which it is suggested the controversy is to be wound up. Nor would he find that our kindly feelings for the people who have succored so many of the miserable sufferers by the war and expressed much valued sympathy for the work the Allies are doing entirely outweighed our fears that the Executive, after chastising our enemy with a whip of very small cords, might devote himself with all his might to lashing us with scorpions. Already the refusal to acknowledge the validity of our blockade is a much heavier blow struck at the Allies than the much attenuated rebukes administered to Germany for acts that outraged not law alone but every human attribute. Colonel Harvey assured the "foremost Cabinet Minister" that there was not the slightest likelihood of the American Government prohibiting or limiting the export of munitions. History, however, has been in the making since he gave that purely unofficial assurance. Germany had not then made the demand that she would be justified in treating armed merchantmen as ships of war, nor had Mr. Lansing approached the belligerents with a series of proposals which seem to us now suspiciously like preparatives for the German policy of wholesale murder on the sea. If we are not to be hurried into one of the most momentous diplomatic crises the war has provoked, it is time the American people were rousing themselves and justifying our confidence in the benevolence of their attitude towards our cause. It is not for us to interfere in their domestic politics and to prescribe methods. But it is the interest of every true man on both sides of the Atlantic to secure that when the world returns to the ways of peace our relations with each other shall not be overshadowed by memories of needless worries and embittering controversies.

A FOREIGN VIEW OF OUR POLITICS

(*From the London Shipping World*)

THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for February contains a budget of good things; but to men of Britain, interested in the political, social, and diplomatic questions of the United States, the article of the Editor, Colonel

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Harvey, will prove to be the most attractive and informing. The chief title of the article is "Wilson and a Second Term"; and the Editor satisfactorily proves that, personally and technically, President Wilson's claim to stand for a second term for the Presidency cannot be challenged. Of course, a second term is contrary to the avowed policy of the Democratic Party, contrary to the gospel as preached by Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Grover Cleveland, and W. J. Bryan. In this technical respect, perhaps, President Wilson is less hampered than ex-President Roosevelt, who, through the assassination of President McKinley, did really serve two terms, though he was only *elected* for the second term. Notwithstanding the excellent case made out by Colonel Harvey, in justification of the candidature of President Wilson for a second term—and, indeed, as intimated even by him—the opinions of the electors within the Democratic Party are important, and no doubt represent votes. But the Editor of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, who knows, pronounces the judgment that will stand, namely, "Regardless of futile attacks, regardless even of his own inclinations, Woodrow Wilson must be the next Democratic candidate for President." But our readers have observed that Senator Root, presiding at a meeting of the Republican Party of New York, the other day, criticized and condemned severely the alleged neutrality policy of President Wilson; and we continue to believe that, with Elihu Root as the candidate, the Republican Party would sweep the country next November. President Wilson has been brave in words, but irresolute in action. "Foreigners," said Mr. Root, "have learned to believe that it does not matter how shocked the United States may be. Its resolution expends itself in words. It was unnecessary," he continues, "for the United States to go to war on account of Belgium, but it was their duty publicly to protest. Instead, they acquiesced. The President counselled neutrality between right and wrong, and the Government appeared as approving German treatment of Belgium." These are the dishes that will be served up in every State of the American Union from today until the polls close next November with Woodrow Wilson as the defeated aspirant for the second Presidential term.

BRITISH BLUNDERS

(*From the English Baptist Times*)

The editor of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, who has recently been visiting this country, has just published a fine article giving his impressions. We have every reason to be gratified by his testimony to the extraordinary efforts we are making, and to our determination to carry the war through to a successful issue, no matter what the cost. He is also just as confident of victory for the Allies as we are ourselves. His criticisms are as valuable as his optimism, and we may learn something from the candid judgments of a friend. They may be summed up in the epigram which he quotes with approval. "Germany," he says, "has been trying her utmost to win for sixteen months, and cannot. Great Britain has been trying to lose for sixteen months, and cannot." This, of course, is a great exaggeration, but it contains an element of truth. We have frittered away our resources, and lost through mismanagement chances of success which, rightly used, would have had far-reaching effect.

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The Battle of Loos was a case in point. A great success was within our grasp, and we let it slip through sheer bungling. Readers of Ian Hay's book, *The First Hundred Thousand,* will be able to appreciate the truth of this statement. We had personal testimony to it the other day. A friend was traveling to London in a carriage with two other occupants. One was an officer of high rank just home on leave, who described to his companion the Battle of Loos, in which he himself had taken part. It will be remembered that the Scottish regiments rushed some of the enemy's advanced trenches, held them all day against tremendous counter-attacks, and then, as no supports came up, they had to retire and abandon their gains. This officer told his friend that the failure to send up supports was due to the carelessness of the officer in command, who had *forgotten* to secure communications with the advance parties. The same officer also *forgot* that he had wagonloads of shrapnel shell two miles behind the guns, waiting for orders which never came. At nightfall, as the wagons were being taken back to the depot, German shells found them out and blew them all to fragments. According to the officer's story this forgetfulness received its due punishment the next morning, but that did not bring back to life the thousands of men who had died, nor did it recover the gains which had been simply thrown away.

A PLEASING ANTIDOTE

(*From the London Chronicle*)

Never before this war has the British nation enjoyed so many opportunities of seeing itself as others see it. Countless articles have been written by foreign observers upon the way the country is bearing itself, and if we exclude both the denunciations of enemies and the commendation of Allies from the catalogue, as lacking impartiality, and turn to the comments and criticisms of neutrals, we may perhaps learn some useful lessons.

Mr. George Harvey, the editor of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, has been visiting England, and in the current issue of his commanding organ gives us his views of "England Today."

There can be no question of his title to do so. When here he appears to have had rare chances of diagnosis. He received the confidences of many people, from "the foremost Cabinet Minister" to a young subaltern who had been wounded and gassed in Flanders.

His judgment is, in many respects, flattering, but it need not on that account be dismissed as valueless, and, at any rate, it provides a pleasing antidote to much of the hypochondria of home critics.

SEEKING AN ANSWER

(*From the London Shipping World*)

The January number of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, edited and owned by Colonel Harvey, is of absorbing interest, especially perhaps because of an article by Colonel Harvey himself on "England Today." It is as full of good things as a Christmas pudding, and as sustaining. Colonel Harvey gives a kind of symposium, holding the mirror up to events and to opinions as they pass along. A lot of shrewd things, and

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true indeed, are said about President Wilson, and here is a philosophic bit with a bite in it. It transpires in a conversation. One of the speakers, an English editor, when the ladies had withdrawn, said, "The official attitude of her (America's) Government he believed they understood." "I do not understand it," interjected a noted huntsman present. "That is, unless what I read in a Manchester paper today is correct." "And what was that, pray?" "It said that, in dealing with President Wilson, it is safer to be inhuman than illegal." Well, what is the reply to that?

LOOKING TO HUGHES

(*From the St. Johnsbury Caledonian*)

George Harvey, editor of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, in his usual able and convincing manner discusses the Republican nomination for President in the March number of his magazine. Briefly summarized, his findings are as follows: The Republicans must name a man able to beat Wilson; the favorite sons now under discussion are not large enough men for the tasks of a President the coming four years; it is an impertinence to further mention Justice Hughes in connection with the Presidency; and "the Republican Party would stamp itself a coward by refusing, at this crucial time, to nominate for President Elihu Root, the foremost statesman now living in this country or in the world." His first choice would be to give Theodore Roosevelt the Senatorship from the State of New York, but if he was to be the Republican nominee for President he would have Elihu Root for Secretary of State.

There is little to disagree with in what Colonel Harvey has said about the Republicans' duty at this time. We believe there are eight fundamental requirements in the next Republican candidate for the Presidency. He

Must secure sufficient revenue to support the Government.
Must protect American industries.
Must restrain unwarranted expenses of the Government.
Must reorganize the diplomatic service.
Must prepare the nation to defend itself.
Must extend the commercial activity of the nation.
Must protect American interests in times of war as well as peace.
Must harmonize the Republican party.

The ability of Hughes, Root or Roosevelt to fulfill the first seven of these requirements is not questioned, but when the eighth requirement is considered Justice Hughes surpasses the others. Therefore we fail to see the impertinence in insisting upon Hughes as the Republican candidate for President. Not one of the first seven requirements can be fulfilled unless the eighth one has been, and it certainly is proper for the Republican party to select the man who can harmonize their ranks and make success and the accomplishments of these other things possible.

WHEN THE RIGHT PREVAILED

(*From the Detroit Saturday Night*)

To President Wilson every candid man must accord the honor of this demonstration of national unity. Had he heard the recent prayer of his

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discoverer, Editor Harvey, uttered in THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, "to take his frost-bitten ear off the ground and stand up and lead," he could not have returned a more manly answer. To a man of spirit, serving his country as he thinks best, it is little less than maddening to find himself confronted in foreign embassies with the opposition of the very people whose interests and ideals he is endeavoring to protect. In this humiliating dilemma, humiliating to his country as well as to himself, he turned from what seemed popular to what he knew was right and challenged the opposition, honest and dishonest alike, to a show-down before the American people. He turned up some pro-German propagandists in Congress, as is usual on such occasions, and a highly organized pro-German lobby as a result of his challenge; also a strange assortment of liars who did not hesitate to carry their lies to the floor of the Senate, where they were promptly denied by those who knew, supported by a denial from the White House itself—a proceeding that seemed superfluous for a President who until yesterday was the butt of jokes the country over for his record as a peace-keeper. In the House of Representatives Acting Chairman Pou made a fairly good job on that mischievous brood of statesmen and interlopers when he proclaimed:

"All the imps of hell never devised a more ingenious lie than the declaration that has been made that President Wilson wants war."

But the right prevailed, and the President, ungagged and unfettered, is again free to speak for the country—for the whole country. Congressmen who were willing to embarrass him and imperil the nation in their eagerness for peace have seen their shame or changed their minds in sufficient numbers to remove immediate danger, and to give promise of good behavior in the future.

ON SPEAKING THE TRUTH

(From the Boston Post)

If any objection at all can be advanced to the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for March it is on the score that it is too much of a good thing rather than too little. The human mind in these days of many happenings is almost too busily engaged keeping up with current events to have either the leisure or the capacity left for the full enjoyment, and proper appreciation of the great variety of interesting philosophical disquisitions to be found in this issue. Colonel Harvey resumes his compliments to the Administration and presents them with a vigor which is probably not so deeply appreciated at the White House as in other quarters, and which we should ourselves have found perhaps more to our taste had they not appeared at a time when the President was engaged in a conflict with a meddlesome Congress in which every right-minded man was unquestionably with the responsible executive and not with the mush-headed busybodies of Oklahoma, Texas and other nests of Bryanism. Desirable as truth always is, there are times when all the truth need not be squandered at once, and the past month has been one of these times. At the present juncture the magazine miscellanist would rather not see the President embarrassed by unnecessary criticism, however just in point of detail that criticism may be. Much more to the purpose of our present needs are the colonel's observations on the subject of preparedness and militarism, which are wholly convincing, written in the right spirit,

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and worthy of the attention of the extreme pacifist, in such moments as that extreme pacifist is capable of using his thinking apparatus effectively. The colonel's conclusions are fittingly summed up in the fine passage:

"We believe it to be possible for a nation as for a man to be strong without being brutal, to be armed without being a brawler, to be prepared to defend its own rights without being irresistibly impelled to attack the rights of others."

That is a worthy sentiment and puts the whole case in a nutshell, which is one of our reasons for believing that some of the advocates of scuttle can carry it in their heads without serious inconvenience.

A COMPLETE DEFENSE

(*From the San Francisco Chronicle*)

Colonel Harvey concludes that with respect to Colonel Bryan the President squared himself and a good deal more by appointing him Secretary of State.

In regard to his obligation to his party, the conclusion reached was that since all former Democratic Presidents who had expressly stood for single terms had sought and received second nominations, Mr. Wilson is simply following Democratic tradition, thereby demonstrating that with respect to the party the President is right and the convention was wrong.

In respect to the President's obligation to his own conscience, Colonel Harvey seems to find more difficulty, for that subdivision occupies three pages of intricate reasoning in the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. After "brushing aside" some things, the conclusion seems to be that if one does not mind the careful concealment from the public, until after election, and even until now, of his views as made known to the platform committee, there cannot be the slightest suspicion of the President's good faith to himself.

But Colonel Harvey really rises to the occasion when he discusses the President's obligation to "the country," which in this branch of his subject he seems to consider as synonymous with the Democracy. There his reasoning is conclusive. Summarized, it is that the country and the Democratic party are identical, that there is no Democratic party or policy except the Wilson party and policies, and that, whatever his obligations elsewhere, public necessity demands that he consider his supposed or implied pledge as a mere scrap of paper, go in for the nomination, get it, and then get elected if he can.

The President is under great obligation to Colonel Harvey for his defense.

NO EMBARRASSMENT FOR VOTERS

(*From the New York Call*)

Fearing that the reader may not catch the drift of these utterances, Colonel Harvey prudently observes that

"There was more to the same effect, but upon the whole the ayes seem to have it. Although 'nothing new has happened,' and there is 'no fear of invasion,' nevertheless, since 'new circumstances have arisen' and 'we are daily treading among the most intricate dangers,' careful weighing of

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the evidence seems convincing that the President thinks something ought to be done by way of national defense."

It is said in Washington that this is "decidedly embarrassing the Administration," but Colonel Harvey deceives himself if he thinks it will in the least embarrass the voters. These contradictions simply stimulate them to more positive action, electorally speaking. The parallel isn't by any means a deadly one, mainly because the voters are too deadly stupid to see it or think of it. We Socialists know, for we have been in this deadly parallel business, for, lo, these many years, and we have yet to find any contradiction so positively absurd that the voters wouldn't swallow it at the ballot box. If they can swallow the contradictions of capitalism—and they do at every election—this little matter will give them no trouble. One might imagine that the mass of the voters were as intelligent as Socialists, to judge from the easy confidence with which Colonel Harvey presents his evidence that Wilson tumbles all over himself.

THE ACCEPTED VIEW

(*From the Sandusky Journal*)

Woodrow Wilson will be the nominee of the Democratic party for a second term as president. Of this there is no doubt. In certain quarters, however, there is a disposition to point to the Democratic platform adopted at the Baltimore Convention, declaring for a single term.

George Harvey, editor of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, cannot be said to be very friendly to President Wilson, even though he was an early supporter, if not the "discoverer" of the executive. He has made some very bitter criticisms of the Administration policies. In the February number of the REVIEW, however, he concludes a very thorough and searching discussion with the assertion that Wilson, "regardless of futile attacks, regardless even of his own inclinations, must be the next Democratic candidate for president."

"So far from impugning his own integrity by accepting a renomination, President Wilson would be recreant to his trust and would play the craven's part should he refuse," declares Mr. Harvey, and that view will be accepted by most people.

AMBASSADORS-AT-LARGE

(*From the Janesville Gazette*)

"Colonel Edward M. House, maker of cabinets, confidential adviser and ambassador-at-large in full charge without responsibility" is the manner in which Colonel George Harvey, "the original Wilson man," refers in the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW to Mr. Wilson's peripatetic plenipotentiary who has arrived in Washington. Colonel Harvey might have added the adjective "unconstitutional," for the appointment of Colonel House without "the advice and consent of the Senate" is unquestionably a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, as it is a reflection on the men appointed to the diplomatic corps by Mr. Wilson and an open confession of Mr. Wilson's own distrust of them.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MR. ROOSEVELT

SIR,—In THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for April is printed a letter from Mr. Roosevelt in which he refers to me, rather contemptuously, as "*a*" Mr. Kennan; accuses me of concealment, meanness, dishonesty and cowardice; characterizes as "monstrous iniquity" my suggestion that there might have been some connection between the Harriman quarrel and the Alton investigation; and finally declares that I am "unfit to be believed," and that he "would refuse to accept my unsupported assertion on any point whatever."

In the brief reference that I made to Mr. Roosevelt in my article on the Chicago & Alton case in the January NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, I endeavored to treat him with courtesy. It seemed necessary to point out the fact that the rupture of friendly relations between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Harriman occurred in the fall of 1906, and that almost immediately thereafter, the Interstate Commerce Commission began an attack on Mr. Harriman which was based on transactions that were then nearly eight years old. A reference to this chronological sequence of events seemed to me justifiable and proper, as a possible explanation of the Commission's sudden interest in ancient railroad history. In making such reference, however, I tried to be as courteous to Mr. Roosevelt as I could—purposely avoiding a discussion of the Roosevelt-Harriman controversy on its merits, and explaining it only so far as seemed to be necessary in order to show its possible bearing on the Chicago & Alton investigation. Mr. Roosevelt calls my forbearance "concealment," and replies by attacking my personal character. No self-respecting man will silently submit to the charge of untruthfulness, nor ought he to do so if conscious of his own sincerity. In Mr. Roosevelt, the making of this charge has become a habit; and in replying to such an accusation from him, it seems necessary, and in the public interest, to devote some consideration to those traits of his character which have prompted him to describe as "unworthy of belief" so many men who have disagreed with him on questions of fact.

I first saw Mr. Roosevelt, in New York City, more than twenty years ago, at a meeting of the old Fellowcraft Club, to which I was taken by Richard Watson Gilder, and at which Mr. Roosevelt made a short speech on tendencies in modern literature. The first impression that he made upon me was that of a robust hater and vehement denouncer of people who were repugnant to him. In the class of "undesirable citizens," at that time, happened to be a certain well-known American novelist. I cannot now remember all the unpleasant things Mr. Roosevelt said about him; but he summed

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up his estimate of the obnoxious writer's character and art in the words: "Some men are bad, and some men are immoral; but ——— ——— is a malignant pustule!" As this characterization was made, with a fierce gesture and a clenching of the strong white teeth, I said mentally to myself: "If this young Civil Service Commissioner fully develops his capacity for hatred and his natural gift for denunciation, he will be, in the maturity of his powers, an unpleasant man to encounter."

About this same time, according to the recollection of a well-known author and publisher, Mr. Roosevelt came from Washington to New York "mainly in order to have the satisfaction of saying, with solemn emphasis, in the sympathetic circle of the Civil Service Reform Association, 'Damn John Wanamaker!'" (*Memories of a Publisher*, by George Haven Putnam, p. 141). Doubtless Mr. Roosevelt could have given perfectly good reasons for condemning the novelist and damning John Wanamaker; but be that as it may, the incidents are of interest as showing that his disposition to denounce the conduct of his opponents as "monstrous iniquity" became apparent almost at the beginning of his public career.

After the meeting at the Fellowcraft Club, I do not remember seeing Mr. Roosevelt again until we were thrown together in the Cuban campaign, when he was with the Rough Riders and I, as Vice-President of the Red Cross, was serving in the field hospital at the front. He then came to me several times for food and medicines, which, on account of the unprepared state of the army, he could not get elsewhere.

Between 1902, when he instructed the Secretary of the Navy to give me transportation on the cruiser *Dixie* to Martinique, and 1904, when he invited me to luncheon at the White House to discuss with other Far Eastern travelers the Russo-Japanese war, I saw Mr. Roosevelt frequently and talked with him concerning many different affairs. I was then the staff correspondent of *The Outlook* in Washington, and my duties made it necessary for me to go to the White House often, and to talk with the President about various Governmental matters that had been referred to me from the home office. Among such matters were the political activities of J. Edward Addicks in Delaware, with regard to which I made several reports to him; and the attempt of two Texan cattle syndicates to get possession of a large part of the Indian Reservation of the Standing Rock Sioux. In the latter case Mr. Roosevelt felt confident, at first, that my statements were erroneous; but when, partly upon my initiative, he sent Mr. George Bird Grinnell to the Standing Rock Agency to make an investigation, he found that my information was in every respect accurate. I am glad to do him the justice of saying that when he was fully convinced of this he blocked the syndicate "steal" with characteristic promptness and vigor.

During my stay in the Far East, from 1904 to 1906, I wrote Mr. Roosevelt a number of times about the question of Japanese immigration, which was then becoming acute, and I was the first, so far as I know, to suggest to him the expediency of allowing the Japanese to limit emigration on their side of the Pacific. Within a year or two thereafter he negotiated with the Japanese Government the so-called "gentlemen's agreement," which is still in force.

After my return from the Far East I saw Mr. Roosevelt several times, by appointment, at the White House, and once, I remember, after talking with him for an hour and a half, I was asked to stay a little longer and tell

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him more things while he was being shaved. Then again, toward the end of his second term, he gave me confidentially, in his White House office, his reasons for believing that Mr. Taft would be the best possible candidate to succeed him. Finally, after he joined the staff of *The Outlook*, of which I was also a member, we were again thrown more or less frequently together, and I met him occasionally at the editorial lunches.

These personal details have little interest perhaps in themselves, but they show what opportunities I have had to observe Mr. Roosevelt, and they also show, incidentally, that when he now speaks of "*a*" Mr. Kennan, as if hearing of me for the first time, he is not wielding the proverbial "big stick," but is using a rather small domestic pin.

I have always regarded Mr. Roosevelt, with respect and esteem, as a man of sincerity and integrity. I do not think that he would, or could, make a statement that he did not believe to be true. Unfortunately, however, he is easily swayed by passion, and when he is angry—righteously angry as it seems to him—his judgment and his memory are so colored by personal feeling that he can neither see with perfect clearness, nor remember with perfect accuracy. He is not consciously unjust or untruthful; on the contrary, he passionately believes that his judgment is fair and his memory infallible. He can review his past controversies with the firm conviction that he has always been right, or nearly right, and that those whom he regards as his enemies have always been "monstrously" wrong.

It is this dominating influence of personal feeling that makes him see the characters of other men not objectively, as they are in themselves, but subjectively, as they appear to him in the light of personal relationship. If a man sympathizes with him, agrees with him and supports him, such man is a good and honorable citizen; but if, on the other hand, a man opposes him, or questions the wisdom or propriety of his actions, such man becomes an undesirable citizen with a more or less defective moral character. The Taft whom Mr. Roosevelt confidentially sketched for me in the early part of 1908, while he and Mr. Taft were still friends, differed widely from the "deceitful" and "hypocritical" Taft whom he saw in his mind's eye during the election campaign of 1912. The eminent railroad president whom he always addressed, between 1901 and 1905, as "My dear Mr. Harriman;" whom he invited again and again to the White House as an honored guest; whom he said it was "a real pleasure to see;" and whom he desired to consult about his letter of acceptance, his message to Congress, and other "Government matters not connected with the campaign," became a totally different Harriman when the quarrel occurred in 1906, and when Mr. Roosevelt looked at his former friend through the distorting medium of a changed personal relation. This disposition to judge men narrowly by their relation to him, rather than broadly by the sum total of their activities, has long been a trait of Mr. Roosevelt's character, and it was notably shown in his attitude toward the struggle for honest government in Delaware, when a notorious political adventurer tried to get into the United States Senate by methods that all the best men of his own political party condemned and combated.

Bearing in mind this characteristic of Mr. Roosevelt, let us inquire whether, at the time of the Alton investigation, the President was, as a matter of fact, influencing the Interstate Commerce Commission, or taking a hand, personally, in its policies and activities.

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In the recent trial of the New York & New Haven Railroad directors for alleged conspiracy to violate the provisions of the Sherman anti-trust law, Mr. Charles S. Mellen, former president of the road, testified that he went to Washington in 1907—the year of the Alton investigation—for the purpose of finding out whether, under the provisions of the Panama Canal Act, his road would be allowed to keep its Long Island Sound steamers, or would be required by the Interstate Commerce Commission to sell them. He went first, not to the Commission, but to President Roosevelt. The latter sent for Commissioners Knapp and Prouty, and presumably consulted them; but he seems to have taken the final determination of the question into his own hands when he said to Mr. Mellen: "I cannot promise you any kind of protection if you break the law; but as far as I and my Administration are concerned, if you do not sell, you will have no trouble about those steamship lines." (*New York Times*, Nov. 11, 1915).

A little later, that same year, Mr. Mellen again went to President Roosevelt, to ascertain whether the Interstate Commerce Commission would interfere if the New York & New Haven Railroad Company should buy the Boston & Maine. Again the President seems to have taken the decision of the question into his own hands by saying: "I would buy it if I were you." (Testimony of Mr. Mellen, *New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1915). Mr. Henry M. Whitney of Boston, who evidently thought that in railroad matters the President was more to be feared than the Interstate Commerce Commission, wrote to Mr. Mellen, on the 21st of May, 1907: "I have also thought it possible that the Little Father in Washington might like to get his finger in the pie [the purchase of the Boston & Maine] in which case * * * it might result in infinite harm to all your interests." (*New York Times*, November 23, 1915).

It would thus appear that in two important cases at least, the President did have a "finger in the pie," and did influence or control, more or less effectively, the Interstate Commerce Commission. Is it wholly unreasonable or "monstrous," then, to suppose that, at or about the same time, he put his strong and capable finger into the "pie" of the Alton investigation, even if he did not make or bake it? I would not contend, for a moment, that Mr. Roosevelt inspired or encouraged the investigation of Mr. Harriman's long-past activities merely because he had had a quarrel with him. He did not look at the matter from that point of view at all. As Mr. Taft in 1912, seemed to him an unworthy candidate for the Presidency, whom it was his duty to oppose, so Mr. Harriman, in 1908, seemed to him the leading exponent of a dangerous railroad policy, whom it was his duty to check. In each case, the quarrel first changed Mr. Roosevelt's view of the man, and then, in each case, the changed view resulted in antagonistic action, based on a sense of duty.

Mr. Roosevelt thinks it "monstrously iniquitous" to suppose that he would ask the Interstate Commerce Commission to proceed against a railroad president merely because he, Mr. Roosevelt, had had a personal disagreement with him. That is not at all my supposition. If he suggested, inspired, encouraged, or controlled the Alton investigation in any way, he did so with the firm and sincere belief that he was under a moral obligation to make an example of a man whom he had come to regard as a dangerous railroad speculator and monopolist. But he did not take anything like this view of the railroad president until after he had quarreled with him, although

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all of Mr. Harriman's more important operations, including the reorganization of the Union Pacific, the Alton transaction, the purchase of control in the Southern Pacific, the Northern Pacific "corner," and the Northern Securities merger, had been fully set forth in the newspapers, or litigated in the courts, and had been well known, not only to students, but to the general public for years. It cannot reasonably be supposed that the President, throughout the period of his friendly association with Mr. Harriman, was wholly ignorant of them; and yet neither he nor the Interstate Commerce Commission took action upon them until after the quarrel in 1906.

In order to show that Mr. Roosevelt *did* exercise some control over the Alton investigation, I shall have to call as a witness Professor William Z. Ripley, of Harvard University, who seems to have been present at the taking of testimony by the Interstate Commerce Commission in New York, and who, according to his own account, was "usually" allowed to cross-examine the witnesses. For some reason best known to himself, Professor Ripley wrote me a letter, on the 10th of March, 1916, to tell me what he was going to do to me in the April number of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. Sympathetically remarking that I "had perhaps floundered in affairs over my depth," he kindly explained to me that a certain prominent member of the "looting" syndicate was treated gently as a witness, and was allowed to give his testimony in the seclusion of a hotel room "*because the Commission had received orders from Washington to apply the soft pedal.*" Of course no one in Washington could give the Commission "orders" except Theodore Roosevelt; and if he controlled the investigation in its later stages, there is a strong probability that he had something to do with it in the beginning. Inasmuch as the chief object of it had been attained by applying the loud pedal when Mr. Harriman was examined, perhaps the President thought it would be expedient to put on the soft pedal in examining the other members of the syndicate. I must say, however, in justice to Mr. Roosevelt, that Professor Ripley has been known, at times, to make wild statements, and this may be one of them. I certainly should not quote it if the two gentlemen named had not recently been in correspondence with regard to this very Alton matter. But if the statement is not true, Mr. Roosevelt has ground for a quarrel, on this point, with Mr. Ripley, not with me. I trust that he will not put the Harvard professor into the class of "undesirable citizens" merely because he told me that, in the Alton case, the Interstate Commerce Commission, while sitting in New York, took its "orders" from Washington.

GEORGE KENNAN.

NEW YORK CITY.

A PLAN FOR A TARIFF COMMISSION

SIR,—I have read with interest and profit the article by Professor F. W. Taussig in the February NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW on "The Proposal for a Tariff Commission." The writer does not go into details as to the way in which this tariff commission should be constituted, but his inclination toward a permanent commission is clearly manifested, and the conclusion which he reaches is that the aim of such commission should be to assist Congress in the intelligent and careful framing of tariff legislation. The question is left open—designedly, I suppose—as to how the commission shall be constituted.

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What would the people of this country say to a permanent tariff commission which should have representatives of the manufacturers of all articles directly affected by the tariff, of transportation of all kinds, of those who till the soil, of financiers, of labor organizations, of university men, of members of the governmental departments which deal with the administration of tariff laws, of editors, publishers, teachers, missionaries and diplomats, and of military and naval officers?

The commission would be large, but it would be representative. Professor Taussig speaks of the permanent commission having an excuse for its continued existence in the frequent changes of the tariff law which it would recommend. I would suggest that more changes be made in the commission, and fewer in the laws; that new blood, representing all lines of activity, be constantly infused into the commission, and that no one be allowed to remain on the commission long enough to feel that he was indispensable to it. A service of sixteen years in the Wisconsin State Senate, during the creation of most of the commissions that have been so much talked about, within and without the State, has led me to think that commissions made up of experts (so-called) are not the best guardians of our liberties. The field of the "expert" investigator is often, if not usually, far removed from that of the legislator or of the governmental administrator.

Professor Taussig assumes that a scientific tariff can hardly be looked for. It will perforce be a series of concessions to expediency and policy. Through such a commission as I have suggested, entire publicity should be attained, and publicity would tend to create an active, intelligent public opinion, which is of vital importance. The commission should have authority to employ any expert needed for any kind of investigation, at home or abroad, that the commission might deem it desirable to make. The facts resulting from such investigations should be carefully preserved and tabulated in such form as to be of general use, and of special value to Congress for expressing, in legislation, the tariff policy of the country.

I am not so much concerned about the non-partisan character of the members of a tariff commission—that is, that the commission should be divided among the political parties of the country—as I am about its representative character. Men in all parties are engaged in almost every kind of business, and they are all out for the same thing. If we can have on this commission men of intelligence and integrity, who are in truth representatives of their various vocations, it is a matter of very little concern to me what particular party title they bear.

I would have this commission serve without pay, but allow their reasonable expense for attendance on their duties. Appropriations for the work of the commission should be generous. The Government should provide the commission with permanent headquarters, but its methods and activities should be unhampered from without. Everything should be done in the broad light of day. It would be a sort of a continuous debate, conducted under the public eye, and never behind closed doors.

I would not have the commission make recommendations to Congress, but would confine them to categorical statements of facts, based upon sufficient evidence to support their statements. An enlightened public opinion would look out for the form of the legislation.

It would be a different kind of a commission from what we have been used to, but less likely, I think, to deteriorate in its personnel, as commissions

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sometimes do, and less inclined to assume dictatorial airs (somewhat characteristic of expert commissions) or to tincture its utterances with any sort of doctrinal finality.

I should expect such a commission, in the course of a few years, to do more toward getting the tariff out of politics than any other kind of commission that could be created. Let it be understood that this commission is created to dig up the facts, and then let Congress, in the presence of the people, face the facts and develop the needful legislation.

It seems to me that Professor Taussig's aim would be realized in a commission whose make-up and functions are as I have described. It would stand for an immediate purpose. It would at least get facts together as soon as possible, calculated to promote the interests of the business represented on the commission, and bring that information to the attention of Congress without unnecessary delay.

I believe the point is well taken by Professor Taussig in his article that any assistance that the commission can render to Congress will be more effective if devoted to a definite, known situation than if conducted along expert lines, abstractly or theoretically.

I have included some unusual elements in this commission, to which I may refer briefly. Transportation of property and intelligence enters so largely into the problems of the manufacturer of today, that it cannot be left out of the account in adjusting tariff duties for manufacturing business conducted over such an extensive territory as the United States.

We are talking about preparedness. Manufactured articles—high explosives and the like—are prime conditions of preparedness. It is important, therefore, that such lines of manufacturing as enter directly into the production of military supplies should be viewed from every standpoint, and especially with reference to our land and naval forces and their operations.

Labor organizations are ever-present in this country, and their demands must be taken into account in adjusting tariffs. Any intelligent investigation of a question relating to the tariff must always give a hearing to the men who are affected by the tariff, and it is possible that labor has not been so much heard in the tariff debates as it should have been.

On the other hand, we have heard so much about special interests, and selfishness, and subordination of the Government to the promotion of private enterprise and schemes, that we have become prejudiced against the captains of industry, for instance, and do ourselves the injustice of depriving ourselves of the means of knowledge which they possess. The men who make steel know more about steel than the men who talk about the steel-makers. The men who export oil products or agricultural implements, or any other article of export trade, presumably know more about the difficulties to be dealt with and the methods to be followed, if success is to be attained, than the others, who hold up their hands in holy horror lest they be contaminated by some plutocratic touch.

I have mentioned also university members, editors, publishers, teachers, diplomats and missionaries, as peculiar agencies of instruction and publicity. They are diffusers of knowledge, and any tariff legislation that is wise for the United States must take into account all the relations of the United States outside, as well as all the economic conditions within the country. If I knew of any better publicity agents than these for the diffusion of intelligence, I would suggest them.

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This commission is not proposed with reference merely to conditions that now exist, while the war goes on in Europe, but to such as may at any time prevail. Professor Taussig's proposal relates to a permanent tariff policy in this country, and it challenges the attention of our best statesmen, regardless of party affiliation.

Of course, I am not oblivious to some objections that will be made to this plan of creating a tariff commission, but I do not think of any objection that is insurmountable.

JOHN M. WHITEHEAD.

P. S. Since writing the above letter, my attention has been called to a kindred thought expressed in Congress by Mr. Hill of Connecticut, in a speech on House bill No. 702, relating to a protective tariff on dye stuffs.

JANESVILLE, WISCONSIN.

WANTED FOR MEXICO: "INTELLIGENCE AND FIRMNESS"

SIR,—The President is going to get our poor soldiers into a trap. You know it is almost impossible to get supplies to our men for more than a few hundred miles in the interior of that part of northern Mexico where Villa is now operating. Carranza won't let us use the railways, so what will our men do if President Wilson keeps up his do-as-little-as-possible plan?

He does not understand the Mexican character or he would not take such awful chances. Whatever he does is done on too small a scale. When our gunboats were at Vera Cruz it would have been a small task to repair railways and reach Mexico City. From there, as we got railways repaired, we could have taken all the other important points, meanwhile putting the Government on a sound financial basis. The capital is the strategic point for attack.

But it will be harder to fight in the mountainous districts than anywhere else. And we have selected one of them (Villa's home district, at that) to send a handful of soldiers into. It is criminal ignorance to proceed in this way. Grant that Carranza were truly loyal to the United States, he cannot prevent his troops from deserting to Villa. With Mexican armies on all sides and the water supplies (springs, lakes, rivers) poisoned, what can our soldiers do if they get far enough from the base of supplies?

It would not be such a task to subdue Mexico and set her on her feet again if we went at it right, but we are going at it all wrong. What good will it do merely to catch Villa? We have got to take hold of the financial end of that Government if we are ever to help the unfortunate masses who need help.

And until we help them back to permanent peace we cannot hope for relief from anarchistic conditions on our border. What else can the starving people of that hapless country be expected to do but murder and rob? We have got to help ourselves by helping them. Our interests are all bound up together. Just having different customs and different colors of skin and different names for our respective countries cannot prevent the great Law of Brotherhood instituted by God from continuing to rule us just the same. And according to that, if we would rise in the scale of civilization ourselves, we have got to help our fellow men to rise with us: both individuals and nations.

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What we need is not "Preparedness" on a gigantic scale, but intelligent and firm use of the forces we already have. All our troops ought to be on the way to Mexico right now and the militia drilling. We shall gain nothing by delay. The Mexican masses are too ignorant to put faith in the United States until after we have controlled their country long enough for them to see that we meant to teach them how to govern it right when we took it over.

Oh, why can't some power bring Mr. Wilson to see the truth about the Mexican character! You cannot rely on them as we do on a white man's word of honor, because their natural instincts make treason the most natural thing on earth. From their point of view, how can a man be fool enough to place consideration higher than his immediate personal interest? Honor doesn't pay, in their estimation.

Please, please, try and help the Administration to bring common sense to bear on this international tangle! The wisest course is always the simplest, bravest, most direct course. Shall we make of this a short, decisive subduing of the lawless element in the entire Mexican nation, with several years of later assistance that will enable them to stand on their own feet; or shall we send our best men in by handfuls to catch a few individual bandits, and have American blood spilled to no purpose but to make ourselves a laughing-stock among nations? We can't help Mexico this way; we are only injuring ourselves.

LAURA ALTHEA HILL.

SAN MARCOS, TEXAS.

CAN WAGE-EARNERS SAVE?

SIR,—In an article, "Capitalism and Social Discontent," by J. Laurence Laughlin, in the March issue of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, the writer asks the question: "Then why is it that in the labor literature of our day, 'Capitalism' is used as a term of reproach or objurgation?"

The answer from the viewpoint of Labor is that capitalism represents a condition of society under which the working classes function only as possessors of powers for the creation of returns upon capital possessed by the capitalist class. A pleasing conclusion reached by the writer was stated in the words: "Betterment cannot be permanently or even sensibly advanced so long as men are merely receivers of wages." But the suggested remedy of extending capitalism so as to give laborers, through their ownership of capital, some of the advantages of capital, is profoundly useless.

Before a wage worker can derive any income above his wages he must possess capital, and to obtain it he must save it out of his wages. Saving is an impossibility because the whole mechanism of the wages system so turns as to make wages equal only to the cost of subsistence. The writer agrees that so long as men are merely receivers of wages no sensible or permanent betterment can take place, but in spite of the conclusions expressed in this statement he proposes in another place that men lift themselves out of their positions by saving! The worker would hardly appreciate such an invitation to create something out of nothing.

It appears from the article itself that so far as economics is concerned, no hope can be held out for the wage worker as such. The writer passes to an entirely different field and speaks of individual qualities, such as

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patience, persistence, foresight, as keys to success as a capitalist One is tempted to ask if it is the capitalist class or the working class who display these qualities in greater abundance? The difference in position is, however, due to much more than these. While the possession of certain characteristics may take individuals out of their class, no change in general class relations is effected—and would not be if all men approached moral perfection.

The mass of wage workers find themselves compelled by iron necessity to work for wages, and from the moment they become employed the production of capital begins. Capital is spoken of in the article as being "saved," but the main point of interest is that it is *created*. Nor is there such a loose relation, or any relation at all, between wages and the price of products as the writer intimates. The price of commodities is governed by the same law which determines wages. The value of commodities is regulated by the labor required for their production. Wages, which represent the price of labor power, are determined in the same way, being equal in value to the value of the commodities for which the worker exchanges his wages for the purpose of keeping himself alive. The value of wages paid is reproduced in the value of the products. And more: an increased value is produced—a value in excess of all values of capital consumed. It is precisely this surplus value which the capitalist appropriates as his own, and out of which he can set a portion aside for purposes of increased production—boasting meanwhile that it represents his "savings." It represents nothing more than a portion of unpaid labor.

To ask the workers to save is useless. They are dispossessed before they even have an opportunity to do so. A more or less clear comprehension of their position leads inevitably to social unrest. The remedy is neither less capitalism nor "more capitalism," but no capitalism at all.

MERVYN SMITH.

BERLIN, ONTARIO.

THE CASE FOR THE WORKING MAN

SIR,—The case for "Capitalism" as presented in the March REVIEW by Professor J. L. Laughlin does not carry conviction with the working man. While agreeing with Professor Laughlin's summary of the good that capital has accomplished, the laborer cannot accept the conclusion that "the true remedy for a healthy 'social discontent' is more capitalism." "The situation," says Professor Laughlin, "is one of the laborer's own creating. The remedy is, in the main, not social but personal." The weight of his argument seems to fall upon three main propositions. They are:

1. The enormous mass of modern industrial capital has come into existence by a personal process of saving.
2. A person who has self-control, patience, persistence, foresight, prudence, and a willingness [to wait], inevitably becomes a possessor of savings and is thus a capitalist.
3. The improvement of the position of the poorer laborer is largely dependent on internal ethical growth and self-control.

The first proposition can hardly be true if we accept the common meaning of the word "saving," that is, being economical. The term is usually applied to the efforts of working people to accumulate a small surplus out of meagre earnings. Much of our industrial capital is being furnished by men of

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wealth, and it is supplied from the excess of income from previous investments. When a competency has already been secured, the decision to re-invest a part of the income would hardly be considered as saving. Professor Laughlin's objection would certainly hold here, that the securing of capital without any personal sacrifice removes the very stimulus to character and virtue which the existing system (Capitalism) should provide.

Wide experience and close observation will certainly show that Professor Laughlin's second premise is untenable. The assumption that the possession of savings *inevitably* follows the exercise of such virtues as foresight, patience and self-control, cannot be admitted in view of the many factors which make the accumulation of savings impossible in the case of the average working man. Among these adverse conditions are (1) an unfavorable situation or environment, (2) physical or financial misfortune, and (3) inadequate income. The first two, being more or less accidental, may be prevented or overcome, but the last affords no hope. Wages may not be increased at the expense of dividends. The average income of workingmen's families in this country is not above $650. Our Government reports indicate that it should be at least $800. It is therefore probable that such families practice sufficient foresight, patience and self control without having "material success set forth as the reward for the exercise of the simplest virtues."

From these somewhat sophistical premises, Professor Laughlin draws the conclusion that "the improvement of the position of the poorer laborer is largely dependent on internal growth and self-control." As to how these shall be achieved, he gives no hint. The drowning laborer clutches in vain for a straw of help. Our present industrial organization does not give favorable opportunities for the development of these mental and spiritual qualities. It is evident that our common schools have not supplied them. They can be attained only under the improved economic and social conditions for which the working people are striving. When Professor Laughlin assures the working man that "the true remedy for a healthy 'social discontent' is more capitalism," he is offering him stones, not bread.

ALBERT LEA MALLERY.

BERTHA, MINN.

LARGE PRINT, ETC.

SIR,—Allow a stranger to congratulate you upon your articles castigating the President.

A learned friend who had considered him a paragon of consistency was no doubt of the opposite opinion after I mailed the number on the President's dealing with Mexico, and your journal gained a subscriber—but the reason for the subscription given in the letter of thanks was "the largeness of the print."

I am sorry that you have to be a thorn in the side of the President, yet you may save us from perdition. Your analysis of his late speeches was very clever, and was like a torpedo hitting his manuscript, or copy of speeches, for apparently they are no more.

THOS. R. EVANS, M. D.

OAKDALE, W. VA.

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

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS NUMBER

"Historicus"
is a distinguished American, well-known personally to the editor of this Review, who has rendered his country many important services.

Sidney Low,
the illustrious Oxonian and barrister of the Inner Temple, is eminent in literature and journalism. He has been literary editor of the *Standard* since 1907, as well as special correspondent overseas. His publications, which are numerous, include *The Governance of England; A Vision of England; Egypt in Transition;* and *The Spirit of the Allied Nations.*

John B. Stanchfield,
a prominent member of the New York Bar and delegate to the Democratic National Convention at Baltimore, was at one time member of the New York State Legislature, and Democratic candidate for Governor in 1900. The high rank he has attained in his profession gives the legal aspect of the present article first importance.

W. H. Mallock,
one of the most noted of contemporary English writers on economic and philosophical subjects, was educated at Oxford. He never adopted any profession, though at one time he was intended for diplomacy. Among his writings are *The New Republic, Is Life Worth Living? The New Paul and Virginia, Studies of Contemporary Superstitions, Social Equality, Aristocracy and Evolution,* etc. In his political and economic writings, Mr. Mallock's main object has been to expose fallacies in Radicalism and Socialism, while his philosophical writings have aimed at showing that science taken by itself can supply no basis for religion.

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James B. Reynolds,
Secretary of the National Republican Committee, was a Member of the Tariff Board from 1909 to 1912, and also Chairman of the Government Commission which visited Great Britain and the Continent in 1907 and 1908 to study trade relations. Mr. Reynolds is specially qualified to consider the advantages and disadvantages of a Tariff Commission.

Lebbeus B. Wilfley
from 1901 to 1906 was Attorney General of the Philippines, and later the first Judge of the United States Court for China. For several years he has been practising law in Mexico City, and is thoroughly familiar with conditions in that country.

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Brander Matthews
is one of the best known of living American authors. He was born in New Orleans in 1852 and studied at Columbia College, where he graduated in 1871. He was admitted to the New York Bar, but he turned from law to literature, to which for many years he has devoted an indefatigable and versatile pen. In 1892 he was appointed Professor of Dramatic Literature in Columbia University.

Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch
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

"NOBODY FOR HUGHES—BUT THE PEOPLE."
—From *The New York Sun.*

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